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require fifteen years to establish the reasonable rate. But long before this result may have been achieved new contingencies may have arisen, and a rate which at first appeared reasonable may be most unreasonable under the changed circumstances. Practically immediate obedience to orders is the only manner in which carriers and shippers can be protected. A delay of some duration, or even of a week, may change the situation enough to make future changes relatively valueless to the complainant. Here, as in so many other cases, we are again confronted by the relentlessness of the third proposition, there exists no power capable of compelling prompt obedience. Promptness," which consumes years and which affects interests based upon short periods of time, is an abuse of the English language. The Cullom Bill provides a remedy: "If after a full hearing it is determined that any party complainant is entitled to an award of damages under the provisions of this Act for a violation of its provisions, the Commission shall make an order directing the carrier to pay to the complainant the sum to which he is entitled on or before a day named. If, after such hearing, it is determined that any carrier is in violation of the provisions of this Act, the Commission shall make an order directing such carrier to cease and desist from such further violation, and shall prescribe in such order the thing which the carrier is required to do or not to do for the future to bring itself into conformity with the provisions of this Act; and in

so doing it shall have power (a) to fix a maximum rate covering the entire cost of the service, (b) to fix both a maximum and minimum rate, or differential in rate, when that may be necessary to prevent discrimination under the third section, (c) to determine the division between carriers of a joint rate and the terms and conditions under which business shall be interchanged when that is necessary to an execution of the provisions of this Act, (d) to make changes in classification, (e) to so amend the rules and regulations under which traffic moves as to bring them into conformity with the provisions of this Act."

The foregoing enumeration of powers shall not exclude any power which the Commission would otherwise have in the making of an order under the provisions of this Act. An order not for the payment of money shall be termed an administrative order. "Every order shall fix the date when it is to take effect, which shall in no case be less than ten and ordinarily not less than thirty days from the service of such an order upon the carrier. Such order shall be forthwith served by mailing to any one of the principal officers or agents of the carrier at his usual place of business a copy of the report and opinion of the Commission, together with a copy of the order, and the registry mail receipt shall be prima facie evidence of the receipt of such order by the carrier in due course of mail."

Perhaps the most important feature of this section is the power which it gives to the Commission

to prescribe what "to do or not to do for the future" in order to bring about a line of action in harmony with the law. What follows are essentially consequences and conditions. Charters and earlier laws took care to prescribe maximum rates, which were frequently placed so ridiculously high that practically no railway manager would ever think of charging them. Minimum rates were rarely prescribed, and differentials never. It is otherwise with the proposed law. The establishment of minimum and differential rates is at present of infinitely greater consequence than the prescription of maximum charges. The power of the Commission in determining divisions of through rates is likely to do away with one of the sources of discriminations.

All legislation rests upon the assumption of a reasonable purpose, and the prevalence of good sense among administrators of the law. Unless one is willing to attribute to the Interstate Commerce Commission the lack of a reasonable purpose, as well as love of fair play and justice, and of ordinary good sense, the opposition to the "ratemaking powers contemplated in the proposed

law is at once unwarranted and fallacious. Nothing but abstract dialecticism and jugglery with "transcendental" words can lead to the unreasonable conclusion that such a power over the rate will vest the Commission with authority to establish the market price of a commodity or service (transportation) in an arbitrary manner, and place the

manufacturers of this commodity in an unfavorable position in the financial control of their properties. If, in the last instance, we must choose between a rate established by a manager, practically unrestricted by law, whose business and duty it is to take the railway point of view, and a rate pronounced reasonable by a body of five capable men whose highest function it is to view impartially the interests of the public and of the railways, there can be no mistake in accepting the judgment of the latter, especially when their judgment is subject to review by the courts and is safeguarded in every way by powers directly vested by the bill in the judiciary.

"Any carrier may, within thirty days from the service of an administrative order upon it, begin, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the district in which its principal operating office is situated, proceedings to review such an order and the findings on which it is based. . . . The court may also, if upon an inspection of the record it plainly appears that the order proceeds upon some error of law or is unjust and unreasonable on the facts, and not otherwise, suspend the operation of the order during the pendency of the proceedings in review, or until further order of the court. Either party may appeal from the judgment or decree of the Circuit Court to the Supreme Court of the United States; but such appeal shall not operate to stay or supersede the order of the Circuit Court nor the execution of any writ or process

thereon. In the Supreme Court the cause shall be given preference over all others, excepting criminal causes."

Especial emphasis should be placed upon the promptness with which a carrier can find a remedy in the courts in case the Commission should make an unjust order. For fifteen years it has taken, on the average, three or four years to get a final decision; and to assert, in the face of that fact, that the proposed law affords no adequate remedy for unreasonable orders of the Commission, sounds very much like the old cry of "stop thief!" Furthermore, the Commission can make no order except after a full and impartial hearing. Having all the facts before it, and having duly weighed the evidence, the Commission may revise a rate fixed by the carriers in the first instance. That the Commission should be incapable of properly comprehending the facts entering into a question of rates, is too preposterous to admit of discussion. And unless we are willing to believe the absurd proposition that both the Commission and the federal courts can together not understand a rate question and decide equitably in the premises, we are compelled to admit that substantial justice will be done under the proposed law to an extent hitherto unknown- justice administered with promptness and efficiency to carriers and shippers alike and to competitive cities, harbors, productive areas, and industries.

In connection with the publication of rates the