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This section has been held to apply to nonenumerated articles only, and was designed to prevent evasions of the customs laws, and to guide the classification of certain articles, not within the strict letter of the tariff law, but within its real intent and meaning. If a given article, therefore, is enumerated the section can have no application to the case. (Arthur v. Fox, 108 U. S., 125; Arthur v. Sussfeld, 96 U. S., 128.) But "to place articles among those designated as enumerated it is not necessary that they should be specially mentioned. It is sufficient that they are designated in any way to distinguish them from other articles." (Arthur v. Butterfield, 125 U. S., 70.)

The inquiry before us is whether the goods under consideration are "goods of like description" with "women's and children's dress goods, coat linings (or) Italian cloth," composed in part of wool or worsted, within the meaning of T. I., 365.

The Supreme Court of the United States has several times construed the phrase "of similar description," which has long appeared in the tariff laws enacted by Congress. That phrase is tantamount in meaning to "like description," and can mean nothing different. It has been held not to be a commercial phrase, nor does it involve the idea that the goods classed under it shall be in all respects the same. The similarity required is one in product, in adaptation to uses, and to its actual uses, and not merely the process by which it was produced. (Schmieder v. Barney, 113 U. S., 645; Greenleaf v. Goodrich, 101 U. S., 278.) "Women's and children's dress goods" is a phrase of commercial designation. The goods in question are substantially like such dress goods. They are, therefore, to be deemed the same and to be charged accordingly. In other words, this class of merchandise "is provided for under the name of what it resembles." (Fisk v. Arthur, 103 U. S., 431, 434.)

Applying these principles to the facts before us, we are of opinion that the goods in question were properly classified by the appraiser as of like description with the class of dress goods enumerated in T. I., 365, above cited.

The assessment of duty as made by you was proper, and your decision is affirmed. (10343-G. A. 64.)

NEW YORK, October 23, 1890.

CHILDREN'S WEARING APPAREL.-Your letter of the 20th ultimo is received, covering protest (No. 97 b) of Messrs. Zimmerman Bros. Clothing Company, against the exaction of duty, at 45 cents per pound and 40 per cent ad valorem, on certain socalled children's wearing apparel, under paragraph 367 of the act of March 3, 1883, claiming that it is dutiable, under paragraph 366, at 40 cents per pound and 35 per cent ad valorem.

It appears from the invoice that the merchandise in this case is clothing, readymade, since it is invoiced as "boys' suits." But the clause of paragraph 367 under which it is assessed for duty is the following: "Cloaks, dolmans, jackets, talmas, ulsters, or other outside garments for ladies' and children's apparel, and goods of similar description, or used for like purposes"-that is to say, "outside garments" for the appareling of women and children. It should be noted that the articles enumerated in this paragraph are all outside garments and all designed for women and children, and the general clause is, "goods of similar description, or used for like purposes." These descriptions do not comprehend the merchandise subject of appeal, either directly or by implication; certainly not if it is more definitely provided for in any other paragraph of the wool schedule. The specific enumeration of articles is found in paragraph 367, and it consists, in particular and in general, of outside garments. On the other hand, the general designation, which is very comprehensive, is found in paragraph 366, as follows: "Clothing, ready-made, and wearing apparel of every description, not specifically provided for in this act.”

H. Mis. 94- -14

The merchandise in question is clearly not specifically enumerated, but falls under the general clause of paragraph 366.

The appeal is sustained. and you will reliquidate the entry in accordance therewith. (10351–G. A. 72.)

NEW YORK, October 29, 1890. WATERPROOF GARMENTS.-We are in receipt of your several communications transmitting protests, as per annexed schedule, against your action in assessing duty, at the rates provided for wool wearing apparel and ladies' outside garments made wholly or in part of wool, on certain so-called "India-rubber fabrics," which were claimed by the importers to be dutiable at 30 per cent ad valorem under the provisions of paragraph 453, act of March 3, 1883.

The merchandise under consideration consists of completed garments manufactured from wool and rubber mixed fabrics, which fabrics, had they been imported in the piece and not made into garments, would, in our opinion, have been covered by paragraph 453, as heretofore ruled by us, under date of September 9, 1890, G. A. 19: The word fabric, in its broader sense, would include manufactured articles of almost every description, but a narrower interpretation must be placed upon the word conformable with the intent of Congress and commercial usage. This would limit the term to a class of textile fabrics or piece goods.

The process of manufacturing the fabrics, which are provided for at one rate, into specific articles subject to duty at another rate permeates the whole tariff acf. We need merely to cite the case of bonnets made from silk to exemplify this point. The wearing apparel and ladies' outside garments, the subject of the protests under consideration, are composed in part of wool; they therefore fulfill all the requirements of paragraphs 366 and 367 of the act of 1883, and inasmuch as there is no specific provision relative to garments made of rubber or of rubber fabrics, your action in returning them for duty under the paragraphs cited was, in our opinion correct, and stands affirmed. (10389—G. A. 80.)

NEW YORK, November 18, 1890.

WOOLEN ELASTIC FABRICS.-The merchandise in dispute was entered prior to October, 1890, and was, therefore, dutiable in conformity with the act of March, 1883. It consisted of an elastic fabric made from wool, cotton, and rubber, commercially known as "webbing," which the appellant claims should have been returned for duty as manufactures of rubber at 25 per cent ad valorem, under T. I., 454, or as India-rubber fabrics, under T. I., 453, at 30 per cent ad valorem, and not at 30 cents per pound and 50 per cent ad valorem, which was the rate assessed.

There are four paragraphs of the act of 1883, either of which, standing alone, would control the classification of the merchandise upon appeal, viz, those which provide for (1) manufactures wholly or in part of rubber; (2) India-rubber fabrics; (3) webbing; (4) webbing composed in part of wool.

These four paragraphs must be construed so as to harmonize all inconsistencies, which can only be done by giving the most specific provision precedence of the others.

A true interpretation of the law affecting the material would, in our opinion, be as follows:

(1) All manufactures composed wholly or in part of rubber, except India-rubber fabrics, 25 per cent ad valorem; and as the merchandise is a fabric, the first claim of the appellant is accordingly denied.

(2) All India rubber fabrics, except webbing, 30 per cent ad valorem. The material being invoiced as webbing, and as there is no dispute relative to this point, this alternate claim of the importer is also rejected.

(3) All webbing except such as is composed in part of wool, 35 per cent ad valorem; but in the present case wool forming a constituent part of the webbing, T. I., 368, becomes the specific provision covering the same.

This ruling is in keeping with a former decision of the board, dated September 9, 1890, G. A. 19, and the assessment of duty at 30 cents per pound and 50 per cent ad valorem, being in conformity therewith, is affirmed. (10468–G. A. 118.)

NEW YORK, November 21, 1890.

DUTIABLE CHARGES-CUTTING INTO LENGTHS OF WOOLEN CLOTHS.-The appraiser reports that all the nondutiable charges were deducted by the appellants at the time of the entry, and were allowed, and that duty was assessed only upon the estimated "net market value of the goods per se."

The goods in question were woolen and worsted cloths, and were imported on July 30, 1890. It was held by the collector that the cost of cutting the goods into various lengths for suits, etc., was a proper element of dutiable value, and it was added as such. The contention of the appellants on this point is stated in the seventh ground of their protest, as follows: "We claim the cutting of the cloth in pieces of 10, 15, and 20 yards or other lengths to be part of the putting up of the goods, and (as such to be) nondutiable."

Under the provisions of section 2907, U. S. Revised Statutes, it was required, among other things, that there should be added not only the value of the coverings of imported merchandise, "but all other actual or usual charges for putting up, preparing, and packing for transportation or shipment." This section was repealed by the act of March 3, 1883, which provided that thereafter none of the charges imposed by the above section should be estimated in ascertaining market value. (Notes on Rev. Stat. U. S. (Gould v. Tucker), p. 619.) This clearly abolished as an element of dutiable value charges for putting up, preparing, and packing such merchandise for transportation. Is this a charge of that kind? Were the goods cut into lengths for the purpose of putting them up or preparing them for shipment, or was this additional expense incurred in order to render them more salable by adapting the goods to the market for certain uses? If it was a finishing process requiring some degree of art or skill and added anything to the market value of the goods prior to shipment, then it was an element of dutiable value. Such, we think, it was; and prima facie the market value of the goods was enhanced to the extent of the prime cost of the work. The practice of the customs collectors has been in accordance with this view. (Synopsis Treasury decisions 9964.) We deem it correct, and the collector's decision in this case is affirmed. (10481 G. A.—131.)

NEW YORK, November 25, 1890.

WOOL ON "CAPE" SKINS.-The appeal is indefinite, as the importer simply protests against the amount of duty exacted, without distinctly claiming free entry or specifying under what clause of the tariff or at what rate his merchandise should be classified. It is probable, however, that his intention was to claim free entry, as the protest states: "These skins are known as common Cape sheep and are covered with short, coarse hair. A small amount of wool is found on a few of the skins, but is so short and so mixed with hair that it has no commercial value except as hair."

While the protest is in itself fatally defective, it is not difficult to show on other grounds why it is not tenable.

The invoice under consideration enumerates several hundred "dry goatskins," which were classified as "raw goatskins, free," and "750 dry sheepskins." The appraiser returned for duty 530 pounds of wool, class 1, upon these sheepskins.

Confining consideration to the claim for free entry, it may be said that an examination of samples by competent experts, and a careful investigation of the case show that the wool has a commercial value of 15 cents a pound, and that it can be used in the manufacture of carpets and blankets.

In Synopsis 7147 the Department decided that the skins of common Cape goats with the hair on should be admitted free of duty under T. I., 709, "goatskins, raw." But the skins in question are not those of the common Cape goat, indeed they are from a very uncommon goat, if, as is claimed, the animal is a cross between a sheep and a goat.

The invoice enumerates the articles as sheepskins, the appellant declares that they are skins of the common Cape sheep, and the wool on the skins proves that they are from the back of sheep whether run down or bastard.

There is no provision in the tariff for the free entry of such merchandise, and the decision of the collector must, therefore, stand. (10492-G. A. 142.)

NEW YORK, November 25, 1890.

WOOL NOILS.-Duty was assessed at 30 cents per pound for wool, class 1, scoured, value in the grease under 30 cents per pound, paragraphs 356 and 357 of the act of 1883.

Appellants claim that the goods in question are noils made from carpet wool, and should be rated at 5 cents per pound as wool of the third class costing over 12 cents a pound.

The appraiser reports that "the merchandise in question consists of carded wool noils made from improved Turkish wool of Merino blood, and is in a scoured condition." In this statement he is sustained by a number of reputable wool experts of Philadelphia, and by the New York appraising officers.

It is proper to say that the question has been one of great difficulty to the board. The wool in its present condition has lost all of its distinctive features, and it is doubtful whether it can be absolutely identified as coming from any particular class. In such a case, were the evidence evenly balanced, we should give the importer the benefit of the doubt; but in this instance the preponderance of the testimony taken before us here is to the effect that the noils are from a low-grade first-class wool, and we therefore affirm the decision of the collector. (10495–G. A. 145.)

NEW YORK, December 2, 1890.

TENNIS BALLS.-The assessment of duty, at the rate of 25 per cent ad valorem, upon the so-called "gut," which consists of racquet gut strings, according with a previous decision of this board, dated November 3, 1890 (G. A. 88), is affirmed.'

In relation to the assessment of duty upon the tennis balls at 35 cents per pound and 40 per cent ad valorem, under the provisions of paragraph 362, act of March 3, 1883, instead of 25 per cent ad valorem, under paragraph 454, as claimed, we are of the opinion that the claim of the importers should not be sustained, for the following reasons: The merchandise consists of rubber balls inflated with air or gas and hermetically sealed, which balls are subsequently covered with a woolen fabric. It appears from the evidence that the rubber forms the chief component material of value, but this fact is not deemed material, inasmuch as the provisions of paragraph 362 are esteemed equally as specific as those of paragraph 454. The one provides for manufactures composed wholly or in part of wool, and the other for articles composed of India rubber. Both conditions are fulfilled in the present instance. The tennis balls are made partly of wool and chiefly of India rubber. The two rates are applicable therefor, and in conformity with section 2499 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, which requires that duty must be assessed at the higher rate, we affirm the decision of the collector. (10511.-G. A. 161.)

NEW YORK, December 11, 1890. HAT CROWNS AND BEAD ORNAMENTS.-The subject of controversy in this case is the proper classification of certain hat crowns and certain ornaments composed of beads.

Accepting as true the statement of facts made by the appraiser, the hat crowns are simply flat pieces of wool and silk, designed probably for use in the making of hats, but not even shaped. Of the bead ornaments a sample accompanies the papers. It is a leaf-shaped article 3 inches long by 1 inches wide at the base, tapering to a point at the apex, the edges being irregular. The foundation of it is coarse cotton, which is entirely covered with small gold-colored glass beads, interspersed with a dozen larger glass beads of a pale blue color.

The appraiser returned the hat crowns for duty as wool trimmings at 30 cents per pound and 50 per cent ad valorem, under paragraph 368 of the act of March 3, 1883, and the collector so classified them, but in his special report he admits his error, and places them under paragraph 362 of said act, as a manufacture wholly or in part of wool, not specially enumerated or provided for, at 35 cents per pound and 40 per cent ad valorem. The bead ornaments were returned for duty by the appraiser at 50 per cent ad valorem, under paragraph 396 of said act, and so classified by the collector.

He admits that his return of commission for duty was erroneous. Appellants protest against the classification of both classes of articles, claiming that the hat crowns are hats, dutiable at 30 per cent ad valorem, under paragraph 400 of said act, and that the beads are dutiable as a manufacture of glass and cotton, glass chief value, at 45 per cent ad valorem, under paragraph 143 of said act.

It is submitted as an incontrovertible proposition that flat pieces of wool and silk are not hats, and hence that the contention of appellants as to this point is groundless. It is equally plain that they are not dress trimmings, or wool trimmings, within the meaning of paragraph 368 of the wool schedule; and that they are not specially provided for in that paragraph or in any other paragraph of the act of March 3, 1883. This being so, they fall under the general clause of paragraph 362, and should be classified for duty thereunder at 35 cents per pound and 40 per cent ad valorem.

The beads, it seems to us, fulfill every condition of the clause-"bead ornaments"-in paragraph 396. It is not easy to perceive the reason of appellants' contention that as between two provisions of a statute the more specific should give way to the more general. The contrary is the true rule of construction, and it must be followed in this case. Were it held that the beads or bead ornaments are not specifically provided for they would still be dutiable at 50 per cent ad valorem under the principle of the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Benziger v. Robertson, vol. 122, U. S. R., p. 211.

Commissions are not dutiable unless they contribute to make market value. According to the report of the appraiser they do not so contribute in this case, and appellants' protest in that regard is therefore sustained. (10541–G. A. 191.)

NEW YORK, December 15, 1890.

SILK AND WOOL KNIT GOODS.-The merchandise in question consists of knit underwear composed of wool and silk, and wool, cotton, and silk, upon which duty was assessed at 35 cents per pound and 40 per cent ad valorem, under paragraph 363 of the act of 1883. Against this rate of duty the importers. protest, claiming that silk formed the component material of chief value in the garments, and that consequently they should have been classified as manufactures made of silk, or of which silk is the component material of chief value, and duty assessed upon them at 50 per cent ad valorem, under paragraph 383.

The goods are itemized in the invoice as "ladies' wool vests." From the evidence

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