N. Y. Rep.] Opinion of the Court, per PECKHAM, J. and faced the man and asked him if his name was William Armstrong and if he lived at 51 Glen avenue, to which the man answered "Yes," and Armstrong replied, "You don't do it; I am the only man that lives there; I occupy the whole house; you don't live there at all;" and turning to the inspectors, he said: "This man has no right to vote here; he is a repeater." The man voted, nevertheless, on that name, and the real Mr. Armstrong had to swear in his vote. One or two more efforts to repeat were made by others of the defendant's men while he and his companions were in the hallway blocking up the same to a great extent, and exercising a supervision over the whole of their subordinates. Before the completion of that work one of the opposition, named Hayner, came to the hallway and persisted in an attempt to get through it and into the voting room, claiming as much of a right to be there as any of the others. His passage was blocked and obstructed by defendant and his companions, and the result was the expulsion of Hayner, who was immediately followed by defendant and others, all going out into the open air. Here a slight affray took place, the defendant and McGough striking some of the others, among them Hayner, and the latter replying by attempting to strike back, and pulling a sort of wrench, used by stovemounters, from his pocket, he attempted to use, and possibly did use, it upon some of his opponents. The defendant and McGough had pistols in their hands. The crowd became quite thick, surging back and forth and up and down the open street, and during that time McGough and William Ross came together, and the latter was shot by the former and fell at once. Robert Ross, seeing the difficulty, started towards where his brother fell and ran in pursuit of McGough, who was running away, and whom he soon overtook, and just at that time, owing to some stumble or misstep on the part of one or both, McGough and Robert Ross fell, the former under and the latter half covering him. At that time the defendant came towards Robert, and while Robert was in a sitting or bending attitude the defendant walked up behind him, and placing his pistol within two or three feet of the back of Robert's Opinion of the Court, per PECKHAM, J. [Vol. 147. head deliberately fired it into him; the defendant was then, as some of the witnesses testified, seen to walk around in front of Robert and again to fire his pistol at him. McGough, in the meantime, had twisted himself from under Ross, and getting up, proceeded to run away, in which action the defendant then joined. This description of the affray which resulted in the death of Robert Ross is very meagre as compared to that given with great detail by the numerous witnesses called by the prosecution, but enough is given to show the main points. Some fifteen or twenty shots in all were fired by different men. The first ball which was fired by the defendant at Robert Ross penetrated the back part of his head, entered the brain and caused instant death. The autopsy showed this fact. As may be supposed, the account of this affair given by the defendant and his witnesses differs radically from that which has been stated above. The facts claimed by the prosecution were proved by more than twenty different witnesses, and while no two saw the whole transaction in exactly the same light as to every detail, yet they all agreed as to the main facts in regard to the shooting of the deceased, and as to how and in what position relative to the deceased the man stood when the shot was fired. All the witnesses did not recognize the defendant as the man who did the shooting, being too far off to identify him, but about fifteen respectable men saw the occurrence and identified the defendant as the man who did the shooting, and under the circumstances detailed above. The defendant denied in toto the shooting; he denied that he was at the spot at the time the shooting was done, and insisted that at that time he had himself been shot, and was leaning up against a fence too weak to stand alone. In the course of the affray it is true that the defendant was shot and slightly wounded, but no serious effect was produced by it, and he was seen to run from the place as soon as he had done the shooting. The defendant is contradicted in his story not only in its main points by many witnesses, but he was himself guilty of several misstatements as to the occurrence when N. Y. Rep.] Opinion of the Court, per PECKHAM, J. asked about it soon thereafter. He denied having had any pistol, and he denied having done any shooting on the day in question, and it is plain that each denial was false, and in the course of his cross-examination he so conceded. The witnesses which were called for him were the men who were his companions. during the day, and were present at the time of the affray. They appeared in a very unsatisfactory light on cross-examination as to their character and antecedents. One or two of them had served terms in the penitentiary and not one of them seems to have been a steady worker at anything, other than frequenting saloons and passing his time in such pursuits as are usually followed there. While denying the shooting himself, the defendant and his witnesses endeavored to give the impression that the deceased was in reality killed by one Boland. It appears without contradiction or dispute that Boland was one of the Ross party, supporting the same candidates, a member of the same wing of the Republican party and a close friend of the deceased and of his brothers and that he was engaged in a respectable business in Troy. How there could be any possibility of Boland shooting Ross was something calling for an explanation as on its face the proposition was absurd. The explanation was attempted on the part of the defendant by showing one man 15 or 20 feet ahead of Robert Ross and, just before the shooting, running away from Ross, while a few feet in the rear of Ross, who was himself running in pursuit of the fleeing man, was Boland who had a pistol in his hand and while running fired it and Ross immediately fell. This it was urged left room for the explanation that both Ross and Boland were in pursuit of the same man and all three in a line running towards the west, the unknown man ahead, Ross behind and within 15 or 20 feet of him, and Boland very near Ross, but behind him, and that, while thus in pursuit, Boland, in attempting to shoot the foremost man, did through mistake shoot Ross. A great many theory. The well-attested facts are at variance with this course of the wound in the back of the head of Robert also Opinion of the Court, per PECKHAM, J. demonstrates the falsity of the claim [Vol. 147. One of the witnesses for the defendant took the position that there was no mistake about it; that he saw Boland aim his pistol directly at the head of Ross and but a short distance from it, and then deliberately fire at and kill his companion and friend. Such manifest and reckless perjury it is sickening to read. To sum up, here were presented the two different contentions on the part of the prosecution and the defendant. There was no claim or assertion made on the part of the defendant that the killing was done in self-defense or in the heat of passion or to aid a companion of the defendant. His version of the occurrence precluded any defense of that nature, for he denied that he shot the deceased at all and asserted that the whole. evidence of the People as to the affray, so far as he was concerned, was a deliberate falsehood or at any rate a mistake. The issue thus formed was presented to the jury in a fair charge by the learned trial judge, to which no exception was taken and the jury have found the defendant guilty as indicted. We are now asked to set that verdict aside upon the merits and to grant a new trial because justice requires it. We cannot do it. We are entirely satisfied that the jury have arrived at a just conclusion, although if we had a rational doubt on that subject, there being at the least a conflict in the evidence from which different inferences might be drawn, we should not feel at liberty to reverse the finding of the jury where such finding is not clearly against the weight of evidence and does not appear to have been influenced by any improper considerations. (People v. Taylor, 138 N. Y. 398.) Fifth. The counsel for the defendant challenge the correctness of the rulings of the trial court in admitting evidence of the repeating in the presence and under the supervision and direction of defendant at the different polls as stated in the point last discussed. Proper exceptions were taken to the decisions of the court in that regard and the question has been argued before us at great length. The objection taken is that the evidence was immaterial and had no proper or legitimate bearing upon the issues joined for trial, and that it N. Y. Rep.] Opinion of the Court, per PECKHAM, J. simply tended to show the defendant guilty of some other, separate and different crime from that for which he was indicted and then on trial and to greatly prejudice him in his defense. The impropriety of giving evidence showing that the accused had been guilty of other crimes merely for the purpose of thereby inferring his guilt of the crime for which he is on trial may be said to have been assumed and consistently maintained by the English courts ever since the common law has itself been in existence. Two antagonistic methods for the judicial investigation of crime and the conduct of criminal trials have existed for many years. One of these methods favors this kind of evidence in order that the tribunal which is engaged in the trial of the accused may have the benefit of the light to be derived from a record of his whole past life, his tendencies, his nature, his associates, his practices, and, in fine, all the facts which go to make up the life of a human being. This is the method which is pursued in France, and it is claimed that entire justice is more apt to be done where such course is pursued than where it is omitted. The common law of England, however, has adopted another and, so far as the party accused is concerned, a much more merciful doctrine. By that law the criminal is to be presumed innocent until his guilt is made to appear, beyond a reasonable doubt, to a jury of 12 men. In order to prove his guilt it is not permitted to show his former character or to prove his guilt of other crimes, merely for the purpose of raising a presumption that he who would commit them would be more apt to commit the crime in question. In People v. Sharp (107 N. Y. 427) the doctrine is dwelt upon and the cases upon the subject collected. Evidence, however, which is relevant to the issue by tending, for example, directly to explain or characterize the act which is in question on a criminal trial has never been held incompetent or inadmissible because it also tended to, or did, prove the accused guilty of another crime. We think the evidence in question comes under this latter rule. It was received by the learned trial judge upon the question of the |