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THE GUNS IN SUSSEX.

Light green of grass and richer green of bush

Slope upwards to the darkest green of fir;

How still! How deathly still! And yet . the hush

Shivers and trembles with some sub

tle stir,

Some far-off throbbing, like a muffled drum,

Beaten in broken rhythm oversea, To play the last funereal march of some Who die today that Europe may be free.

The deep-blue heaven, curving from the green,

Spans with its shimmering arch the flowery zone;

In all God's earth there is no gentler

scene,

And yet I hear that awesome monotone;

Above the circling midge's piping shrill, And the long droning of the questing bee,

Above all sultry summer sounds, it

still

Mutters its ceaseless menaces to me.

And as I listen all the garden fair

Darkens to plains of misery and death,

And looking past the roses I see there Those sordid furrows, with the rising breath

Of all things foul and black. My heart is hot

Within me as I view it, and I cry, "Better the misery of these men's lot Than all the peace that comes to such as I!"

And strange that in the pauses of the sound

I hear the children's laughter as they roam,

And then their mother calls, and all around

Rise up the gentle murmurs of a

home.

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In the green spaces of the listening trees

Pan sits at ease, Watching with lazy eyes Little blue butterflies

That flicker sidelong in the fitful breeze;

While on his pipe he plays
Quaint trills and roundelays
With dropping cadences;

And shy red squirrels rub against his knees.

And, thro' the city's tumult and the beat

Of hurrying feet,
Those whom the god loves hear

Pan's pipe, insistent, clear; Echoes of elfin laughter, high and sweet;

Catch in the sparrows' cries
Those tinkling melodies

That sing where brooklets meet,

And the wood's glamour colors the

gray street.

Punch.

THE AMERICAN AVIATION PROGRAM.

The large total of 640,000,000 dollars provided for the construction of aeroplanes and the training of the necessary pilots, observers, mechanics, etc., shows that, though the American aviation services have to be created from top to bottom, the determination of our new Allies to carry out their huge program is most serious. They have already set to work with a will to execute it. And, it is important to note it has been stated on reliable authority that the machines are to be of the most approved British and French types. The Americans have had enough common sense to recognize that the avions built, thus far, by their constructors are not fit for war purposes. They have consequently invited the British and French aviation authorities to assist them, not only by furnishing them with the plans and specifications of their machines, but by instructing them in all matters concerning the organization of their aviation services.

When, immediately after the declaration of war by the United States, it was announced that America would construct an immense aerial fleet, Orville Wright said: "I do not believe the war can be ended by any other method with so little loss of life and property." He was probably right, and though the number of aeroplanes to be built is only 22,000 instead of the 100,000 first spoken of, his assertion loses none of its weight. Every day the war has lasted has served to demonstrate to the British and French the indispensable character of the avion in modern warfare, and the decision now taken by the Americans to send a formidable aerial force to Europe, can but act as an additional stimulus to them to make yet more strenuous efforts to secure that mastery in the air which is an

all-important factor of superiority on the earth. The Entente Powers will therefore continue to increase and strengthen their aerial forces which, with the addition of the avions the Americans will furnish, should insure the retention of that superiority in the air which has been already wrested from the Germans. The Germans, however, in the hope of regaining it, have, it is affirmed, abandoned altogether the building of Zeppelins, and converted Friedrichshafen into a great aeroplane factory. But in spite of all the efforts the Germans may make to augment their aerial fleet, our superiority should be rendered sufficiently complete to blind the enemy's artillery, and at the same time keep the eyes of the British, French, and American commanders wide open: that is to say, the aerial forces of the Entente Powers should be strong enough to beat back, capture, or destroy every hostile aeroplane seeking to penetrate over their lines, to reconnoitre and discover the positions of batteries, fortified places, troops, etc., and to make incursion over the territory occupied by the foe to learn his military secrets a comparatively easy matter.

To reconnoitre and direct the fire of artillery are two indispensable services rendered by aeroplanes, but they have made their action felt in many other ways. They have bombarded with good effect munitions depôts and factories, fortified places, camps, etc. They have flown far over the enemy's territory, and it is only natural to anticipate that, with the addition of the American aerial contingent, and the ever-increasing importance of the British and French aerial forces, those journeys will ere long be effected with still larger fleets. The assistance in aerial warfare the Americans can

render the Entente Powers is therefore most valuable, and their intention to do their utmost to give it is unquestionable. The voting of the big aviation grant is no bluff, but the task they have undertaken will probably prove more difficult to perform than they imagine even now. Admitting that it is possible for them, with their powerful industrial organizations, to construct the 22,000 aeroplanes, as they hope to do, by the end of June, 1918, in spite of the inevitable delays resulting from the modifications which future experience in the war will render advisable and even indispensable, and that the necessary motors suitable for the various types of avions can be provided within the time-limit, there still remains the difficult and delicate task of training the great number of pilots who will be required. The aerodromes for their instruction have to be created, the machines on which the pupils will have to practise flight do not yet exist in anything like sufficient numbers, and the professors have to be found. The "output" of pilots, if that expression be permissible in speaking of such brave men, would have to be 100 per week to provide 5,200 pilots in twelve months. If the Americans succeed in making that number of really skilled pilots within that period of a year, the result will be most brilliant, especially as in the first months they cannot terminate the training of one single man.

The French employ a method of selection from among the volunteers for service as pilots in the aviation corps. It was invented by Doctors Camus and Nepper. It consists in tests of the applicant's physical aptitudes. With the aid of ingenious instruments the candidate's nervous reactions are mechanically inscribed. In war the safety of the pilot and the success of his mission

must often depend on rapidity of action. A fraction of a second between the perception of a sound, the instant when an object is perceived or a shock felt, and the requisite action to avert the danger is often of vital importance. Doctors Camus and

Nepper have succeeded in measuring that lapse of time which, for military aviators, should be but a small fraction of a second. The same doctors, knowing that a military aviator has not only to pilot his machine safely, but also to fight, have invented an apparatus to ascertain his emotional reactions. The instrument inscribes the applicant's sang-froid, or his lack of that quality. The application of those tests has proved very useful for the elimination of candidates physically unfit for service in the aviation corps as pilots. Doctors Camus and Nepper do not pretend that every man who undergoes the tests successfully will make a good military aviation pilot, but they contend that those men who fail to pass are physically unfit for such service. By adopting this or some similar test, the Americans would avoid great loss of time in the training of aviation pupils who, after considerable training, might be found physically incapable of performing the work required of them. There is, however, a physical aptitude indispensable for a good military aviation pilot to test which no apparatus has yet been invented. It is the ability to ascend to a high altitude without feeling emotion calculated to diminish the pilot's capacities. It is not a question of the strength or weakness of the heart, which can, of course, be easily ascertained. At the beginning of the war the military aviators rarely ascended higher than 600 or 1,000 metres (1,968 or 3,280 feet). At the present time battles in the air are frequently fought at altitudes varying between 3,000 and 4,000 metres (9,840 and

13,120 feet). Many aviators who are in possession of all their faculties while flying at the height of 1,000 or even 2,000 metres (3,280 or 6,560 feet) cannot ascend to a greater altitude without losing their self-possession.

That being said, it is useful to indicate what the huge American Aviation Program really means. "The Man-in-the-street" seems to imagine that immense fleets of thousands of American aeroplanes will soon be seen flying over Germany, bombarding the Krupp factory at Essen, Berlin, and the other capitals of the German States. Undoubtedly such expeditions will be undertaken by the Entente Allies with more important aerial forces, and more frequently than heretofore; but it must be remembered that the Americans cannot, even with the complete execution of their aviation program, ever have at the same time anything approaching 22,000 avions in service. Though money has been spent lavishly on the creation and organization of the British and French aviation services, it is not divulging any secret to say that the two nations have never had so many avions fit for military and naval operations in their possession. The average length of life of a military aeroplane in active service is not more than four months; therefore, to maintain a fleet of 22,000 avions at the front, the construction of 66,000 a year would be necessary. As the American grant provides for the building of only 22,000 within the next twelve months, and as the machines will be put into service gradually, it must be taken for granted that the very largest number which can be in service at the same time will be between 7,000 and 10,000. And it does not at all follow that all those machines will be available all together for reconnoitring, bombarding, etc. On the contrary, each pilot should have at his

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one, half his time, and probably more will be spent in doing nothing during the repair of his avion or its motor. Consequently, it would seem a liberal estimate to reckon that the construction of 22,000 aeroplanes could at no moment of the year furnish an aerial reconnoitring and fighting force of more than 5,000, especially as in both the British and French aviation services two aeroplanes per pilot are not considered sufficient. Under these circumstances it is agreeable to note the declarations of General Squiers in charge of the execution of the American aviation program. He says it is no secret that the 640,000,000 dollars voted for the creation of the American aviation services "is only the forerunner of another grant equally big." It is certain that to maintain even 5,000 avions working at the front it will be necessary for the Americans to build at least three times that number per annum. no doubt be attempted, and perhaps achieved. At any rate, General Squiers's conception of the mission confided to him would lead the world to think so. He says: "The conception I have of my duty is not only to launch an attack by way of the air, but to create a veritable 'inundation of aeroplanes.' We intend to furnish the cavalry of the sky,' which will contribute to the final victory." On his side Mr. Howard Coffin, President of the American Aviation Commission, knows very well "the building of aeroplanes is not like shaking leaves from a tree." Referring to the training of the necessary number of pilots, he adds: "Already three of our twentyfour great training-grounds for aviators are ready, and on those grounds training has begun. . . . My fellowcountrymen have given us money and men; let our Allies give us confidence and credit."

The addition of 5,000 American avions to the ever-increasingly large number of military and naval aeroplanes possessed by Great Britain and France would constitute an extremely valuable reinforcement of the Entente Powers' aerial forces, though it would not have that overwhelmingly powerful character which too many people appear to imagine. The Germans are thoroughly alive to the vital importance of aeroplanes in the present conflict, and in presence of the strenuous efforts they are making to regain supremacy in the air by the construction of such powerful aerial craft as the Gotha, propelled by two 250 h.p. engines, and armed with four mitrailleuses, nothing could indicate more clearly the immense services the Americans can render their Allies than the following extract from a German official document, found in possession of a prisoner. It is the general report of the battle of the Somme, drawn up by the Staff of General von Bellow, Commander of the First German Army, which had to bear the brunt of the battle and which suffered such severe losses:

Our aviators were very seldom able to execute long-distance reconnoitring expeditions. Our artillery aviators were driven back as soon as they attempted to cross the enemy's lines to regulate the fire of our batteries. Reconnoitring by photography did not furnish the indications demanded of it. The consequence was that, often at decisive moments, our infantry could not obtain support from our artillery, either by counteraction against the enemy's artillery, or by an annihilating fire on the hostile infantry awaiting the word of command to attack. Our artillery suffered serious losses in its personnel and material from the enemy's artillery, of which the fire was regulated by perfect aerial observations, without ours being able to engage in the

struggle. During the attacks our infantry and artillery were, moreover, exposed to the attacks of the hostile aviators, and the moral effect resulting from it was undeniable. One of the causes of that inferiority was the limited number of our aviators, which was in the proportion of one to ten. Moreover, they could not be effectually supported by our anti-aircraft guns, of which the small number was diminished by the great losses in material caused by the Anglo-French artillery fire, and by the wearing out of the tubes, resulting from abnormal service. And we possessed no telephonic aerial defense, so that the arrival of the enemy's, aviators was always announced too late. Lastly, our fighting aerial squadrons were stationed too far in the rear, and some of them were provided with C machines, which are, so to say, unfit for aerial battle.

This long general report of the great battle concludes with the well-founded assertion: "Nothing but the presence in useful time, of a great aerial force can insure success."

That the Germans have profited by the lesson thus taught them in 1916 is demonstrated by the now frequent use of groups of fighting avions, superior both in numbers and armament to those formerly employed, to support the attacking waves of infantry by flying low and firing on their enemies. Without neglecting the primary duties of the aerial services, those of reconnoitring and regulating the fire of artillery, our enemies are every day extending more and more the employment of aeroplanes in conjunction with the other arms. To counter such combined attacks, and to organize similar combined action against the foe, all the aid the Americans can furnish will not be more than will be the required, because sooner the Germans are thoroughly mastered in the air, the sooner the land forces of

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