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ARTICLE 2.

Omit the words "The ambassadors or ministers of the high contracting parties

at are

This clause then would read:

"Meetings of the body of delegates shall be held at the seat of the league or at such other place as may be found convenient, and shall consist of representatives specially appointed for this purpose.'

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Very respectfully, yours,

Senator KNOX. Up to that time all of the projects had contemplated the different countries being represented by their diplomatic agents?

The

Mr. BULLITT. The President had insisted on it repeatedly. British had been very much opposed to it, and the reason for my discussing the matter with Col. House was that I had in the course of trying to keep in touch with what was going on there, and receiving these reports from the different sections of the conference, found that the feeling against this was very, very great, and had called it, of course, to the attention of Col. House.

Senator BRANDEGEE. I do not quite understand. Does the phrase "body of delegates" as employed in that proposition which you made refer to what is known in the pending treaty as "the assembly"? Mr. BULLITT. Yes, sir.

Senator BRANDEGEE. That was what is now known as the council, what I understand is now called the council, referred to as in the draft?

Mr. BULLITT. I can tell you, but I have not it in my mind.
Senator BRANDEGEE. Never mind about it.

Senator KNOX. The President was opposed to having the representative bodies of the different countries represented in the league; he thought it impracticable? Is that correct?

Mr. BULLITT. I shall attempt to make my meaning a little clearer. The idea was to have representation from the various countries to represent the various political parties in the States which made up the league, in order that there might be a popular representation. Senator KNOX. You mean representation of the congresses of the nations in the league?

Mr. BULLITT. Yes.

Senator KNOX. That is the way I understand it.

Mr. BULLITT. Yes.

Senator KNOX. And Clemenceau and Lloyd-George-what was their opinion?

Mr. BULLITT. Clemenceau-I don't know what his position was on that subject.

Senator KNOX. But you know Col. House's position was in favor of this?

Mr. BULLITT. Col. House was in favor of it. Lord Robert Cecil and Gen. Smuts were in favor of it. They were the members of the league of nations commission from England and the United States.

Senator KNOX. The President seems to have lost out, then, on the proposition that the countries should be represented in the league of nations by their diplomatic officers?

The CHAIRMAN. He did not say that, did he?
Senator KNOX. Yes; he did.

In your judgment, you having been in daily touch with these negotiations and being in the confidence of Col. House, and it being your duty to gather up all of the information that it was possible to gather for dissemination among the American members of the commission, what do you regard as the President's greatest contribution to this league covenant?

Mr. BULLITT. So far as I know, in the final form of the league the only proposal of the President which remains more or less intact is article 10.

Senator KNOX. Do you know what the attitude of the representatives of the other Governments was toward article 10?

Mr. BULLITT. I do not, sir.

Senator KNOX. Could you give us some idea as to how the general work of the commission was done by the American representatives, and who were the active agents in conducting this work? For instance, begin with the President. Did the President have a secretary and body of men about him working for him personally in connection with his labors, or was it handed over to somebody else; and if so, to whom?

Mr. BULLITT. The President had no assistants or secretaries of his own. He had his own two confidential stenographers, Mr. Close and Mr. Swem. Mr. Close was generally called "confidential secretary." The President, of course, conducted all the negotiations himself, all the actual practically all the actual-negotiations. The usual course of the preparation of a point of view was for the President to refer the matter to Col. House, who had built up a considerable secretariat, in the Crillon; and Col. House in turn would turn the matter over to his secretariat, the heads of which were Mr. Gordon Auchincloss and Mr. David Hunter Miller. Mr. David Hunter Miller had practically the revising of every paper in the conference, as an adviser on international law.

Senator KNOx. Is it not a fact that Auchincloss and Miller were the members the most active, and covering a wider sphere in relation to what was going on over there than anybody else?

Mr. BULLITT. I should distinctly say so, except, of course, Col. House and the President.

Senator KNOX. How many people were there connected with the American mission?

Mr. BULLITT. I am unable to give you the exact figures.
Senator KNOX. I do not care about that.

Mr. BULLITT. I think it was 1,300. It was something like that.
Senator KNOX. One thousand three hundred?

Mr. BULLITT. Yes; something like that.

Senator KNOX. What were they doing principally?

Mr. BULLITT. There were a large number of experts on various problems-territorial problems; economic problems. There were large numbers of, I believe they were called, liaison officers, who were supposed to keep in touch with various other delegations, although they later were cut down in number. In the main, the delegation was functioning as well as it could, attempting to maintain as wise a point of view as possible on all questions, but it was rather functioning in its own sphere.

Senator KNOX. It was pretty busy trying to appear to keep busy, was it not?

Mr. BULLITT. No; I should not say that. It was very busy. All the peoples who had troubles in the world brought them to the experts of the American delegation-hundreds of them.

Senator KNOX. Was there not some complaint among the American delegates as to the manner in which this was being conducted for America?

Mr. BULLITT. I do not quite understand the question. Do you mean formal complaint, or

Senator KNOX. No; I mean was there not a feeling of dissatisfaction with the way the American end of the business was being handled by the representatives there.

Mr. BULLITT. There was, of course, the feeling that there was very, very little contact between the top of the organization and the experts, and so on, at the bottom. There was naturally a feeling of that sort. I am not in a position really to say a great deal about this, because, as I said before, it was more or less my business to try and pass the stuff up.

Senator KNOX. What was your mission to Berne? You say you left Paris in February to go to Berne?

Mr. BULLITT. I was sent down to observe and report on the international labor and socialist conference which was taking place in Berne.

Senator KNOX. What was your mission to Russia, and when did you go?

Mr. BULLITT. I was ordered to go to Russia on the 18th of February. I received the following order from Secretary Lansing [reading]:

Mr. WILLIAM C. BULLITT,

BULLITT EXHIBIT NO 9.

AMERICAN COMMISSION TO NEGOTIATE PEACE,
18 February, 1919.

American Commission to Negotiate Peace.

SIR: You are hereby directed to proceed to Russia for the purpose of studying conditions, political and economic, therein, for the benefit of the American commissioners plenipotentiary to negotiate peace, and all American diplomatic and consular officials are hereby directed to extend to you the proper courtesies and facilities to enable you to fulfill the duties of your mission.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

[SEAL.]

ROBERT LANSING,

Secretary of State of the United States of America.

Senator KNOX. What is the date of that?

Mr. BULLITT. February 18, 1919. I also received at the same time from Mr. Joseph C. Grew, the secretary of the American commission, the following [reading]:

BULLITT EXHIBIT NO. 10.

AMERICAN COMMISSION TO NEGOTIATE PEACE,
February 18, 1919.

To whom it may concern:
I hereby certify that Mr. William C. Bullitt has been authorized by the American
commissioners plenipotentiary to negotiate peace to proceed to Russia, for the pur-
pose of studying conditions, political and economic, therein, for the benefit of the
commission, and I bespeak for him the proper courtesies and facilities in enabling
him to fulfill the duties of his mission.
J. C. GREW,

[SEAL.]

Secretary of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace.

Senator KNOX. You say you started in February. What time in February?

Mr. BULLITT. I left on the 22d day of February.

Senator KNOX. Did you know at that time, or have you ascertained since, whether a secret mission had or not been dispatched from Paris, that is, by the President himself; a man by the name of Buckler, who went to Russia a few days before you did?

Mr. BULLITT. Mr. W. H. Buckler, Mr. Henry White's half brother. He was an attaché of the American embassy in London. He was ordered from there to go, about the 1st of January, to Stockholm, to confer with Litvinov, who had been the ambassador of the soviet government to London-the British had allowed him to stay there without actually recognizing his official status, and had dealt with him.

Mr. Buckler there conferred with Litvinov, who made various propositions and representations to him which Mr. Buckler at once telegraphed back to Paris, and which were considered so important by the President that the President read them in extenso to the council of ten on the morning of January 21. I regret that I have no actual copy of those proposals by Litvinov, or of Buckler's telegrams. At that time there was a discussion taking place in regard to Russia which had extended over a couple of weeks, a discussion of the utmost interest, in the council of ten. I happen to have the minutes of the council for January 16, when this Russian question was taken up, which I shall be glad to read, if the Senators should be interested, and also the minutes of the council of ten on January 21, at which meeting the Prinkipos proposal was decided upon. The Buckler meeting with Litvinov was what eventually swung the meeting in favor of Prinkipos, the suggestion for which had been made by Mr. LloydGeorge. No; that is slightly incorrect. Mr. Lloyd-George had suggested that representatives of the various Russian governments and factions should be brought to Paris.

(The minutes above referred to were marked by the stenographer "Bullitt Exhibit No. 11," and are printed in the record in full, as follows:)

BULLITT EXHIBIT NO. 11.

NOTES ON CONVERSATIONS HELD IN THE OFFICE OF M. PICHON AT THE QUAI D'ORSAY, ON JANUARY 16, 1919-PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION REGARDING THE SITUATION IN RUSSIA.

Mr. Lloyd George commenced his statement setting forth the information in the possession of the British Government regarding the Russian situation, by referring to the matter which had been exposed recently in L'Humanite. He stated that he wished to point out that there had been a serious misconception on the part of the French Government as to the character of the proposal of the British Government. The British proposal did not contemplate in any sense whatever, a recognition of the Bolsheviki Government, nor a suggestion that Bolshevik delegates be invited to attend the Conference. The British proposal was to invite all of the different governments now at war within what used to be the Russian Empire, to a truce of God, to stop reprisals and outrages and to send men here to give, so to speak, an account of themselves. The Great Powers would then try to find a way to bring some order out of chaos. These men were not to be delegates to the Peace Conference, and he agreed with the French Government entirely that they should not be made members of the Conference.

Mr. Lloyd George then proceeded to set forth briefly the reasons which had led the British Government to make this proposal. They were as follows:

Firstly, the real facts are not known;

Secondly, it is impossible to get the facts, the only way is to adjudicate the question;

and

Thirdly, conditions in Russia are very bad; there is general mis-government and starvation. It is not known who is obtaining the upper hand, but the hope that the Bolshevik Government would collapse had not been realized. In fact, there is one report that the Bolsheviki are stronger than ever, that their internal position is strong, and that their hold on the people is stronger. Take, for instance, the case of the Ukraine. Some adventurer raises a few men and overthrows the Government. The Government is incapable of overthrowing him. It is also reported that the peasants are becoming Bolsheviki. It is hardly the business of the Great Powers to intervene either in lending financial support to one side or the other, or in sending munitions to either side.

Mr. Lloyd George stated that there seemed to be three possible policies:

1. Military intervention. It is true there the Bolsheviki movement is as dangerous to civilization as German militarism, but as to putting it down by the sword, is there anyone who proposes it? It would mean holding a certain number of vast provinces in Russia. The Germans with one million men on their Eastern Front only held the fringe of this territory. If he now proposed to send a thousand British troops to Russia for that purpose, the armies would mutiny. The same applies to U. S. troops in Siberia; also to Canadians and French as well. The mere idea of crushing Bolshevism by a military force is pure madness. Even admitting that it is done, who is to occupy Russia? No one can conceive or understand to bring about order by force.

2. A cordon. The second suggestion is to besiege Bolshevik Russia. Mr. Lloyd George wondered if those present realized what this would mean. From the information furnished him Bolshevik Russia has no corn, but within this territory there are 150,000,000 men, women, and children. There is now starvation in Petrograd and Moscow. This is not an health cordon, it is a death cordon. Moreover, as a matter of fact, the people who would die are just the people that the Allies desire to protect. It would not result in the starvation of the Bolsheviki; it would simply mean the death of our friends. The cordon policy is a policy which, as humane people, those present could not consider.

Mr. Lloyd George asked who was there to overthrow the Bolsheviki? He had been told there were three men, Denekin, Kolchak and Knox. In considering the chances of these people to overthrow the Bolsheviki, he pointed out that he had received information that the Czecho-Slovaks now refused to fight; that the Russian Army was not to be trusted, and that while it was true that a Bolshevik Army had recently gone over to Kolchak it was never certain that just the reverse of this would not take place. If the Allies counted on any of these men, he believed they were building on quick-sand. He had heard a lot of talk about Denekin, but when he looked on the map he found that Denekin was occupying a little backyard near the Black Sea. Then he had been told that Denekin had recognized Kolchak, but when he looked on the map there was a great solid block of territory between Denekin and Kolchak. Moreover, from information received it would appear that Kolchak had been collecting members of the old regime around him, and would seem to be at heart a monarchist. It appeared that the Czecho-Slovaks were finding this out. The sympathies of the Czecho-Slovaks are very democratic, and they are not at all prepared to fight for the restoration of the old conditions in Russia.

Mr. Lloyd George stated that he was informed that at the present time two-thirds of Bolshevik Russia was starving.

Institutions of Bolsheviki are institutions of old Czarist regime. This is not what one would call creating a new world.

3. The third alternative was contained in the British proposal, which was to summon these people to Paris to appear before those present, somewhat in the way that the Roman Empire summoned chiefs of outlying tributary states to render an account of their actions.

Mr. Lloyd George pointed out the fact that the argument might be used that there were already here certain representatives of these Governments; but take, for instance, the case of Sassonoff, who claims to represent the Government of Omsk. As a matter of fact, Sassonoff can not speak from personal observation. He is nothing but a partisan, like all the rest. He has never been in contact, and is not now in direct contact with the Government at Omsk.

It would be manifestly absurd for those who are responsible for bringing about the Peace Conference, to come to any agreement and leave Paris when one-half of Europe and one-half of Asia is still in flames. Those present must settle this question or make fools of themselves.

Mr. Lloyd George referred to the objection that had been raised to permitting Bolshevik delegates to come to Paris. It had been claimed that they would convert France and England to Bolshevism. If England becomes Bolshevist, it will not be because a single Bolshevist representative is permitted to enter England. On the

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