he could. The obscure individual, to whom the door of honorable fame is for ever closed, might find an excuse for becoming the incendiary of the Ephesian Temple: but what defence could be made for the Guardian of the shrine, who had, himself, snatched a living coal from the altar to wrap the fabric in flames? To the sincere and honest conviction of Mr. Calhoun in the constitutionality and fitness of his remedy, the independent attitude he has assumed, his manly disregard of the personal bearing of the question, his uncompromising devotion to his oath to support the Constitution-the expose before us bears ample testimony. We accord to him the high and honorable eulogium of regarding truth, and disregarding party; of preferring the interests of South Carolina to the emoluments of the Union; of sacrificing self to what he sincerely believed the cause of the Constitution. In the chief point he has discussed, the constitutional question, we are so unfortunate as to differ with him. We differ honestly, after long and laborious reflection, and shall freely detail our grounds of dissent. If we misconceive or mistate the question, we are sincerely desirous of correction.

We will, in fairness, state this important constitutional question in the words of its originator: nor, indeed, could we find language that more succinctly embraces the whole ground in dispute.

"The question of the relation, which the State and General Government bear to each other, is not one of recent origin. From the commencement of our system, it has divided. public sentiment. Even in the Convention, while the Constitution was struggling into existence, there were two parties, as to what this relation should be, whose different sentiments, constituted no small impediment in forming that instrument. After the General Government went into operation, experience soon proved that the question had not terminated with the labors of the Constitution. The great struggle, that preceded the political revolution of 1801, which brought Mr. Jefferson into power, turned essentially on it; and the doctrines and arguments on both sides were.

embodied and ably sustained; on the one, in the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, and the report to the Virginia Legislature; and on the other, in the replies of the Legisla ture of Massachusetts and some of the other States.These resolutions and this report, with the decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania about the same time, (particularly in the case of Cobbett, delivered by Chief Justice M'Kean and concurred in by the whole bench,) contain what I believe to be the true doctrine on this important subject.”

"Their great and leading principle is that the General Government emanated from the people of the several States, forming distinct political communities, and acting in their separate and sovereign capacity, and not from all of the people forming one aggregate political community: that the Constitution of the U. States is in fact a compact, to which each State is a party, in the character already described; and that the several States or parties, have a right to judge of its infractions, and in case of a deliberate, palpable, and dangerous exercise of a power not delegated, they have the right, in the last resort, to use the language of the Virginia resolu tions, "to interpose for arresting the progress of the evil, and for maintaining within their respective limits, the authorities, rights and liberties appertaining to them.”

Where the diversity of interests exists in separate and distinct classes of the community, as is the case in England, and was formerly the case in Sparta, Rome, and most of the free States of antiquity, the rational constitutional provision is, that each should be represented in the Government, as a separate estate with a distinct voice, and a negative on the acts of its co-estates, in order to check their encroachments. In England, the Constitution has assumed expressly thin form; while in the governments of Sparta and Rome the same thing was effected under different but not much less efficacious forms."

"Happily for us, we have no artificial and separate classes of society. We have wisely exploded all such distinctions; but we are not, on that account exempt from all contrariety of interests, as the present distracted and dangerous condition of our country, unfortunately, but too clearly proves. With us they are almost exclusively geographical, resulting mainly

from difference of climate, soil, situation, industry and production, but are not, therefore, less necessary to be protected by an adequate constitutional provision, than where the dis tinct interests exist in separate classes. The necessity is, in truth greater, as such separate and dissimilar geographical interests, are not liable to come into conflict, and more dangerous when in that state, than those of any other description."

"This right of interposition, thus solemnly asserted by the State of Virginia, be it called what it may, state right, veto, nullification, or by any other name, I conceive to be the fundamental principle of our system, resting on facts historically as certain, as our revolution itself, and deductions as simple and demonstrative, as that of any political or moral truth whatever, and I firmly believe that on its recognition depends, the stability and safety of our political institutions."

Were we to start any general objection to the doctrine of the Vice President, it would be, that it is too metaphysical-too vague-too speculative. It appeals more to abstract analogies than to practical illustrations -more to what might be the most perfect scheme of government, than to what actually is the organization of our own. It gives to human nature too much virtue and forbearance; and while providing cheeks against the cupidity of a majority, seems to apprehend no abuse of power on the part of a factious and disorganizing minority. In proof of, at least, one of our allegations, we would refer to the sweeping assertion, that by nature every individual has a right to govern himself." The expression is imposing at first sight, and seems to carry truth along with it. The question however involves nice point in metaphysics, and may well admit of doubt. We do not express a definitive opinion at this time, but will simply suggest a difficulty or two, that readily oc

cur.

Man being born with the several qualities of reciprocal enjoyment and protection-bearing many relations to his fellows, which can be developed only by the act of his congregating with them-this situation would appear to be a necessary feature of his nature. More

over, being found in a social state, and-since what is universal may be said to be natural-society, with its conditions and restrictions—one of which we conceive to be, in the emphatic language of Mr. Jefferson, “absolute acquiescence to the decisions of the majority"is his proper situation. If so, to deny the right of the majority to govern, is to oppugn a condition of Society, and, as we shall hereafter shew, to shake the main pillar of Republicanism. As if in anticipation of these dificulties, Mr. Calhoun has drawn a vivid picture of the evils of partial legislation, the likelihood of interested majorities, and the disastrous and remediless situation of oppressed minorities. These points are made to figure prominently on the foreground of the sketch-highly colored, and in bold relief. But there are dark, as well as bright points, in the picture. There are shadows, which obscure its brilliancy-blots which mar the liberty of its coloring-and irregularities, destroying all the harmony of its proportions.True, an interested majority may misconstrue the charter-may enact unjust and unconstitutional laws. But on the other hand, is it probable, that the decision of a single confederate, alarmed for its rights-deeply interested in the issue and goaded on by its passionswill prove more profound-more temperate and more impartial than that of the collective wisdom and virtue of the whole Union?

“After a measure may have been framed with the greatest wisdom and caution, and with the assistance of all those guards which the Constitution has deemed indispensable, it enables a single member of the government to undo every thing-to bid defiance to the government of its own choice; and to commit, perhaps, an irretrievable injury to the inte rests of every other member of the confederacy. And this, too, without putting it in the power of that single member to cure, in any practical manner, the faulty legislation of which it complains. A power of this kind-a power which is only potent to do mischief-is absolutely irreconcileable with the preservation of our free institutions."

It appears to us, that the fundamental error of the doctrine, one which runs through, and unconsciously tinctures the whole theory, in claiming such ultra and unheard of rights for the States, is a radical misunderstanding of the nature of our government. The opposite extremes of our peculiar polity are CONSOLIDATION, on the one hand, and the STATE VETO or Nullification on the other. The former would first crush the confederate government, and then amalgamate the particles into mass-newly remodelling them and preserving no trace of their original elements. This would make us an unlimited consolidation, with no final remedy in any measure of injustice, save in the "ultima ratio regum. "The latter, would render the confederacy a league (and one of a most peculiar character) instead of a government*—would subtract from the wholesome powers of the Union, to annex a dangerous prerogative to the States-and, virtually, throw us back upon the old, rotten, discarded, inefficient confederation of '77. Our government, then, is strictly neither entirely National, nor entirely Federal, but a mixture of both. In its origin it is purely federal-in its operation it is purely national-in its organization it is partly federal, and partly national.

Mr. Calhoun, has, we think, been led away by considering not what is, but what ought to be the character of our civil polity. In settling it, he has been misled by a deceptive view of the veto power in the different branches of the British Government. He considers these departments as representing distinct interests, and derives their privilege of check from this contrariety. This is not the case.-Every branch of that government represents partially, if not entirely, the same interests

The distinction here made by our author, between the character of a league and a government, has been dwelt upon with much force and adroitness by a subsequent reviewer of the whole subject, in the North American Review; in a long paper contained in the number of that journal for January, 1933, attributed, (though we doubt with correctness,) to the pen of Mr. Webster. See pages 226-7 of that periodical