restrictions imposed by the Constitution, and confined to subjects in which every portion of the community have a similar interest: but it is a great error to suppose as many do, that the right of a majority to govern is a natural and not a conventional right.”

The principle here entertained and expressed---denying, in fact, in the teeth of its estimated value, the right of the majority to govern the minority, forms the leading, and indeed, the essential feature in the theory of Nullification. We have already shown, in another place, and in the language of Mr. Jefferson, that, "absolute acquiescence in the decisions of the majority". constitutes the main pillar of Republicanism, and is, in fact, a natural, and not a conventional right. This latter distinction, however, is of no practical importance. The doctrine in its real and important bearings inevitably leads to aristocratic influence, and is nearly, if not entirely as objectionable as the avowed principle of the elder Adams, "that aristocracy is natural, and therefore unavoidable." We do not here intend, that Mr. Ca!houn's ostensible motive only appears, while the real lies concealed in his own breast. Nor do we mean, that he countenances the absurdity, into which Mr. Adams fell, of believing that "nature creates Kings and aristocracies." But we contend, that in its practical operation his theory leads to the same results. Whatever detracts from the rightful prerogative of the majority, to increase thereby the influence of the minority, is of aristocratic tendency. A pure aristocracy is nothing more than the rule of a minority; a mixed aristocracy is giving that minority undue and dangerous powers. We will, for the present, content ourselves with controverting Mr. Adams' proposition-incidentally noticing that of the Vice-President of necessity, from the similar tendency of the two---but reserving our objections in extenso to the latter for another occasion. "Whether the human mind is able to circumsc ribe its own powers, is a question between the two

modern political parties. One (of which Mr. Adams was a disciple) asserts, that a man can ascertain his own moral capacity-deducing consequences from this pos tulate and erecting thercon systems of government. Right (say they)—because natural. The other, observing that those who affirm the doctrine, have never been able to agree upon this natural form of Government, and that human nature has been perpetually escaping from all forms, considers government as susceptible of unascertained modification and improvement, from moral causes. To illustrate the question, let us confront Mr. Adams' opinion, "that aristocracy is natural, and therefore, unavoidable," with one that it is arti ficial or factitious, and therefore evitable." He seems to use the term “natural” to convey an idea distinct from moral, by coupling it with the idea of fatality. But moral causes, being susceptible of human modification, events flowing from them possess the quality of freedom or evitation. As the moral efforts, by which ig norance or knowledge are produced, are subjects themselves of election, so ignorance and knowledge, the effect of these moral efforts, are also subjects of election; and ignorance and knowledge are powerful moral causes. If, therefore, by the term "natural," Mr. Adams intended to include moral, the idea of fatality is inaccurately coupled with it: and if he resigns this idea, the infallibility of his system, as being "natural" must also be resigned. That he must resign his political predestination and all its consequences, we shall attempt to prove, by shewing, that aristocracies, both ancient and modern, have been variable and artificial,that they have all proceeded from moral, not from natural causes; and that they are evitable and not inevitable.

An opinion that nature makes kings or nobles" has been the creed of political fatalists from the commencement of the world:-and confronts its rival creed "that liberty and slavery are regulated by political law."

However lightly Mr. Adams may speak of Filmer (Mr. Calhoun would doubtless do the same) it is an opinion in which they are associated, and is selected for discussion, because by its truth or falsehood, the folly or wis dom of the policy of the United States is determined. Mr. Adams rears his system upen two assertions: That there are only three general forms of Government—monarchy, aristocracy and democracy-of which all other forms are mixtures:-and that every Society naturally produces an order of men, which it is impossible to confine to an equality of rights."*

Political power in one man, without division or responsibility, is MONARCHY:-the same power in a (minority) few, is ARISTOCRACY;-and the same power in the whole nation is DEMOCRACY. And the resemblance of our system of government to either of these forms, depends upon the resemblance of a President or Governor to a Monarch:-of an American Senate to an hereditary order: and of a House of Representatives, to a Legislating nation. Upon this threefold resemblance Mr. Adams has seized," "to bring the political system of

*These are sources of inequality, which are common to every people, and can never be altered by any, because they are founded in the constitution of nature Thus natural Aristocracy among mankind has been dilated on, because it is a fact essential to be considered in the constitution of a goveru ment. It is a body of men, which contains the greatest collection of virtues and abilities in a fiee government, the brightest ornament and glory of a Nation; and always may be made the greatest blessing of Society, if it be judiciously managed in the Constitution. But if it is not, it is always the most dangerous:-nay, it may be added, it never fails to be the destruction of the Commonwealth. What shall be done to guard against it? There is but one expedient discovered, to avail society of all the benefits from this body of men, which they are capable of affording, and at the same time, prevent them from undermining, or invading the public liberty:—and that is, to throw them all, or at least, the most remarkable of them into one assembly together, in the Legislature; to keep all the executive power cutirely out of their hands, as a body:-to erect a first magistrate over them, invested with the whole executive authority; to make them dependant on that executive magistrate for all further executive employment; to give that magistrate a negative on the Legislature, by which he may defend himself and the people fro u all their enterprizes, and to erect on the other side of them an impregnable barrier, in a House of Commons, fairly, fully and adequately representing the People, who shall have power of negativing all such attempts at encroach meuts," &c.-Adams' Def. p. 116, 17-vol. 1.

America within the pale of the English system of checks and balances, by following the analysis of antiquity:* and in obedience to that authority by modify ing our temporary, elective responsible governors into monarchs: our senates into aristocratical orders:-and our representatives into a nation personally exercising the functions of government."+

*

Mr. Calhoun thus indicates the authority upon which he grounds his theory, and, having for its countenance so much that is matter of history, we shall dwell awhile upon its consideration. He tells us-vide, Exposition-that, the question of the relation which the States and General Government bear to each other, is not one of recent origin. From the commencement of our system, it has divided public sentiment. Even in the Convention, while the Constitution was struggling into existence, there were two parties as to what this relation should be, whose different sentiments constituted no small impediment in forming that instrument. After the General Government went into operation, experience soon proved that the question had not terminated with the labors of the Convention. The great struggle that preceded the political revolution of 1801, which brought Mr. Jefferson into power, turned essentially on it; and the doctrines and arguments on both sides were embodied and ably sustained; on the one, in the Virginia and Kentucky resolutions, and the report to the Virginia Legislature; and on the other, in the replies of the Legislature of Massachusetts and some of the other States."

It had been, heretofore, our opinion that the evidence against the authorities here relied on, was so overwhelming, so perfectly impregnable, that no hardihood of disputation would have encouraged the advocates of

Quere: Has not Mr. Calhoun done the same? Has not such a standard been always present to his eye in the formation of his theory? Jahn Taylor, of Caroline

this or any other heresy to look in such a quarter for countenance or support. As, however, we have thought idly, and find ourselves, in this particular, sadly mistaken, while all our impressions are contradicted by authority so high-it is a duty once again to go over and reconsider the great body of proof, upon which the argument depends, and of which, our previous consideration brought us to a conclusion, entirely the reverse. From the speech therefore of General Hayne, we shall take the text which that gentleman and others of the creed have relied on, and proceed to its re-examination, though with a serious and irresistible doubt whether our optics will yet sufficiently serve to discover in it the most remote or passing sanction for that strange and extravagant solecism, in terms, at least, which is called Constitutional Nullification. Better senses and an understanding of more accommodating and flexible temper than that of which we may boast, may however succeed in an endeavor, which, to our present vision, is beyond all hope.

The resolutions, after premising the true origin and policy of our Government, go on to say that in case of a deliberate, palpable and dangerous exercise of other powers not granted by said compact, the States, who are parties thereto, have the right," &c.

We have quoted the very language of the resolution, and what is its plain and common sense signification? Allow that the Government is an agent, who are the principals? They, it seems, have the right to check the agent when going astray, and who ever doubted it? We will not trouble the reader with dwelling upon the obvious import of the quoted resolution, which refers to the States, who are the parties," and not to any one of them, to determine upon the action of the government, equally an agent of the rest, and of all entire, as of herself.

In addition to the above resolution the General Assembly of Virginia "appealed to the other States, in