decline. M. de Tocqueville does not himself point out, with much precision, the sources of the supposed danger; he even admits that experience has dissipated many vague apprehensions upon this subject, and has increased the general confidence in the stability of the Union. Where then is the cause for distrust? M. de Tocqueville speaks rather loosely of the multiplication of the States, which would be sufficient, he thinks, to break the federal bond, and of the tendency of circumstances to diminish rather than increase the power of the General Government, which he appears to suppose would operate in the same way. We will advert, for a moment, to both these points.

The multiplication of the States and the extension of the territory of the Union, far from having any tendency to break the federal bond, have always appeared to us to be among the causes that have operated, and were likely to operate, most favorably upon its continuance. The great danger to be apprehended in democratic States is the effect of sudden impulses resulting from merely accidental causes, such, for example, as the influence of a popular individual. The frame-work of a government, which supposes the sovereignty of the popular will, gives way, at once, when that will is concentrated in a single individual, and before there is time to recover from a temporary delusion the liberty of the State is lost. In this way Cæsar, Cromwell, Napoleon, and so many others in all ages, have effected revolutions in States, which consisted virtually of single cities. In an extended territory, and especially in a Union of different States this danger is completely neutralized. There is the same opportunity for sudden impulses, and for individual influence, but their effects are confined to the

points where they immediately operate. The vast field upon which the general political action is conducted, affords no scope for personal, local, or sectional influences to obtain the ascendency so as to modify the principles of the government. One trifling aberration neutralizes another, and the general result is conformable to the laws of the system, and favorable, of course, to its continuance. Thus in a widely extended Republic the great elemental powers of time and space are enlisted in favor of the existing state of things, and to a certain extent, guaranty its perpetuity. If our country were a single consolidated State there might be more plausibility in the objection, although experience is, after all, far from showing that large States, under whatever form administered, have been less durable than small ones. But, considered as a union of States, there can be no doubt, we think, that the system acquires strength by every extension, as the great Indian banyan tree roots itself more firmly in the ground by every new perpendicular shoot which descends from its branches. We see no reason, other than the merely material inconvenience of assembling representatives

from so great a distance, why the Union may not cross the Rocky Mountains with as much facility as it has done the Alleghanies, and spread itself from the Arctic Sea to the Gulf of Mexico with as much safety as it did of old from Maine to Georgia.

The apprehension of weakness in the federal bond resulting from a supposed tendency in the progress of events, to diminish the attributions of the Federal Government is, in our view, not less groundless than the one just adverted to. There may have been, as M. de Tocqueville supposes, a growing disposition to contest the power of the General Government upon certain points, particularly that of making internal improvements, and a willingness in the administration of the Federal Government to yield, in this respect, to what may have appeared to be the public opinion. We rejoice at this tendency of events to restrain the central action of our system and to diffuse the functions of government as widely as possible among the local sovereignties of the States. But the powers so contested might be given to or taken from the government without affecting its ability to sustain itself against any danger from within or without to which it is exposed. The purse and the sword are the essential elements of power, and they belong, by universal admission, to the Federal Government. There is nothing in the Constitution to prevent the Federal Government from declaring war against any nation on the globe, at any session of Congress, raising a million of men to carry it on with, and borrowing a hundred millions of dollars to pay the expenses. All these gigantic operations are within the admitted, uncontested attributions of the Union. Whether, in addition to these substantial and masculine powers, the Union do or do not possess those of laying out a road, chartering a bank, or founding an university, are practical questions of great importance, but having little or no effect upon the ability of the Government to sustain itself against attack or perpetuate its existence. The Federal Government possesses, in fact, for the purposes for which it is constituted, all the strength that can possibly belong to any government. If it has appeared, at times, to sustain itself against attacks from at home or abroad with less vigor than governments of a different kind might, perhaps, have done, it has not been for want of constitutional authority, but because the agents who administer it are appointed in a different way, and, being subject to the variable impulses, of the popular will, are less likely than they would be under other circumstances, to exercise their powers in the same bold, unflinching spirit in which they were given. There has been however, of late, no apparent tendency in the federal authorities to shrink from responsibility; on the contrary, the last President, by the freedom and firmness with which he used his legislative veto, and asserted his right to act upon the Constitution, as he understood it,

developed the energies of the government in a point where they had been previously dormant, and thus left it more efficient than he found it. M. de Tocqueville notices this feature in the adminis tration of General Jackson, without appearing to remark that it is rather at variance with his theory of a constantly increasing weakness in the Federal Government. The popular complaint, for some years past, has been, as is well known, of a directly opposite character. It has pointed to federal usurpation, rather than imbecility in the federal authorities, as the crying evil of the times. This clamor has, probably, very little foundation, but may serve, at least, to show that there is no important error on the other side.

The Union, therefore, we repeat, is not, in our view, exposed to any danger, either present or future. There is no general cause in operation, of which we are aware, that has any powerful tendency to relax its bonds, while on the other hand, the rapid settlement of the country, the increase of population, and the improvements in the communications between the different States, are constantly bringing them into closer connexion, and thus strengthening, in the most unexceptionable, and, indeed, the only effectual way, the ties that unite them together. We are satisfied that the loss of the Union would carry with it the loss of all our national advantages; and we are also satisfied that it is the natural form of the existence of the States; that it is beyond the reach of accident or of the perversity of any individual, State, or even generation of the citizens which might attempt to destroy it; that it must and will endure, through the whole period, whether long or short, of our national being, and can only perish by the decay and ruin of the members that compose it.

With these remarks, we close our notice of this valuable work. The importance which we attach to it has been sufficiently shown by the space which we have devoted to it, as well as by the unequivocal commendation which we have given to its general character. We recommend it, in conclusion, as a valuable study to the young inquirer for political truth, and a most interesting and useful contribution to the library of the general reader. We anticipate much gratification from the further publications which are already announced from the same source, and assure them, in advance, friendly welcome in our pages.

Full well he knew the Syren's voice,

Oft heard in former hours,

In Malmaison's sequestered shades,
Compeigne's enchanting bowers.

But now those once bewildering tones
Have lost their magic power,
Nor can the memory of the past
Illume that fearful hour.

In vain St. Bernard's towering steep
Is brought before his eyes;
In vain the Egyptian pyramids
In silent grandeur rise.

Nor charms Marengo's battle-field

With all its proud array,
The martial pomp and chivalry

Of that victorious day.

Where round him far as eye could reach,

Rolled on a living sea,

Dependent on his word alone

To guide its destiny.

What sounds are these, which rend the air,
Midst thundering cannon's roar?-
The Conqueror, decked in royal robes,
Is hailed the Emperor. '

Away, away, earth's pageantry,

Her brightest gems are dim,

And glittering wealth, and power, and fame, How worthless now to him!

Though fortune in capricious hour
Unlocked her boundless store,

Yet with the Macedonian chief
He could have wept for more.

What did this universe contain
That he might not enjoy ?—
Yet in contentment far behind

The humblest shepherd boy.