the Government, created by that compact, to submit a ques tion touching its infraction, to the parties who created it; to avoid the supposed dangers of which, it is proposed to resort to the novel, the hazardous, and I must add, fatal project of giving to the General Government the sole and final right of interpreting the Constitution, thereby reversing the whole system, making that instrument the creature of its will; instead of a rule of action impressed on it at its creation, and annihilating in fact the authority which imposed it, and from which the government itself derives its existence."

We cannot find the clause in the Constitution, which authorizes Congress to call a Convention for any other purposes, than to alter, amend, or abrogate the Charter. The State interposition, be it remembered, only forces a construction from the assembled confederates. We are also at a loss to understand the force of the analogy which gives the power of construing exclusively to three-fourths, because three-fourths are requisite to amend. Why not insist, because the Constitution was unanimously adopted, that it should be unanimously expounded? The analogy appears equally obvious and conclusive. The error appears to be in imagining, that there is a peaceable and universal remedy for all governmental obliquities:-a political panacea for every abuse of power. It is beyond human ingenuity to contrive such a system, as long as man is constituted with his present passions. Power must be confided somewhere, and will sometimes be overstepped. We have provided every safeguard for its just administration, in the responsibility of our National Senators and Representatives to the people:-in the liability of federal officers to impeachment: and in the independence of U. States influence in the appointment of State functionaries. But after all these precautions, the Constitution is a compact to be expounded by its text and spirit-by the facts of the case, and the provisions for expounding it-which provisions none of the parties can constitutionally reject. The instrument provides that the laws of the United States shall be the supreme law of

the land, and that the judges in every State shall be bound thereby: any thing in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.* 'The Charter also ordains, that the judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity under this Constitution, &c. This is the law of the Constitution-the arrangement of power and adjustment of interests may be faulty-may be dangerous:-but that such is the scheme of our government, the language used is too explicit to admit of a doubt. But we can entrust this point in abler hands, and we gladly avail ourselves of superior intellect and experience. Mr. Madison, in relation to the tribunal of dernier resort, holds the following language:

"It is true, that in controversies relating to the boundary between the two jurisdictions, the tribunal which is ultimately to decide, is to be established under the General Government. But this does not change the principle of the case. The decision is to be impartially made according to the rules of the Constitution; and all the usual and most effectual precautions are taken to secure this impartiality. Some such tribunal is clearly essential to prevent an appeal to the sword and a dissolution of the compact; and that it ought to be established under the General, rather than the Local Governments; or to speak more properly, that it could be safely established under the first alone, is a position not likely to be combated."

If the State does not possess this right of forcible appeal, the exposition infers, that Congress is the final judge of its own powers, and that ours is virtually a consolidated government. We have already shewn, that the Constitution provides another tribunal to settle the question which the veto would provoke, viz: "has Congress this power?" But independent of this, the States, as well as Congress, possess their own mode of appeal. If the one is satisfied of the legality of the · act, and declines submitting it to the emendatory tribuConstitution, U. S. Sec. 4, Art. VI. 2. +Ibid, Art. 8, Sec. 2.

nal, what ground of complaint have the other? Congress is satisfied: Let those who are dissatisfied, exercise their Constitutional prerogative.* Let the State draw up its view of the unconstitutionality of the act-let it apply to the Legislatures of the other States for their opinion--let it respectfully, but firmly remonstrate against the act, and obtain a decision as the Constitution points out. If this fails to assemble the confederates, it ought to convince the appellate State, that the call of a Couvention would not alter the case: but that the tribunal thus referred to, would infallibly reject our claim. If, after this application of the Constitutional provision, the people deem the evil too great for acquiescence, they need not unconditionally and absolutely secede. Let them assemble in their majesty-let them take their vital interests in their own hands-let them make a final appeal-let them solemnly adjure the government of their own choice. to pause, or incur the mournful alternative of blotting out one bright star from our political firmament-of effacing one stripe from our National flag. Let the question be respectfully but firmly put-renounce the

*This view of the writer has been followed up, more in detail, by the Reviewer, to whose paper on the topic in question, comprised in the North American, we have already referred. It will be seen by the brief passage which we subjoin, how nearly the two writem coincide in their separate consideration of the point. The Reviewer says: "It would therefore be the duty of the discontented State, instead of proceeding to nullify and throwing upon the General Government the responsibility of bringing the subject before the other States, to begin by addressing herself directly to the other States in the way of consultation. But in what form is this to be done? The Vice President tells us that the subject must be brought before the States "in the only form in which, according to the Constitution it can be, by a proposition to amend in the manner prescribed by that instrument But how does it ap pear, that this is the only or the proper form in which the business can be done? The object is to ascertain the meaning of the Constitution. Why resort for this purpose, to a process intended for a totally different one, and, as we have seen, wholly unsuitable and ineffectual for this? Suppose that all the insuperable prelimшary objections to which we have adverted are overcome; that the General Government has applied for a graut of the disputed power, and that the States, as the Vice President would of course desire, have refused the application;-how would the case then stand? Precisely as it does now. The question would still be, what is the meaning of the Constitution

as it is?""

Tariff-not so much as an evil in itself, as implying the existence of a right to impose other and greater evils or renounce the Union? We do not believe, that the present or prospective state of affairs would warrant such a dreadful alternative, but let not the party, of which we are, it is true, but an inefficient member, be taunted as remediless.* We claim every right which the Constitution provides, and are ready, when occasion demands, to apply those rights which are above all Constitutions, the right to fight"-the right to resist oppression-the right to appeal from man to God.

"As strongly as I am impressed with the great dissimilari ty, and, I must add, as truth compels me to do, contrariety of interests in our country, resulting from the causes already indicated, and which are so great, that they cannot be subjected to the unchecked will of a majority of the whole, without defeating the great end of government (and without which it is a curse:) yet I see in the Union, as ordained in the Constitution, the means, &c. &c."

In this passage, which substantially embraces the whole theory, containing the fact-predicate, (discordant interests, in the Confederacy) and the inference deduced (the danger of legislation by a mere majority) Mr. Calhoun has only thrown the weight of his authority into the scale, and we are content to settle the question by this rule. We think we shall be able to throw into our scale, sanction at least as high as Mr. Calhoun's; (by no means an easy task;) and to refute, by the most unequivocal opinions of two of the patriarchs of our country, each of the positions upon which his doctrines are founded. Our quotations are from Presidents Washington and Jefferson, and are so singularly appropriate, that they appear to have been penned for the express purpose of answering the embryo theory of Mr. Calhoun. If the question before us was, what is the best government? and, not, what actually is the government under which we live? we might alter our The Union Party of South Carolina is here referred to

position, and adopt a different system of defence. But, as the question stands, our extracts conclusively shew, that both of Mr. Calhoun's positions-the fact-predicate and the conclusion-were repudiated by our earliest and ablest statesmen, and formed no part of the government under which they lived. Upon Mr. Calhoun's first principle ("geographical distinctions") President Washington holds the following Language : "THE UNITY OF GOVERNMENTS, which constitutes you one people, is also now dear to you. It is justly so: With slight shades of difference, you have the same religion, manners, habits, and political principles. "These considerations speak the most persuasive language to every reflecting and virtuous mind, and exhibit the continuance of the Union as a primary object of patriotic desire. Is there a doubt, whether a common government can embrace so large a sphere? Let experience solve it. To listen to mere speculation, in

such a case were criminal.”

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These sentiments, though mildy, are emphatically expressed. But the venerable father whose language they are, does not stop here. "In contemplating," says he, "the causes which disturb our Union, it occurs, as a matter of serious concern, that any ground should have been furnished for characterizing parties by geographical discriminations-Northern and SouthernAtlantic and Western; whence designing men may endeavour to excite a belief that there is a real difference of local interests and views. One of the expedients of party to acquire influence within particular districts, is to misrepresent the opinions and aims of other districts. You cannot shield yourselves too much against the jealousies and heart burning which spring from these misrepresentations; they tend to render alien to each other those who ought to be bound together by fraternal affection."

Could any thing be more calculated than the passage above italicised to apply to the present condition of