understood that it bore a strong resemblance to ours in pre-Cardwell days; that it was the armed police of an essentially pacific people; that it was starved for men and war material; that it was scattered in detachments in distant garrisons; that it was not a modern Army in any sense except in its spirit and in the excellence and the spartan discipline of the West Point training; and that even the General Staff, that mainspring of success in war, had been relegated to a position inferior to its deserts. All the struggles which our soldiers have been through to improve our Army in recent years the American soldiers have also been through, almost measure for measure, but just as it required this World War to bring home to the minds of our people that right without might was unsafe in a still imperfect world, so it has needed this perfidious aggression and these insane barbarities of Germany to convince the citizens of the United States that they must in defense of principles which they have deeply at heart, turn their ploughshares into swords for awhile.

I admit that the key of the situation so far as the American Expeditionary Force is concerned, remains in Washington. The vast and extremely complicated problem of organizing, transporting, and maintaining armies adequate to represent America honorably in the war must be solved at Washington and cannot be solved anywhere else. The American armies gathering here are the expression of the ability or otherwise of Washington to work out one of the most arduous Staff exercises ever set to a military administration, and upon the competence or otherwise of the President and his advisers to foresee and provide for all contingencies must depend the success of this astounding American adventure.

It is a cause of disquiet to some people that, owing to President Wil

son's almost autocratic powers, and the leading rôle which he plays in these great events, one false note struck by him may fatally injure the cause. But as against this fear there stands the fact, admitted even by the President's political opponents, that not only in all that he has said and done since he took his great decision, but also in all that he has not said and has not done, he has at present not made one single mistake. There is consequently complete confidence in his supreme direction and control.

I have to make this last reservation because people are too busy here to follow in all their details the preparations in America. But we know that the necessary men are at the President's disposal, that all the youth and strength and energy of America are being enlisted for the war; that the arrangements for providing munitions and equipments are well forward, and as each new division lands in France we see not only evidence but proof that the machine at home works well. The President's practice of sending men here to gain experience by harsh contact with practical realities, and then of calling them back to advise him, is an excellent system, and might even be further extended with advantage.

To understand the difficulties of Washington we must, for example, comprehend the transport problem. We must know how many tons gross are needed, first for the transport and then for the maintenance of every American soldier; how long the circular tour of the transports takes; how much of this time is occupied by embarking and disembarking, and how much by steaming in convoy or otherwise; and there enters into this calculation the question of draughts of vessels and of ports, as well as that of railway or other communications with the troops at the front. A margin to provide

against losses at sea is also one of the necessities of the situation.

There have been no great American Armies in the field since the Civil War, and that was quite a long time ago. Consequently General Pershing and his staff have been almost exclusively occupied, since they landed in June last, in creating the organization for the Armies now in course of arriving. It has been a stupendous task, greater, I think, than any American soldier realized before he arrived here. The whole of the Headquarters Staff, and the whole great administrative services at the front and on the lines of communication, have had to be devised and then created and manned.

We have built up the magnificent organization of our British Armies from small beginnings, and after a long lapse of time. The organization of the ports, railways, lines of communication, rest camps, depôts, magazines, hospitals, remount establishments, artillery repair shops, billets, wash-houses, and a score of other services has been evolved by a long process of painful experience. This experience, and that of our French Allies, are placed freely at the disposal of the American Staff, but an Army like that of the United States coming fresh to this gigantic problem must be appalled at its magnitude and complexity, and must be given full time to master it. The American Army is not in its own country. It has, in everything connected with the French territory, and even railways, to act through the French mission under a general officer which is attached to it, and through French civil administration. American ways are not the ways of other people, and it has required good will on both sides to overcome all the formidable difficulties which have constantly presented themselves. All these difficulties are being overcome by the natural good sense of both sides,

and, though the time taken to complete the organization appears long to ardent spirits, I am convinced that the Americans are working on the right lines, and that it is merely a question of time for the organization to be completed.

It is the same with the troops who are distributed in huts and billets in localities suitable for training, each division by itself. The divisional commander is able to gain a grip upon his men, to know all his chief officers, and to supervise the training, which is in general charge of the French, so far as the battalion and the battery work is concerned, in case any help is needed. American officers and men attend both French schools and ours, and every assistance needed is freely rendered. The progress of all arms is remarkable. All ranks display a serious spirit and show the greatest keenness. The officers of the old Regular Army are a distinguished body of men, thoroughly professional, highly educated, and most modest and anxious to learn all the new methods of war which this campaign has produced. The case of the American colonel who refused to be a mere spectator at one of our bombing schools, and went through the whole course in the guise of a private under a British sergeant-instructor, is to my mind typical of the manner in which American officers approach their task. The troops are a fine, virile, upstanding body of men, nearest perhaps to the Australians in type, but with a very distinct individuality of their own. The discipline is excellent so far as can be judged from externals, and I shall be almost sorry for the Boches when these lithe, active Americans run up against them.

The American Expeditionary Force is completely self-supporting, and draws nothing from France except air, water, fresh vegetables, and eggs. The sol

diers eat the best white bread that I have tasted for many months, and all the flour comes from America, as does the frozen meat and everything else in the way of supplies, including the iron ration of bacon and biscuit, and even milk. The Americans do not therefore impose any very severe strain upon the food supplies of the nation whose guests they are, and, moreover, they are bringing over locomotives, carriages, trucks, and railway plant to increase the possibilities of railway traffic on the French lines.

The relations between the Americans and their French hosts are excellent. There have been difficulties to be overcome, naturally, and things move more slowly than is pleasing to everyone, but by the exercise of tact and discretion on both sides the ways are being smoothed, and the troops and staffs are settling down to the long preliminary work necessary to fit units for the specialized warfare of today. In a thousand ways the French prove excellent guides and invaluable helpers. They are employed by the hundred thousand in erecting huts for the troops, so that the Americans may be comfortably housed during their first winter in France. They are busy manufacturing an important part of the American artillery, and in training the new arrivals to use these guns. They help in training specialists, especially in the infantry, and, in short, they place themselves completely at American disposal while their guests are in what the latter themselves describe as a "formative" stage.

Our rôle in helping the Americans to perfect their organization and training is much more restricted, but still it is important. Our practice is to place everything that we have unreservedly at American disposal, and to throw all doors widely open to them. Field

Marshal Sir Douglas Haig is excellently well represented at General Pershing's Headquarters by a good, sound, practical officer. The wonderful organization, spirit, and efficiency of our Armies come as a complete revelation to most American soldiers. Americans of all grades have visited our Armies, have studied and have adopted much of our organization, have been present at our operations, large and small, and have, many of them, undergone the training in our schools for specialists. Some of our specialists, by request, help to found the American schools on sure bases. We have not forced ourselves in any way upon the Americans. We wait for them to come to us. They have just come to us at their good will and pleasure, without any false pride, and the unbreakable link of a common language, common ideals, and a common outlook upon life has enabled them to understand us rapidly. What they find good in our system they accept and adopt, and what they find bad they reject.

In France, we have suddenly discovered America, and America has discovered us. How different we both are from our preconceived notions of each other! We did not know what a highly educated, professional, and modest gentleman the American Regular officer was, nor did we quite realize what a splendid body of active fighting men he was going to bring over with him. We are a great deal more enthusiastic about the Americans, and, if I may say so, more proud of them, than we show on the surface. How can we not regard as men of our own flesh and blood the relays of American soldiers of all grades who come to us, who speak our own language and bear our own names, who understand us in a flash of time, and whose point of view on almost every conceivable subject under heaven is our own?

These sentiments are, I hope, mutual.

The Americans did not know what our Armies were, nor what they had done or are doing. Many of them know now. They witness under fire our grand attacks and our raids. They observe with astonishment the terrific powers of our modern artillery and the glorious activities of our splendid airmen. They see the spirit, the discipline, and the emulation of our infantry, and they are profoundly

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impressed by them. I hope that the pride which we feel, without venturing to express it, in the Americans is a little reciprocated by them. I can only say that every American soldier who has told me of his experiences on the British front has spoken with enthusiastic admiration of our men, and that an entirely new feeling, the consequences of which may be immense, is growing up between the two kindred nations in arms.

Sir Edward Carson and General Smuts, speaking for the National War Aims Committee both affirmed that the ultimate object of the war was to end war. We were bound, said Sir Edward Carson, to see to it "that never again should this monster of war raise its head in a civilized world." "Militarism," said General Smuts, "must be swept away from the face of the earth," and there must be "no future threat against the peace of the world." We can all heartily assent to these propositions in the abstract; but when we come to consider their practical application, doubts arise. There were many respectable persons who, before the war, labored to discover a means of making war impossible. Some found a remedy, which no one would adopt, in universal disarmament. Others thought that commercial interests would prevent war. Another war came; and we have now to begin all over again. Two questions are here involved: one is the general problem of how to prevent all war in the future; the other, the particular problem of how to make it impossible that Germany should again set fire to the world. And as it seems that only the solution of the second problem can make practicable the solution of the first, it is with the case

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of Germany we have to deal. question is by what means can Germany be compelled to keep the peace in the future? It is not an abstract question. It is so important that unless it is settled the cause of civilization will be defeated and the war will have been fought in vain. But how is it possible to bind over a great and a powerful nation to keep the peace? It may be possible, but so far the way and means thereto have not been invented. The old method was annihilation, which is not suggested. The more modern expedient is to secure guarantees by treaty. But that also is set aside, because the word of the German is worthless. Nor, as General Smuts observed, is it proposed to break up the German nation.

What, then, remains? History should help us to the answer. There is no instance in modern history of the success of the attempt on the part of one nation to dominate the rest of the world; and the reason of the failure seems to consist in the simple fact that the rest of the world will not submit to conquest. The hegemony of the world was the ambition of the First Napoleon. A soldier of genius, an administrator of consummate ability, Napoleon came to France when she was struggling in the throes of revolu

tion, mastered her wild spirit, and led her upon the mounting path of conquest. Here was no preconceived plan of aggression. The Napoleonic wars were the work of Napoleon, who marched upon a great adventure, perhaps the greatest adventure ever attempted by one man, marched from triumph to triumph, until the antagonistic forces he had awakened closed in upon him. He fell, but to rise again with an indomitable splendor; then fell to rise no more. He tried to do what is not permitted to man to accomplish. Did his failure end war, so far as France was concerned? We are to consider that since the passing of Napoleon France has never even contemplated another series of great wars of aggression. Nor is it to be supposed for an instant that France had or will have any such impulse. The war of 1870 was the work of the German, like the present war. But we have here to reflect that, except in so far as the Napoleonic wars were directed towards conquest, there is no parallel between those campaigns and the conflict provoked by Germany. Napoleon was a great adventurer, whose commanding personality drew to his banner a whole nation. war provoked by Germany was the subject of forty years of preparation by the rulers of Germany. They framed the whole national policy to the one supreme end, and educated an entire population to believe in it. The process was achieved with a dull and an obstinate malignity devoid of any spark of genius. Piece by piece, the man-devouring machine was built up. It was designed for the sole purpose of acquiring material gain. The French went to war for an idea. The Germans organized slaughter for lust. The German people were promised a great reward. They were promised the kingdoms of the earth and the glory thereof; and Dr. Faustus duly clenched The London Post,

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the bargain with Mephistopheles.

When Napoleon fell the light of France went out. The thing was over and done. The Frenchman returned to cultivate his garden. But in the case of Germany there is no single person whose removal would materially affect the situation. It is the population of Germany which is involved in this affair; and you cannot destroy a whole population. Therefore the only method by which the Germans can be turned from their wickedness is to prove to them by practical demonstration that its results are and must be fraught with the most frightful disaster. What means soever are requisite to that end will be taken. How far Germany is from appreciating the situation is demonstrated by the fact stated by Sir Edward Carson that the Allies have never had from the German Government any offer of peace whatsoever. According to all the available evidence, the Pan-German, or Fatherland, Party is still unshakably predominant. And until recently the German people undoubtedly believed what they were told, that the war was forced upon Germany by her jealous rivals. But the entrance of America, who has nothing to gain by her action, into the quarrel, and the declared enmity of almost all the rest of the world, are beginning to shake the credence of the German people in the enormous falsehood of their rulers. It is possible they are beginning to learn that a war of conquest is a fatal mistake. That is their lesson, and it is the business of the Allies to teach the moral once for all. And that is the purpose of the war. Restitution, reparation, punishment, are all means to the same end. They are not ends in themselves. It is the business of the Allies to concentrate their energies upon the first step towards securing peace in the future, which is to convince the malefactor of his guilt.