-with this, in the present instance, unimportant distinction, that the Lords are a step above the Commons in rank the King a step above the Lords. The lower house represents the commercial and landed interest— the upper also represents the latter, with no small share of the monied class. The King embraces both, and has a check upon both. Precisely such is the foundation of our checks of different departments. It could not be otherwise, for it is the simplest-the least disorganizing-the most efficient. There is one difference, however, which republicanism has introduced into our form. The veto of our Chief Magistrate dif fers from that of the British throne, inasmuch as it is not absolute, not final-it is conditional. There is no sound reason, then, for saying, that, since the British Constitution has provided for different classes by mutu al checks upon each other, our Constitution should secure different geographical interests by a more extensive veto.

By Mr. Calhoun's theory, this declaration of the Confederates in General Congress assembled, is neither a new grant of power to Congress—nor an amendment, nor a legislative act in any particular. It is simply an expression of opinion—the renewal of a grant already made--or a refusal of a power never delegated. In other words, the Convention is organized into a Court of Justice-a judicia! tribunal-not to amend-alterremodel-or abrogate the Constitution: but to pass senlence upon a law of Congress. For our own part, we cannot see the difference between a settlement of the Charter by three fourths of a Convention and an amendment. To one party it must partake estentially of that character. South Carolina believes the Tariff law unconstitutional;-if a Convention decides otherwise, it is surely an amendment, as far as she is concerned. If the decision is in our favor, it is precisely the same in relation to our opponents. To this complexion it must come at last"-to construe a law, ad libitum, is

by the position of the advocates of the veto on another occasion, fully equivalent to the power to make or amend.

If we are not mistaken in our interpretation of what the advocates of the Veto term the settlement of the Charter," it will be a very easy matter to demonstrate its inconsistency with the letter of the Constitution.It is admitted by Mr. Calhoun, and indeed by every partizan on that side, though they differ among thenselves in other particulars, that the object-the sole end and aim of Nullification is, to force Congress to submit the law in question to a General Convention, which shall either formally cede the disputed power, by a vote of three fourths, or deny it by a vote of more than one fourth. We pass by the inconsistency developed in the difference between the vote necessary to give, and that required to deny the power. This ground has been already occupied-nor have we ever seen a plausible rejoinder. But, to the point in hand. If to declare to pronounce valid-to "settle"-be virtually to amend-then is the assumption on the part of a single State to force such an amendment palpably unconstitutional. There are two (and only two) modes provided by the Constitution to amend, revise, and abrogate that instrument (Art. V. Sec. I.)-whenever two thirds of both houses shall deem it necessary, or upon application of two thirds of the State Legislatures." This is the only legal mode-the power so far from being given to a single State, is expressly denied. Now, if South-Carolina, by her Legislature or Convention, usurps this power, she violates the Constitution -she resists the Government of her own adoption-shc places herself in an attitude of war, and is at once without the pale and protection of the Union.-Again, if there is no such express prerogative given to a State, -if, on the contrary, it is expressly denied, can it be found among the reserved rights? Can it be supported by implication, construction, or what the nullifiers call

the "eature of things" and the "character of our Ge vernment?" No one, more deeply feels, or more sensibly deplores than ourselves, the fallen condition of of this once "glorious little State." No one more heartily desires her a safe cgress from her pressures-no one more sincerely loves peaceable and constitutional remedies, and no one, we are pleased to believe, would be more willing to apply them. Could we think the veto safe, peaceable and constitutional, we would unite heart and hand with our opponents. But, stubborn conviction forces us to reject the proposed remedy, (if that may be called a remedy, which rids us of life?) and we cannot but believe, but, that, in order to get rid of a vexatious (and we hope temporary) evil, the advocates of the new system violate the very instrument which they profess to desire to restore to its original import and purity.

The ostensible end and aim of the veto is to compel Congress to keep within, what, in the opinion of the Nullifying State, is its legitimate sphere; by submitting to the joint employers a doubtful act of the common agent, not for purposes of amendment, but simply to obtain an expression of opinion. Now we would enquire, by what clause of the Constitution a state is invested with the power to call a General Convention not to alter or to abrogate, but to pass a judicial opinion upon a legislative act? We have searched for it in vain nor can we admit of it by implication, construction, or what the Nullifiers term the "nature of things." If a State can decide upon the constitutionality of an act of Congress, either absolutely, or by requiring, against its construction, a vote equal to that which called the Constitution into existence, then is the Judiciary virtually abolished, and its powers transferred to each and every State. The Constitution has, in the most unequivocal language, appointed the Supreme Court the tribunal of constitutional appeal--making it independent, but in other respects feeble,strong in its

own sphere, but powerless out of it-in order that it might be safely interposed as a check upon the other departments We do not say or believe that this body is perfectly profound in theory, and admirable in its practical operation. The assertion would imply, that its creators were not men, and that itself is more than human. We believe certain of the objections of the Vice President to be well founded, and, to a certain extent, conclusive. But these relate to inherent defects of the Constitution, which can be remedied only by an amendment. We believe that the concession of this power to the Supreme Court is perfectly consistent with the admission, that the power may not always have been rightly exercised, and may require re-consideration and re-adjustment. At one period of our History, the Bench descended from its high and responsible functions to become a school of intemperate party harangues. But power must be trusted somewhere, and all human trusts are obnoxious to abuse-still, if the People have the corrective in their own hands, there is no reasonable ground of complaint. Reasoning from abuses is decidedly the least philosophical and satisfactory mode that can be adopted and under such an habit, we would reject all Government, because misrule sometimes triumphs: all Law, because villainy still stalks abroad without punishment: all Medicine, because disease sometimes baffles its efforts. The Judiciary, whatever may be the errors in its organization, though the weakest department of our government, has ever been esteemed the strongest against the encroachments of the Legislature: and when any change is to take place in its stricture and capacity, we may well pause, before we prefer the ardor, intemperance, and the, necessarily, tumultuous character of an excited State Convention, to the cool, dispassionate, reasoning habits of a learned, dignified and temperate Bench.

"How the States are to exercise this high power of interposition which constitutes so essential a portion of their re

served rights that it cannot be delegated without an entire surrender of their sovereignty, and converting our system from a federal into a consolidated government, is a question that the States only are competent to determine."

Mr. Calhoun here bases the right of State interposition by veto upon the reserved sovereignty of the States. His position is, that the confederates of the league, originally free, sovereign and independent, have not yielded to Congress the power in question, or the right to assume it by implication or construction. The States, and each State severally, retain this power by virtue of their reserved sovereignty. Now, it so happens, that of the twenty-four confederates which at present compose the Union, eleven were never sovereign States, and, of course cannot claim this right of interposition. Here are the two horns of a dilemma; choose either, and the case is the same. If one State possesses this right of veto, it must, by the provisions of the Constitution, be common to all. The right is claimed by virtue of powers appertaining to a sovereign community, which have never been ceded to the common agent; but this ægis of sovereignty throws its protection over the thirteen original parties alone; and yet we live under a government of equal privileges, and under a Constitution which expressly provides, that no preference shall be given to one State over another! To the scheme of our opponeats, this objection, from their own shewing, appears fatal; and a solution of the difficulty, if possible, would not a little enlighten our understandings.

"Should the General Government, and a State cɔme into conflict, we have a high remedy; the power which called the General Government into existence, which gave it all of its authority, and can enlarge, contract, or abolish its powers at its pleasure, may be invoked. The States themselves may be appealed to, three fourths of which, in fact, form a power, whose decrees are the Constitution itself, and whose voice can silence all discontent. The utmost extent then of the power is, that a State acting in its sovereign capacity, as one of the parties to the constitutional compact, may compel