WILLIAM H. ARMSTRONG, Appellant, v. LAKE CHAMPLAIN
GRANITE COMPANY, Respondent.

1. GRANITE CONVEYANCE OF MINERAL ORES. Granite is not a mineral ore in either a popular or scientific sense, and does not pass under a conveyance of "mineral ores."

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2. DEED OF MINERALS MEANING OF WORDS STATEMENTS OF PARTIES. The interpretation of the words minerals and ores" in a deed cannot be controlled in an action which is not brought to reform the deed but to determine the rights of the parties under the instrument as written, by testimony of the purpose of the grantees in acquiring the property, or of their statements made contemporaneously with the deed that they had purchased the iron ore on the premises.

3. USAGE MEANING OF WORD 'MINERALS." Evidence of certain persons who lived or had property in the locality in which mineral property was situated, that the word "minerals" in a conveyance of such property was understood about there" to mean iron ores, without proof that any transaction had taken place based upon such usage, or that such usage was known to either of the parties to the conveyance in which the word is used, will not be sufficient to establish a settled and recognized usage which will override the legal meaning of the word.

4. GRANITE CONVEYANCE OF MINERALS. Granite is embraced in a reservation or grant of "minerals" in the absence of any qualification of the meaning of that word; but it will not pass by a grant of "minerals and ores" when these words are connected with a context which clearly indicates that the parties had in view only such minerals as are to be got by mining in the ordinary sense of that term, that is, by underground and not by open workings. Such is the case where a grant is made of "all the minerals and ores with the right to mine and remove the same; also, the right to sink shafts and sufficient surface to erect suitable buildings for machinery and other buildings necessary and usual in mining and raising ores; also, the right of ingress and egress for mining purposes and to make explorations for minerals and ores."

Mem. of decision below, 71 Hun, 614.

(Argued October 24, 1895; decided November 26, 1895.)

APPEAL from judgment of the General Term of the Supreme Court in the third judicial department, entered upon an order made May 9, 1893, which affirmed a judgment in favor of defendant, dismissing the complaint upon the merits,

entered upon a decision of the court on trial at Special Term.

The nature of the action and the facts, so far as material, are stated in the opinion.

Richard L. Hand for appellant. The plaintiff established title to all of the granite on lot No. 27. Minerals and ores may be held by perfect title in fee as distinct from the soil. (Ryckman v. Gillis, 57 N. Y. 68, 73.) The conveyance of "all the minerals and ores" vested in the grantees all granite in the premises. (Dwight v. G. L. Ins. Co., 103 N. Y. 341; Brady v. Cassidy, 104 N. Y. 155; Humphreys v. N. Y., L. E. & W. R. R. Co., 121 N. Y. 435; Serat v. Smith, 61 Hun, 36; Boone on Real Prop. § 6; 4 Wait's Act. & Def. 421; McSweeny on Mines, 12; Bainbridge on Mines, 4; 2 Washb. on Real Prop. [2d ed.] § 5; Rosse v. Wainman, 14 M. & W. 859; Micklethwait v. Winter; 6 Exch. 644; M. R. Co. v. Checkley, L. R. [4 Eq.] 19; Bell v. Wilson, L. R. [1 Ch. App.] 303; Hext v. Gill, L. R. [7 Ch. App.] 699; Tucker v. Linger, L. R. [21 Ch. Div.] 18; Jersey v. Guardians, etc., L. R. [21 Q. B. Div.] 555; M. R. Co. v. Robinson, L. R. [37 Ch. Div.] 386; Provost of Glasgow v. Farie, L. R. [13 App. Cas.] 657; Gesner v. G. Co., 1 James [N. S.], 72; Hartwell v. Camman, 2 Stock. Ch. 128; Gibson v. Tyson, 5 Watts, 34; Caldwell v. Copeland, 37 Penn. St. 427; Thompson v. Noble, 3 Pittsb. 201; Stoughton's Appeal, 88 Penn. St. 198; Dark v. Johnson, 55 Penn. St. 164; Doster v. F. Z. Co., 21 Atl. Rep. 251; Davis v. Wiebbold, 139 U. S. 507; Deffeback v. Hawke, 115 U. S. 392; Copp's U. S. Min. Lands, 50; Moore v. Brown, 139 N. Y. 127; F. N. Bank of Richburg v. Dow, 41 Hun, 13; Marvin v. B. I. Co., 55 N. Y. 538.) The construction of Baldwin's deeds to Bridgford and Randalls, by which the meaning of the words is so limited as to exclude granite, is erroneous and should not be allowed to stand. (Van Nostrand v. Moore, 52 N. Y. 12; Voorhees v. Burchard, 55 N. Y. 98; Genet v. D. & H. C'. Co., 122 N. Y. 505, 520; Jackson v. Tibbetts, 9 Cow. 241,

250; Broom's Leg. Max. 617; Lanyon v. Carne, 2 Saund. 165; House v. Walch, 144 N. Y. 420; Flora v. Anderson, 67 Fed. Rep. 182; Wilson v. Deen, 34 N. Y. 531; Eighmie v. Taylor, 98 N. Y. 288; Long v. M. I. Co., 101 N. Y. 638; Corse v. Peck, 102 N. Y. 513; Drew v. Swift, 46 N. Y. 204; F., etc., Bank v. Logan, 74 N. Y. 568; Armstrong v. Dubois, 90 N. Y. 95; Jackson v. Sill, 11 Johns. 201; Paul v. Lewis, 4 Watts, 402; Harvey v. Vandergrift, 89 Penn. St. 346; Hellner v. Imbrie, 6 Serg. & R. 400; Buck v. Fisher, 4 Whart. 516; Moran v. Prather, 23 Wall. 492; Odine v. N. E. M. Ins. Co., 101 Mass. 551; Brady v. Cassidy, 104 N. Y. 147; Humphreys v. N. Y., L. E. & W. R. R. Co., 121 N. Y. 444; Caldwell v. Fulton, 31 Penn. St. 475; Hartwell v. Camman, 10 N. J. Eq. 128; Atkinson v. Truesdell, 127 N. Y. 230; Bradley v. Wheeler, 44 N. Y. 495; Higgins v. Moore, 34 N. Y. 417; Dickinson v. Poughkeepsie, 75 N. Y. 65; Putman v. Stewart, 97 N. Y. 411; Bedell v. Kennedy, 109 N. Y. 157; Jackson v. Hudson, 3 Johns. 375, 387; Jackson v. Blodgett, 16 Johns. 172; Jackson v, Gardner, 8 Johns. 308; Coleman v. Beach, 97 N. Y. 545; Hathaway v. Power, 6 Hill, 453, 457; L. I. R. R. v. Conklin, 32 Barb. 381, 386; Boone on Real Prop. §§ 6, 304; Clute v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co., 120 N. Y. 272; U. S. R. S. § 2320; Jackson v. Roby, 109 U. S. 440; Jameson v. Kirk, 98 U. S. 453; Erhardt v. Boaro, 113 U. S. 527 ; S. Co. v. Kemp, 104 U. S. 636, 650; Morrison's Min. Rights, 150, 285; Moore v. Brown, 139 N. Y. 127; 1 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 504; 4 Wait's Act. & Def. 421; McSweeny on Mines, 12; Bainbridge Law of Mines & Min. 4; Rosse v. Wainman, 14 M. & W. 859; M. R. Co. v. Robinson, L. R. [37 Ch. Div.] 386; Doster v. F. Z. Co., 21 Atl. Rep. 251; U. S. R. S., chap. 6; F. N. Bank of Richburg v. Dow, 41 Hun, 15; C. Co. v. Mellon, 25 Atl. Rep. 598.) Evidence as to how others understood similar deeds was inadmissible. (Newhall v. Appleton, 124 N. Y. 668.) The defense of champerty has no foundation. (Dawley v. Brown, 79 N. Y. 396; Higinbotham Stoddard, 72 N. Y. 100; Stoddard v. Whiting, 46 N. Y. 634;

Corning v. T., etc., Factory, 39 Barb. 321; Stevens v. Hauser, 39 N. Y. 302; Learned v. Tallmadge, 26 Barb. 454; Moody v. Moody, 16 Hun, 191; Danziger v. Boyd, 120 N. Y. 628; A. B. N. Co., v. N. Y. El. R. R., 129 N. Y. 263; Allen v. Welsh, 18 Hun, 226; Morford v. Davis, 28 N. Y. 481; Milbank v. Jones, 127 N. Y. 370, 376; Porter v. Wormser, 94 N. Y. 431, 450; Honegger v. Wettstein, 94 N. Y. 252; Hamer v. Sidway, 124 N. Y. 548; Wells v. Monihan, 129 N. Y. 164; Erving v. Mayor, etc., 131 N. Y. 133.) The action was properly brought for the injunction prayed for. (W. P. I. Co. v. Reymert, 45 N. Y. 703; A. O. Co. v. B. O. Co., 21 Hun, 26; 86 N. Y. 638; Broiestedt v. S., etc., R. R. Co., 55 N. Y. 220; Livingston v. Reynolds, 26 Wend. 115; Spear v. Cutter, 5 Barb. 486.) An interlocutory decree should have been made, establishing the rights of the plaintiff, enjoining the defendant and directing an accounting by the defendant for the injury already done. (Weatherby v. Wood, 29 How. Pr. 404.)

Chester B. McLaughlin for respondent. All the interest that plaintiff has in lot 27 is that acquired by Bridgford and the Randalls from Baldwin under the deed of March 30 and May 18, 1871, and his claim must be based upon one or the other, or both of those deeds, neither of which transferred any interest in the granite. (15 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 500.) The meaning of the word "minerals," if taken alone, undoubtedly is ambiguous, inasmuch as in its broadest and most comprehensive sense, it includes everything not animal or vegetable, while in the ordinary acceptation or use of the word it has a much more restricted meaning; for this reason parol evidence was admissible to show in what sense the parties to the grant used it. (Coit v. C. Ins. Co., 7 Johns. 385; Astor v. Ins. Co., 7 Cow. 202; Cochran v. Retburgh, 3 Esp. [N. P.] 121; Myers v. Walker, 24 Ill. 133; Fitch v. Carpenter, 43 Barb. 40; Miller v. Stevens, 100 Mass. 318; Smith v. Clews, 114 N. Y. 190; Atkinson v. Truesdell, 127 N. Y. 230; Hartwell v. Camman, 10 N. J. Eq. 120; Walls v. Bailey, 49 N. Y. 470; Silberman v. Clark, 96 N. Y. 524; Coleman v. M.

N. Y. Rep.] Opinion of the Court, per ANDREWS, Ch. J.

B. I. Co., 94 N. Y. 229; French v. Carhart, 1 N. Y. 96; Bridger v. Pierson, 45 N. Y. 601; Green v. Eldred, 66 N. Y. 611; Masten v. Olcott, 101 N. Y. 152; Livingston v. Ten Broeck, 16 Johns. 22; Wyckoff v. Stevenson, 14 Ohio, 134; Collender v. Dinsmore, 55 N. Y. 200; Miles v. Burrows, 127 Mass. 159; Chester v. Luca, 112 Mass. 524.) The word "minerals" does not include common granite, even taken alone, unless it be first found as a fact that it was the intention of the parties that it should be included, and pass by that term. (Dunham v. Kirpatrick, 101 Penn. St. 43; Countess of Listowel v. Gibbings, 9 Ir. C. L. 223; Provost of Glasgow v. Farie, L. R. [13 App. Cas.] 657; Brown v. Chadwick, 7 Ir. C. L. 101; Tucker v. Linger, L. R. [21 Ch. Div.] 18; Darvill v. Roper, 3 Drury, 294; Gibson v. Tyson, 5 Watts, 34; Wood on Nuisances, § 168; Stevens v. Gill, 1 Min. Rep. 576; Stevens v. Williams, 1 Min. Rep. 557, 566, 573; I. S. M. Co. v. Cheeseman, 2 McCrary, 191.) Both the Federal and state statutes on the subject of minerals show that the popular understanding of the word minerals does not include granite. (W. P. R. R. Co. v. United States, 108 U. S. 510; I. S. M. Co. v. Cheeseman, 116 U. S. 529; Laws of 1890, chap. 411; Laws of 1881, chap. 293.) The judgment in the case at bar must be affirmed, for the reason that plaintiff's deed is void, because, at the time he acquired his title, defendant was in the actual possession of the granite on lot 27, claiming it under a title adverse to the grantor. (1 R. S. 825, § 12; Webster v. Van Steenberg, 46 Barb. 211; Towle v. Remsen, 70 N. Y. 303; Christie v. Gage, 71 N. Y. 189; Becker v. Church, 75 N. Y. 562; Eldridge v. Binghamton, 120 N. Y. 309; Terrell v. Wheeler, 13 Civ. Pro. Rep. 178; Colvin v. Baker, 2 Barb. 206; Raynor v. Timerson, 46 Barb. 519; Campbell v. Holt, 115 U. S. 620.)

ANDREWS, Ch. J. This action was brought to restrain the defendants from quarrying granite upon lot 27, Split Rock tract, in Essex county. Both parties claim title to the granite. The plaintiff claims under two deeds from Philip S.