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offered by those more highly abstract schemes that depend upon the enormous assumption that good faith necessarily exists in the Governments of all nations. Surely a test of good faith should be satisfied before the candidature of any nation for membership of a League is considered.

All through his Note Mr. Wilson is careful to distinguish between the German Government and the German people. It is true that he accuses the German people of having entered with zest upon the criminal adventures dictated to them by their Government, but his belief that there is still a very appreciable difference between the guilt of the people and the guilt of the Government is evident. It is this belief that gives to his Note its peculiar character of being at once a manifesto to the world and a special appeal to the German people to repudiate their rulers. “We cannot, he says, “take the word of the present rulers of Germany as a guarantee of anything that is to endure unless explicitly supported by such conclusive evidence of the will and purpose of the German people themselves as the other peoples of the world would be justified in accepting.” In other words, Mr. Wilson suggests that there should be no peace with the Kaiser unless the people of Germany, by some recognized means of popular expression, guarantee that the word of the Kaiser is genuine. That brings us rather nearer to the point where the Kaiser might be eliminated altogether by the Allies. We have always felt that perhaps the simplest and safest plan would be to inform the German people that we would not make peace under any conditions with their present rulers, just as Bismarck, when outside Paris, refused to treat with Gambetta, but insisted on the French people creating a special Assembly for the purpose of negotiating peace.

The Spectator.

It is interesting to notice that Mr. Wilson seems to stand apart from the Allies in what we take to be an implicit disapproval of he Paris resolutions. “Responsible statesmen,” he says, “must now everywhere see, if they never saw before, that no peace can rest securely upon political or economic restrictions meant to benefit some nations and cripple or embarrass others.” Again, on the same lines he says: “Punitive damages, the dismemberment of Empires, the establishment of selfish and exclusive Economic Leagues, we deem inex pedient and in the end worse than futile.” We imagine that where the rights of distinct groups of people or races, such as the South Slavs, are concerned, Mr. Wilson would consider that those rights have precedence over the right of the Austrian Empire not to be dismembered. But in a formal document like this American answer to the Pope it is not, of course, possible to insert innumerable safeguarding clauses and parenthetical reservations. It is rather a general statement of American resolution to fight on, however long the war may last, till democracy has established itself as the principle for all civilized nations, and the foreign and disturbing element of autocracy has been removed as not only a nuisance but a terrible danger. In the true manner of Lincoln, Mr. Wilson balances his hatred of war against the German people and his trust in democracy as being the only safeguard of the world, and he sums up fearlessly and with a clear conscience in favor of what seems to him much the greater cause. Just so did Lincoln strike a balance when he said: “Was it possible to lose the Nation and yet preserve the Constitution? By general law life and limb must be protected; yet often a limb must be amputated to save a life; but a life is never wisely given to save a limb.”


And what," I said, "did you do during the Great War, Francesca?”

"In the first place I fine you a sum not exceeding one hundred pounds for asking me such a question. In the second place I retort upon you by telling you that one of the things you're going to do during the Great War is to give up marmalade."

"What! Give up the thing which lends to breakfast its one and only distinction? Never.".

“That,” she said, "sounds very brave; but what are you going to do if there isn't any marmalade to be obtained for love or money?”'

"Mine,” I said, “ has always been the sort you get for money. I have not hitherto met the amatory variety; but if it's really marmalade I'm prepared to have a go at it.”.

.“And that,” she said, "is very kind of you, but it's quite useless. For the moment there's no marmalade of any kind to be had."

“None of the dark-brown variety?” No.

“Or the sort that looks like golden jelly?"

"Not a scrap."

"Or the old-fashioned but admirable kind? The excellent substitute for butter at breakfast?”

"That must go like the rest. It has been a substitute for the last time.”

"Impossible,” I said. “Everything is now a substitute for something else. Marmalade started being a substitute long ago, and it isn't fair to stop it and let the other things go on.”

"Well," she said, "what are you going to do about it? If you can't get Seville oranges how are you going to get Seville orange marmalade?"

"Oh, that's it, is it?"

"Yes, that's it, more or less. And now let's have your remedy."

“You needn't think,” I said, "that I'm going to take it lying down. I shall go up to London and defy Lord Rhondda to his face. I shall write pro-marmalade letters to various newspapers. I shall form a Marmalade League, with branches in all the constituencies so as to bring political pressure to bear. I shall head a deputation to the Prime Minister. I shall get Mr. King or Mr. Hogge or Mr. Pringle, or all three of them, to ask questions in the House of Commons. In short, I shall exhaust all the usual devices for giving the Government a thoroughly uncomfortable time."

“In short you will do your patriotic best to help your country through its difficulties and to put the interest of the nation above your own convenience.”

“Francesca," I said, "you must not be too serious. I was but attempting a jest.”

“This is no time for jests. I can't bear even to think of your joining the Brigade of Grousers who are always girding at the Government. I won't stand your being a girder. So make up your mind to that."

“Very well," I said, “I will endeavor not to be a girder; but you simply must get me a pot or two of marmalade."

And allow the Kaiser to win the war? Not if I know it. Besides, I don't like marmalade."

“There you are,” I said. "You don't . like marmalade-few women do—and so you're going to make a virtue for yourself by forcing me to give it up. My dear, you've given the whole show away."

"Don't juggle with words,” she said, speaking with a dreadful calm. “I may be able to get a pot or two--say at the outside a dozen pots. Well, if I manage it I will inform you—"

“Yes," I said eagerly.

"If I manage it,” she repeated, "you shall know of it, and you shall make your self-denial complete and efficacious."

"I don't like the way in which this sentence is turning out."

“You shall have a pot in front of you at breakfast, and you shan't touch a shred of it."

"Francesca," I said, "you're a tyrant. But no, you wouldn't be mean enough to do it-before the children too."

"Perhaps, as a concession, I would allow you a little marmalade in a pudding at luncheon."

"But I don't like marmalade in a Punch.

pudding at luncheon. I like it on toast at breakfast."

“But you're not going to have it on toast at breakfast."

“Well,” I said, “I shall conduct reprisals. For every time you don't allow me to have any I shall destroy something you like-a blouse or a hat. If I'm to give up the essence of Dundee or Paisley you shall at least give up hats."

“But the marmalade will remain.”

“Yes, and the hats will all perish. That's where I come in."

"Don't buoy yourself up with that notion,” she said. “You'll have to pay for the new ones-or owe."

R. C. Lehmann.


What is beginning very seriously to counterbalance the increased conto trouble the statesmen of every sumption and waste incident on transcountry, neutrals no less than bellig- forming some thirty millions of peaserents, and to add to their more ants and laborers into soldiers, who pressing perplexities, is the practical must be maintained in fighting energy; certainty of there being, for some time and on engaging perhaps fifteen milafter the war, the gravest world- lion other men and women at enshortage, not only in the principal hanced wages on the manufacture foodstuffs, but also in the most in- of munitions. For one or other dispensable raw materials. In spite reason, it is to be expected that of frantic efforts to maintain and to 'Russia, Roumania and Hungary, and increase production, the aggregate to a large extent even the United wheat harvests of the world have States, will, for the next year or two, been year by year falling behind the drop out of the list of food-exporting demands of the growing populations. countries. What is no less serious is Though supplies are held up tem- that the shortage will extend to most porarily in this country and that of the raw materials needed for "refor lack of the means of conveyance, construction" and for the resumption the aggregate world stock is rapidly of manufacturing production, on which shrinking. Though the number of the forty or fifty millions of workers cattle, sheep and pigs has been so far throughout the world now in arms or maintained in some countries, it is engaged in "war trades”-numbering, believed to have been greatly reduced with their dependents, possibly one throughout all Continental Europe. in twelve of the entire population of The markets of the world are being the globe—will depend for subsistence swept bare of all the subsidiary food. when the Declaration of Peace gives stuffs. All the efforts at economy, the signal for demobilization. What voluntary and enforced, do not suffice has increased during the war has been

the production of steel. But the aggregate output of coal has largely diminished, together with that of most of the metallic ores. There will be the gravest shortage of oil and timber and hides and wool. This general world shortage of the principal commodities will be enormously aggravated by the shortage of shipping. The aggregate merchant shipping tonnage of the world may, at the end of the war, probably stand at not much more than two-thirds of the pre-war figure, whilst of that which survives a large proportion will be required for a year or two to carry the millions of soldiers home. To aggravate the difficulty, all the railways and roads of Europe will be in a terrible state of disrepair; and land transport will everywhere be slow, uncertain and extremely costly. It is not merely that the world is dependent for a sufficiency of food on the successive harvests in its different countries during the next twelve or eighteen months being relatively good. The statesmen's difficulties will, it is true, be intensified if there should be any widespread failure of crops, such as might be produced by drought in Australia or floods spread of the potato disease throughout Europe, or a bad monsoon in India. But the famine into which the world is hurrying will be even more of a money-famine than a food-famine. Over large parts of Europe the resumption of manufacturing production will be for a long time impracticable—even the restoration of the destroyed factories and machinery will be difficult—owing to the lack of raw material and fuel. Whilst prices will be fabulously high, there will be no wages. Unless some very drastic and very far-reaching measures are taken in time, and taken on a sufficiently large scale, there will be many millions of families in parts of Europe

in China, the

and Southeastern Asia without employment and without means to buy the scanty supplies of extremely dear food that will be locally accessible to them. There will be labor revolts and revolutionary upheavals. Whole districts will be starving. It is not too much to say that there will be places within a day's journey of European capitals where society, from an extremity of want not paralleled in Europe since the Thirty Years' War, may be near dissolution. It is this prospective result of diverting forty or fifty millions of European workers, during three or four years, from production to destruction that has caused all the schemes for “Trade after the War” to shrivel up, and taken the life out of both the Paris Economic Conference resolutions and the “pre-emption” projects of the Central Powers. What the statesmen are beginning to realize is that the world after the war, so far as the exportable surpluses of foodstuffs and raw materials are concerned, will be in the position of a beleagured city. There will not be enough to go round. It will be plainly impossible to revert, for some time to come, to the unfettered scramble of private enterprise that we call Free Trade. No government, belligerent or neutral, will feel able, the morning after Peace has been declared, to dispense with the extensive controls that it has had to exercise over importing, exporting, manufacturing and distributing. No nation will be inclined, whatever may be the prices offered by others in more desperate need, to allow the export of any commodity of which it may presently run short. On the other hand, every nation will be eager to increase its own exports, and therefore obtain for this purpose materials and coal, in order both to employ its demobilized millions and to pay for the imports of

which in such sore need. What policy of International Trade does this impending world-shortage indicate? Half a century ago the orthodox economists would have blindly relied on the “Law of Supply and Demand”; they would have said that where there was most scarcity prices would rise highest, and supplies would flow automatically whither they were most required. Within each country the available commodities would similarly go to those who were willing to pay the highest prices for them, and must therefore be presumed to have the greatest need of them! Upon this argument food continued to be exported from Ireland throughout the Great Famine because the starving Irish could not compete in “effective demand” with the London diners-out. The economists now know better; and they are adv'sing their governments that if in the impending worldshortage, distribution, either between nations or within each nation, is left to the “free play of economic forces,” it will mean famine on a large scale. The richer nations, the richer classes within each nation, the richest family within each class, may thus be fully suplied, at no greater inconvenience than increased payment. But the poorer nations, classes and families will be starved. What might be, as in a beleaguered city, no worse than a general abstinence, if systematic distribution is arranged, will be converted, if “let alone,” into a famine so extensive as possibly to bring down society in ruin. It is significant of the change which has come over both economics and politics that it is to the Labor and Socialist Parties that the world is indebted for calling attention to this impending peril; and that it is under their pressure that the heavily burdened governments are beginning to give the subject consideration. It

it will stand

remains to be seen whether the statesmanship of the present governing classes of Europe can rise to the height of the task that they have brought upon themselves. The shortage will probably be sufficiently great to demand that, as in a beleaguered city, the whole world should be placed on 1ations. This, so far as some of the principal food-producing countries are concerned (such, for instance, as the South American Republics, India and China), we have no machinery to secure. But what could be established, and what in spite of the strenuous opposition of the merchants and shipowners certainly ought to be established—for the peril is imminent and unmistakable—is an international control of the whole export trade in the commodities of which we shall be short, and of the whole marine transportation that will be required. What may, we hope, be expected is some extension and transformation of the Commission Internationale de Ravitailement that the Allied Governments have found it necessary to set up in order to coordinate their own international dealings; the admission to this (possibly under the management of the Council of the League of Nations—or whatever may be the title of the Supernational Authority in which this war must issue), not only of all the countries lately belligerent, but also of the neutrals; the control by this Commission of all export trade between nations (reserving to each its own coastwise and colonial trade), and of all beyond each nation's indispensable quota of merchant shipping; and the deliberate allocation and conveyance to each country, out of the aggregate exportable surpluses, of whatever is required to supply the most urgent primary needs of all of them, before the less urgent demands of any one among them are satisfied, whatever may be

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