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Salta, where he was soon afterwards followed by Bel. grano, and compelled to surrender with his whole army, to the number of two thousand men. The smothered flames of the revolution again burst forth, and Goyneche found himself under the necessity of retreating towards the north, The provinces of Po. tosi, Cbarcas, Chayanta, and Cochabamba, once more fell into the hands of the patriots. Belgrano, how. ever, confiding in the good faith of the enemy, generously set the captured army free, on their taking an oath not to serve during the war; but they had no sooner joined Goyneche, than they were ordered to take the field, in violation of the obligation they had entered into. In consequence of this, the royalists, now under the command of Pezuela, attacked Belgrano at Vilcapugio, in the north of Peru, and after a desperate action, the latter was worsted and compelled to retreat to Ayuma, where he was again attacked towards the close of November, 1813, and completely defeated; but the dispatch of Pezuela, bestowed the highest praise on his conduct. In consequence of the yictory, Pezuela was enabled to take possession once more of the principal cities of alto Peru, as low down as Salta and Tarija; and Belgrano, who had been rendered unpopular by his misfortunes, was recalled.
General Rondeau was despatched with reinforcements, to make head against the royalists; and after rapidly organizing an army at Tucuman, he advanced to meet Pezuela. . The patriot general was seconded at this time, by the revolution wbich broke out in the provinces of lower Peru, in the neighborhood of Cusco, and which spread into several of the provin
more than maintain its ground. The Spaniards are in possession of the principal cities, and the country is, partially, under their influence, but very far from being subdued. There are numerous parties of guerillas, through the provinces of Cochabamba, Char. cas, and La Paz, under Padilla, Warnes, and others. In the minds of the people, there can be little doubt that the cause of independence is daily gaining ground, and the Spaniards can only be considered masters of what they can directly control with their military force. During the important movements in the direction of Chili, it became necessary to use great caution in the management of the war in Peru; it would perhaps have been a wiser course to have pursued, from the commencement, more of the Fabian policy, and not to hazard so much on the result of a battle. The probability is, that they are now preparing to strike a decisive blow. The present army has been continually improving in discipline, as well as increasing in numbers. There is no doubt, that its approach will be hailed by the people of Peru, with greater joy than ever.
It has been asked, why have pot arms been put into the hands of the numerous Indian peasantry, to enable them to terminate the war at once? The inci. dents already related, furnish a sufficient answer to the question. It might have been asked, with much more propriety, why were not arms put into the hands of every male citizen above fifteen years of age, during our revolutionary struggle, or into the hands of the American people during the late war? The truth is,, but a small proportion of the population of a country can be kept embodied, and entirely withdrawa
from their ordinary occupations; a mere unorganised multitude, is of very little importance when opposed to regular armies; an enemy, it is true, may be greatly annoyed by guerillas, but these can only act with any ultimate effect, in conjunction with a regular army. It appears to have been the continual complaint of general Washington, that the term of service for which the militia were called out, was too short; and even then, it was difficult to keep them together. During the late southern war, General Jackson was, at one time, almost abandoned by the Tennessee militia, al. through there could be no doubt as to their bravery or devotion to the cause. This loose and silly talk of putting muskets into the hands of the Peruvians, even admitting that the patriots bad a sufficient supply for the
purpose, shows but a shallow knowledge of human nature, or of the composition of armies; and is only to be equalled by the lowness and vulgarity of attempt. ing to cast suspicion, by insinuations of this nature, against the brave chieftains who are now contending with the Spanish power in Peru.
I have thus given a very rapid, perhaps very meagre outline of the interesting war carried on in the provinces of alto Peru. It is, in fact, replete with incident that would furnish materials for history, of a6 bigh a character as that of any other country. The part taken by the United Provinces in this chequered contest, cannot fail to create a high opinion of their resources, and of the abilities of their leading men; that under the various circumstances in which they have been placed—their war with the Spaniards at Monte Video, and afterwards with Artigas, and then
with the Spaniards in Chili; they have been able to keep their enemies in check in Peru, entitles them to the esteem of the brave, and the admiration of the world.
MILITARY FORCEPUBLIC REVENUES-COMMERCE-STATE OF
LEARNING AND GENERAL INFORMATION.,
The forces of the republic, are distributed into four divisions, or armies, which are kept on foot in different and distant parts of this immense territory: the first, is the army of the centre; so called, from its head quarters being in the capital; the second, is the auxiliary army of Peru; the third, the army of the Andes; and the fourth, the auxiliary army of the Entre Rios. There are, also, qther corps under separate commands.
The table delivered by the government of Buenos Ayres, and accompanying the report of Mr. Rodney, exhibits all the details of their organization, in a very neat and comprehensive manner. The peculiarities, if they be such, in this organization, will be seen on casting the eye over the table before mentioned. For instance, it will be seen, that there are no major-generals, and but eight brigadiers, in all four of their armies; there being a grade of officers denominated colonel-majors; which nearly corresponds with our