SE C T. XXVI. Taste and Smell 236-
SECT. XXVII. The Sublime and
Beautiful compared

237

PART IV.

SECT. I. Of the efficient cause of

the Sublime and Beautiful.

SECT. II. Affociation:

241.

244

SECT. VI. How Pain can be a cause

254

256

of Delight
SECT. VII. Exercife neceffary for
the finer Organs
SECT. VIII. Why things not dan-
gerous fometimes produce a paffion

like Terror

258

SECT. IX. Why vifual objects of
great dimenfions are Sublime 259

SECT.

SECT. X. Unity why requifite to
261

Vaftness

SECT. XI. The artificial Infinite 264
SECT. XII. The vibrations must be

fimilar

267

268

SEC T. XIII. The effects of fucceffion
in vifual objects explained
SE CT. XIV. Locke's opinion con-
cerning darkness considered 272

SECT. XV. Darkness terrible in its
own nature

275
SE C T. XVI. Why Darkness is ter-
rible
SECT. XVII. The effects of Black-

nefs

278

2816

SE CT, XVIII. The effects of Black-

285

nefs moderated
SECT. XIX. The phyfical caufe of

Love

286

SECT. XX. Why Smoothness is
beautiful
SECT. XXI. Sweetness, its nature

290

291

SE C T. XXII. Sweetness relaxing 296
SE C T. XXIII. Variation, why beau-
tiful
SECT. XXIV. Concerning Smallness

299

302

SECT. XXV. Of Colour

308

PART

PART V.

SECT. I. Of Words

311

SECT. II. The common effect of
Poetry, not by raising ideas of things.

313

SECT. III. General words before
ideas

SECT. IV. The effect of Words

317

319

SECT. V. Examples that Words may
affect without raifing images. 322
SECT. VI. Poetry not strictly an
imitative art

333

ON

Na superficial view, we may seem to differ very widely from each other in our reasonings, and no less in our pleasures: but notwithstanding this difference, which I think to be rather apparent than real, it is probable that the standard both of reason and Taste is the same in all human creatures. For if there were not some principles of judgment as well as of sentiment common to all mankind, no hold could possibly be taken either on their reason or their passions, sufficient to maintain the ordinary correspondence of life. It appears indeed to be generally

common nature.

acknowledged, that with regard to truth and falshood there is something fixed. We find people in their disputes continually appealing to certain tests and standards which are allowed on all sides, and are supposed to be established in our But there is not the same obvious concurrence in any uniform or settled principles which relate to Taste. It is even commonly supposed that this delicate and aerial faculty, which seems too volatile to endure even the chains of a definition, cannot be perly tried by any test, nor regulated by any standard. There is so continual a call for the exercise of the reasoning faculty, and it is so much strengthened by perpetual contention, that certain maxims of right reason seem to be tacitly settled amongst the most ignorant. The learned have improved on this rude science, and reduced those maxims into a system. If Taste has not been so happily cultivated, it was not that the fubject

pro