cafe they fhould be encountered on the march from Williamsburg; affuring them, that they would thereby effectually cure the vanity of the British troops, who attributed to themselves fo decided a fuperiority in that fort of clofe and trying combat. Nor did he omit any means to excite that honourable emulation between the allied troops, which appeared fo confpicuoutly in the fubfequent. operations.

The British General found it neceflary to contract his pofts and defences, which having been extended for the purpofe of commanding the Peninfula, were, in the prefent circumftances, too remote and expofed to be maintained. They were of courfe feized by the enemy as they were abandoned. The poft at Gloucefter Point, on the oppofite fide of the river, which was occupied by Tarleton, with the cavalry and fome infantry, amounting to about 600 men, was at the fame time clofely invefted by the Duke de Lauzun with his legion, and a body of Virginia militia under General Wieden; but the active operations on that fide went no

farther than a warm kirmish on the first day in driving in the out-pofts.

The trenches were opened by both armies in the night between the 6th and 7th of October; their attacks were carried on with great vigour; and their batteries were covered with little lefs than an hundred pieces of heavy ordnance. The new loofe works would have been little capable of withstanding fuch a weight of fire, if they had even been completed; but they were fo far from that flate,

that the British troops were not lefs employed in their construction under the fire of the enemy, than they were in their defence. In a few days, moft of their guns were accordingly filenced, their defences in many places ruined, and the enemy's fhells reached even the fhips in the harbour, where the Charon of 44 guns with fome of the tranfports were burnt.

The British fleet, on its return to New York, was joined by the Prudent man of war, with feveral frigates from the West Indies; and in a few days after its arrival, was farther reinforced by Rear-admiral Digby, with three fhips of the line from England; but the junction of the Rhode Island fquadron, had given fo decided a fuperiority to M. de Graffe, that nothing lefs than the moft defperate circumftances, or that almoft irrefiftible motive which actually fubfifted, could have juftified any attempt towards another encounter.

The defire of extricating Lord Cornwallis and his army, however, prevailed over all confiderations of danger and lofs, and the British naval commanders ufed all pollible expedition in refitting and equipping the fleet at New York. This, however, though unavoidably neceflary, took up more time than could have been afforded at this juncture. The delay feemed indeed to be in fome degree compenfated, by the arrival of the Prince William and Torbay men of war from Jamaica. In the mean time a council of war, compofed of all the flag and general officers, being held, it was determined that every poffible exertion fould be used both by the fleet and army, to form a junction with

the

the fquadron and army in Virginia. It was however the 19th of October, before the fleet could get clear over the bar; Sir Henry Clinton, with above 7000 of his beft forces, having embarked on board the thips of war. The fleet now amounted to 25 fhips of the line, two fifties, and eight frigates; and, notwithstanding the great fuperiority of force which the enemy ftill retained, the fpirit which operated both upon the common men and officers was fo high, that whatever doubts might be formed with refpect to the final point of fuccefs, none could be entertained, but that the expected naval action would ftand foremost, among the most obstinate and the moft bloody, that had yet been known. It was, indeed, a defperate caft, and the fleet and army were both staked upon the fortune of ons During thefe tranfactions on the fide of New York, the united armies which were employed in the fiege of York Town, fenfible of the efforts that would be made for its relief, and unwilling to ftake all their hopes on the iflue of a naval engagement, ufed the utmoft exertions in the profecution of their works, and fhewed no lets resolution in their attacks, than vivacity in the fire of their batteries. On the night of the 11th of October, they began their fecond parallel within 300 yards of the works of the place, being within just half the distance of the first, and carried it on with unremitting induftry.

Nothing lefs than the certain hope and expectation of relief, could have induced Lord Cornwallis to attempt the defence of a poft, which he deemed fo incapable of refifting the force opposed to

it, as that which he now occupied. He would otherwise have attempted a retreat, however difficult, or he would even have hazarded an encounter in the open field, and, trusting to the gallantry of his troops, leave the reft to the decifion of fortune. This hope was farther confirmed, by a letter from the commander in chief at New York, dated on the 24th of September, which informed him, that the relief would fail from thence about the 5th of October. Thus circumftanced, Lord Cornwallis could not think himself justified in abandoning his poft; and in rifquing the confequences of thofe defperate measures, which must then of neceflity be adopted. On the other hand, it happened mott unfortunately, that the delay which occurred in refitting and equipping the fleet, rendered it impoffible for Sir Henry Clinton to fulfil his intention.

Two redoubts, which were advanced about 300 yards on the British left, had greatly incominoded the enemy, and ftill continued to impede their progreis. It was determined to attack these at the fame time, at dark, on the evening of the 14th. To balance the honour, as well as the duty, between both nations, the attack on one was committed to the Americans, and of the other to the French.

Col. Hamilton, Washington's aid-de-camp, commanded the American detachment ; which marched to the affault with unloaded arms; paffed the abbatis and palifades without waiting to remove them; and attacking the works on all fides at once, carried the redoubt with the utmost rapidity. Young Laurens gained great credit upon this occafion, [1] 2

and

and perfonally took the command-, ing officer prifoner. The lofs was very moderate on both fides; and Hamilton, in his report to the Marquis de la Fayette, boafts (with what juftice will be decided for themselves, by those who have attended to the transactions of the war) that the foldiery under his command, incapable,as he expreffes himself, of imitating examples of barbarity, and forgetting recent provocations, fpared every man that ceased to refift.

The French were equally fuccessful on their fide, but their lofs was more confiderable; amounting, by their own acknowledgement, to about an hundred in killed and wounded. The emulation between the two nations, appeared in their labour, as well as in action; and the two redoubts were included in the fecond parallel by daylight.

The taking of these two redoubts may be faid to decide the fate of the army. Lord Cornwallis, in a letter which he wrote on the following day to Sir Henry Clinton, confiders their fituation as being fo defperate, that he could not recommend to the fleet and army to run any great rifque in endeavouring to fave them. In deed nothing could be more hopelefs; for, as he fays himself in the fame letter, they dared not to thew a gun to the enemy's old batteries, and they expected that their new ones would be opened on the following morning.

The British commander, however, left nothing untried which could procraftinate, if it was impofiible to prevent, that final iffue, which was not more dreaded than expected. Being fenfible that his

works could not stand many hours after the opening of the batteries of the fecond parallel, he did every thing that was poffible to interrupt that work, opening new embrazures for guns, and keeping up a conftant fire with all his howitzers and small mortars.

The troops had been fo much weakened by fickness, as well as by the fire of the enemy, that the general could not venture any confiderable number in the making of fallies, and the enemy had fo well fecured their flanks, and proceeded in all their operations with so much regularity and caution, that nothing less than a strong and wellfupported attack could produce any effect. The prefent emergency was, however, fo critical, that a little before day-break, on the morning of the 16th, he ordered a fortie of about 350 men, under the conduct of Lieut. Col. Abercrombie, to attack two batteries which appeared to be in the greateft forwardness, and to fpike the guns. A detachment of guards, with the Soth company of grenadiers, under the command of Lieut. Col. Leake, was appointed to one of thefe, and another of light infantry, under Major Armstrong, to the other battery. Both attacks were made with an impetuofity which could not be refifted. The redoubts that covered both batteries were forced, eleven pieces of cannon fpiked, and the French troops, who had the guard of that part of the entrenchment, fuffered confiderably.

Though the vigour and gaflantry difplayed in this brifk and fuccefsful action, did the greateft honour to the officers and troops that were engaged, yet it produc

ed

ed no effential fervice. The cannon, which were haftily fpiked, were foon again rendered fit for fervice; and the industry of the. enemy was fo great, that, before dark, the whole parallel and the batteries feemed nearly completed. At the fame time, the works were fo ruined, and the batteries fo overpowered, that there was no part of the whole front attacked, in which the befieged could fhew a fingle gun; and their fhells, which were the last fource of defence, were nearly expended.

In thefe unfortunate circumftances, Lord Cornwallis had no other choice left but to prepare for a furrender on the following day, or to endeavour to escape with the greatest part of the troops. He determined upon attempting the latter, under the confideration, that though it should prove unfuccefsful in its immediate object, it might at least delay the enemy in the profecution of farther enterprizes. The adverfe current of tortune gave a contrary effect to a defign well calculated to delay the iate of Lord Cornwallis's army.

Boats were prepared, under other pretexts, to be in readiness for receiving the troops at ten at night, in order to pass them over to Gloucefter Point. The arrangements were made with the atmost secrecy; and the intention was, to abandon the baggage, and to leave a detachment behind, in crder to capitulate for the town's people, and for the fick and wounded; Lord Cornwallis having already prepared a letter upon the fubject, which was to be delivered to Gen. Washington upon his departure.

The firtt embarkation, confifte

ing of the light infantry, the guards, and a part of the 23d regiment, had arrived at Gloucester Point, and the greater part of the troops were already landed, when, at that critical moment of hope, apprehenfion, and danger, fortune proved adverfe, and the weather, which was then moderate and calm, inftantly changed to a moft violent ftorm of wind and rain. The boats, with the remaining troops, were all driven down the river, and the defign of paffing was not only entirely fruftrated, but the abfence of the boats rendered it impoffible to bring back the troops from Gloucefter. Thus weakened and divided, the army, by this untoward accident, was involved in a ftate of the moft imminent danger.

To increase the anxiety and peril of this state of things, the enemies batteries were opened, with great force and effect, at daybreak; and the paffage at Gloucefter Point was now much expofed to their fire.

The boats, however, happily returned; and the troops were brought back without much lofs in the courfe of the forenoon.

But things were now drawing to that crifis, which could no longer be averted. The works were every where finking under the weight of the enemy's artillery; and Lord Cornwallis himself could not but concur in opinion, with the engineer and principal officers, that they were already affailable in many places, and that a continuance of the fame fire, only for a few hours longer, would reduce them to fuch a condition, that it would then become desperate to attempt their defence. While 11] 3

they

they were expofed to fo heavy a fire from the enemy, they could not return a gun, and only about 100 cohorn fhells remained. The troops were not only diminished by lofs and by fick nefs, but the ftrength and spirits of thofe in the works were exhaufted and worn down by conftant watching, and unremitting fatigue. And while they were to be attacked and overborne on all fides by land, the French fhips, in the mouth of York River, feemed prepared to fecond and complete the general ftorm, by water.

In fuch circumftances it would have been cruelty in the extreme to have facrificed fuch gallant, and in every respect deferving troops, to a point of honour, which the improved ftate of civilization has wifely exploded, that of standing an affault, which could not in the nature of things but prove fucceffful. Lord Cornwallis accordingly wrote a letter to Gen. Washington on the fame day, the 17th, propofing a ceffation of arms for 24 hours, and that commiffioners might be appointed on both fides for fettling the terms of capitulation.

The pofts of York and Gloucefter were furrendered on the 19th of October. The troops, with the fame honours which had been granted to the garrison of Charles Town, were of neceffity obliged to become prifoners of war. They were composed of Britifh and German regiments, the light infantry, detachments from the guards, and Tarleton's cavalry. They amounted to between five and fix thousand men; but fuch was the number of fick and wounded, that there were only 3,800

of all forts, capable of bearing arms, in both pofts, on the day of furrender. Fifteen hundred fea men underwent the fate of the garrifon. The officers and foldiers retained their baggage and effects; but all property taken in the country, if vifible, was liable to be reclaimed. The Guadaloupe frigate of 24 guns, with a number of tranfports, were furrendered to the conquerors; and about 20 tranfports had been funk or burnt during the fiege. They obtained a numerous artillery of various forts, but not of weight fufficient for their late purpose of defence in a fiege.

Lord Cornwallis ftrove in vain to obtain better conditions; particularly that the British and German troops might be returned to their refpective countries, as prifoners on parole, on condition of not ferving against France or America until they were exchanged. Some favourable conditions which he wished to obtain in behalf of the inhabitants of York Town, and other Americans, who were under the protection, as they had fhared the fortune, of the British army, were likewife refufed, upon the footing of their being civil matters, which did not come within the authority of the military commanders. To extricate thofe Americans who would have been expofed to imminent danger, he, however, made it a condition, that the Bonetta floop, which was to convey his dispatches to New York, fhould pafs without fearch or examination, he being only anfwerable that the number of perfons the conveyed thould be accounted for as prifoners of war upon exchange. With a retro

1pective