tending parties took to arms. All Switzerland was of course armed against Zuric, the refractory member. She sought protection from her ancient enemy, the House of Austria, and the controversy was not terminated in favor of the federal decree, until after six years of furious and destructive war.

"Had there been sufficient energy in the government of the United States, under the Articles of Confederation, to have enforced the constitutional requisitions, it might have proved fatal to public liberty; for Congress, as then constituted, was a most unfit and unsafe depository of political power, since all the authority of the nation, in one complicated mass of juris liction, was vested in a single body of men. It was, indeed, exceedingly fortunate, as the event has subsequently shown, that the State Legislatures even refused to confer upon Congress the right to levy and collect a general impost, notwithstanding the refusal appeared to be extremely disas trous at the time, and was deeply regretted by the intelligent friends of the Union. Had such a power been granted, the effort to amend the Confederation would probably not have been made, and the people of this country might have been languishing, to this day, the miserable victims of a feeble and incompetent Union.

"Most of the federal constitutions in the world have degenerated or perished in the same way, and by the same means. They are to be classed among the most defective political institutions which have been erected by mankind for their security. The great and incurable defect of former federal governments, such as the Amphyctionic, the Achæan, and Lycian confederacies in ancient Greece; and the Germanic, the Helvetic, the Hanseatic, and the Dutch republics, in modern history, is, that they were sovereigntics or sovereigns, and legislations, not for private individuals, but for communities in their political capacity. The only coercion for disobedience was physical force, instead of the decree and the pacific arm of the civil magistrate. The inevitable consequence, in every case in which a member chooses to be disobedient, is either a civil war, or an annihilation of national authority.

A late history of Poland, in one or two of its passages, affords us in strong confirmation of the views above expressed, a few particulars, the quotation of which we cannot forbear.

"It was in the reign of Casimir that the liberum vclo (Nullification) or privilege of the deputies to stop all proceedings in the Diet by a simple dissent, first assumed the form of a legal custom. The leaven of superstition and bigotry,' says Rulhiere, began to ferment and blend itself with all the other vices of the constitution; they then became closely united, and their junction defied all remedy. It was then that in the bosom of the National Assembly sprung up this singular anarchy, which, under the pretext of making the constitution more firm, has destroyed in Poland all sovereign power. The right of single opposi tion to general decrees, although always admitted, was for a long time not acted upon. There remained but one step to complete the destructive system, and that was taken in 1652, under the reign of John Casimir. A Polish noble named Sizinski, whom his contemporaries have denounced to the indignation of posterity, having left the Diet at the period allotted for its resolutions, and by his voluntary absence preventing the possibility of any unanimity, the Diet considered that it had lost its power by the desertion of one deputy. A precedent so absurd, but so easily imitated, could not fail to have the most pernicious effects.

"Saxony was Augustus' most agrecable residence, and as he was obliged to return to Poland during the sessions of the Diets, he was always pleased to see them suspended by the liberum veto, and always contrived to effect the rupture himself, if the deputies happened to be themselves unanimous. It is said that on one occasion, the Diet being uncommonly long-lived, not knowing how to force a veto, he turned over the Polish laws, and discovered that it was illegal to debate by candle-light; accordingly he ordered his partizans to prolong the debate till night, and to call for candles. They were brought, and immediately the Poles, who 'strain at a gnat,' when privilege is concerned, exclaimed against the violation of the laws, and the Diet was dissolved.

"This was almost the invariable termination of the sessions, during the thirty years which this reign lasted. The state of affairs may be readily imagined: all public business was at an end: the chief officers were almost uncontrolled, and. no ministers were sent to foreign courts. The pospolite neglected all military exercises, and became a mere mass of men, courageous, it is true, but without arms, without discipline, and equally incapable of commanding and obeying."

THE DOCTRINE OF THE VETO.

[The spirit of the following article, which formed one of the political newspaper essays of Mr. Richardson, is somewhat more popular than that of the long review which he has more particularly given of the doctrine of Mr. Calhoun. It is for this reason, in part, that we have concluded on its re-publication, with the risk of repeating some of those views which are more fully detailed in its predecessor.—E».]

Were we to take the doctrine of the veto at the hands of its several advocates, we should find it mere plastic clay in the mouids of the potter-every one frames it into the shape best suited to his taste and temperament. It is continually varying its position, changing its garb, and shifting the source of its operations. Like the Grecian Drama

modo ponit Rome-modo Athenis—

and it would be just as rational to take the brick of the fool of Palaphetus as a specimen of the house, as an individual Nullifier as a representative of the party to which he belongs. One derives the right from the nature of things"—another from the Declaration of Independence: one from the provisions of the Constitution-another from the law of nature, above all constitutions: one turns to the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions-another to the law of nations: one points to the example of particular States-another pins his votive faith to the sleeve of the Apostle of Liberty.Quousque tandem abutere nostra patientia?

We will briefly submit a few objections to the theory. taking as our text-book the Erpose of the distinguished Statesman, whose opinions we discuss more at large in another place. These objections strike us, as fatal to the doctrine.

As yet, they are unanswered, and we

believe they are unanswerable: emphatically, reponse sans replique.

The doctrine of Nullification is new and speculative, but lately developed, seldom intelligibly stated, and not settled to this day. Grammatici certant, etc. How comes this? Does not the fact speak volumes against it? Has it lain in obscurity since the adoption of our Constitution-upwards of forty years,—or is it a new theory? The original objection to the adoption of the charter was, that it subtracted too much power from the States, but this counter check was never even hinted at by way of rejoinder! How shall this be accounted for? We pause for a reply.

By the doctrine, the right is claimed for the State of determining the extent of her jurisdiction, and following up her judgment with acts. This, by the law of nations, puts her in the condition of the absolute independence and undivided sovereignty she possessed previously to entering into the Federal Compact: and, in so doing, she rejects, and is above, the authority of the Constitution. True, this assumption is a reserved right, but it is at the same time one that is inalienable.

It has been urged, if Congress be the ultimate judge of the powers delegated to itself-rejecting the authority of the Supreme Court that the will of the majority is substituted for the Constitution, and State Sovereignty subverted. But is it not equally evident, if a single State-not the sole crcator, employer, or owner of the Federal Government,-can. at pleasure arrest its laws, that the Union is subverted?

Again, if this right be possessed by one State, it must inhere in all, together with the means of enforcing it. without which the mere abstract right would be a nonentity-a word, not a thing a shadow, not a substance. But by what process could Tennessee nullify the Tariff Acts? She has no sea-port to declare freeno citizens to absolve from Custom House bonds-no smugglers to pronounce patriots. She might, like the

Roman Tribune, pronounce Veto"-I forbid it. She might go farther, and add, with a sovereign State's contempt, the rescript of the Emperor-car tel est notre plaisirs" but the Atlantic States would tell a different tale. They would remain precisely where they are, and the "safe, peaceable, and efficient remedy" would eventuate in "arrant quackery," or "steel diet."

It is said, that since three-fourths are required to. confer upon Congress a new power, the same majority is necessary to settle a disputed grant of power, and make a law under it valid: that the Constitution was adopted by sovereign parties, and that they have the right to expound it. But the Constitution was accepted unanimously, must it therefore be expounded unanimously? If the method of its ratification decides its construction, this would be the unavoidable concession. Is this the government we live under?

We cheerfully admit, that there may be circumstances of hardship attending the passage of a law of a bare majority, and that the Tariff Acts of 1828 were of that character. It would be hard indeed that a majority of one should definitively settle a question of great vested interest. But would it not be infinitely harder, that the same law should be passed by no majority at all, but by a minority? The inconsistency and confusion into which the minus principle would lead us, irresistibly recalls the retort of Peter Pindar to the sophistical Paine. The latter was arguing, that since the majority of mankind were fools,. the minority, as the collected wisdom of the State, should have supreme command. The wit moved, that it be put to vote,the company acquiesced in the reasoning, and Paine looked around trium huntly. "Hold" says Pindar, "the majority are fools. I, the intelligent minority, decide just the contrary." So we go!

South-Carolina, in her Legislature assembled, has declared the act a "deliberate, palpable and dangerous usurpation of power," and that she will, with this con