MORALITY AND RELIGION IDENTICAL. 131 his proper place? Would not the adoption of a lower position, in any book pretending to be from God, have been of itself, sufficient to discredit and repudiate its pretensions? We are often told that relative morality consists in giving every one his due. The definition is a good one; but the application of it should commence at the highest point in the scale of obligation. Is there nothing due from creatures, but to their fellow-creatures? Has the everlasting God nothing due to him? Is not love his due? Is not worship his due? Is not obedience his due? The Deity must not be degraded to a secondary station: he is entitled to the first. 306. The obligation to God, compared with other obligations, is the first that binds the creature, and in this obligation all other obligations originate; they depend upon it; they are comprehended in it. What are the duties which we owe to our fellow-creatures, but integrant parts of his law? It is as His precepts that they must be fulfilled; so that, if they are duly done, they must be done from regard to his authority, which amounts to the same thing with their being done from a religious principle. The precepts of the first and second tables of the revealed law come equally under the designation of moral duties. The obligation to the one and to the other is the very same. The man who obeys his parents, who keeps his word, who pays his debts, who dispenses his charities, who performs any other acts, under the influence of principles that rise no higher than to a recognition of the claims of his fellow-creatures, has the first principles of moral obligation yet to learn. 307. In the department of morals, as well as in that of natural science, mischief often arises from the substitution of the word Nature, instead of the word God. Though the term Nature is used only by a figure of speech, yet it is employed by writers on natural philosophy in such a way, and so often, that there is danger of its assuming in the mind an imaginary personality, like the mysterious "plastic power" of some of the ancients; putting forth voluntary energies in the production, arrangement, and superintendence of the universe. Thus also it happens in the science of ethics. Moral theorists speak of the dictates of nature, till they too are Is virtue, then, and piety the same? Good-will to men; nor know, they strive to part "Tis the first-born of rationality. On piety, humanity is built; And, on humanity, much happiness; And yet still more on piety itself. A soul in commerce with her God, is heav'n; A Deity beloved, is joy matured. YOUNG. 302. Do the sacred scriptures warrant the too prevalent opinion that morality and religion are distinct attributes of character; that a man may be properly denominated a moral man though destitute of religion? 303. How does the sentiment of Scripture differ from the sentiment expressed in society and in the writings of philosophers? 304. What, in contrast with prevailing sentiment, is one of the distinguishing peculiarities of all Bible morality? 305. Can the Scriptures be vindicated on principles of reason for thus identifying morality and religion; for asserting that the one cannot exist without the other? 206. How is our obligation to God related to other obligations, and what is their relative importance? 307. In the department of morals, as well as in that of natural philosophy, what danger arises from the substitution of the word nature instead of God? DUTIES WHICH RESPECT OURSELVES. 133 BOOK VI. OF THE VARIOUS BRANCHES OF HUMAN DUTY. THIS Book is divided into two Parts: the first embraces a consideration of the duties which respect ourselves, and which may be learned in a great measure from an investigation of our active and moral powers. In the Book which treats of these, some remarks are made upou the duty and mode of a proper exercise and control of these powers, which remarks, but for the sake of convenience, might have been reserved to this place, and may be profitably referred to, in connection with the duties that stand somewhat related, and which are now to be described. The second Part of Book VI. defines the duty of man chiefly with respect to other beings, as it may be learned from the two fundamental Laws of Love-that of love to God, and that of love to our neighbor; from the law delivered by our Savior-" All things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them;" from St. Paul's beautiful description of love to our neighbor; from the Ten Commandments; and from the biography of Christ, and of his followers PART I. OF THE DUTIES WHICH RESPECT OURSELVES. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS. MAN, doubtless, is laid under the most sacred obligations to feel concerned for his own moral improvement and happiness, and to use all proper means to secure and promote them. These are duties which he owes to himself, and the violation of which is peculiarly criminal in him, since he thus so far frustrates the glorious design of his being, by rendering himself unfit for discharging his obligations either to God or to man. The obligations which more immediately terminate on himself, and which may therefore be styled the duties he owes himself, may be classed under the heads of intellectual cultivation and control; moral progress and reformation; temperance or self-government, and contentment; fortitude ; the formation of good habits; prudence, or a suitable regard to his own happiness. The duty of contentment, and the evils opposed to it, are exhibited under the head of the Tenth Commandment: the other duties will now be considered in the order just stated. CHAPTER I. DUTY OF INTELLECTUAL CULTIVATION AND CONTROL. 308. THE intellectual powers, in proportion as they are improved, are ornamental to our nature, and qualify us for being serviceable to ourselves, our friends, the community, and mankind. We should therefore be continually solicitous to acquire knowledge, strengthen our memory, rectify our judgment, and refine our taste: by reading good books, and those only; by accurately observing what passes in the world around us; by studying the works of nature, and elegant performances of art; by meditating on the real nature of things, and the causes and consequences of human conduct, as they occur in history and common life; by avoiding frivolous pursuits, trifling discourse, and unprofitable theory; and by losing no opportunity of profiting by the conversation and example of wise and good men. To neglect the acquisition of wisdom, when the means of it are in our power, is always followed by a bitter, and generally unavailing, repentance. All 309. The regulation of our trains of thought will be seen to be our duty, when we reflect that the thoughts are the prime movers of the whole human conduct. that makes a figure on the great theater of the world, the employments of the busy, the enterprises of the ambitious, and the exploits of the warlike, the virtues which CONTROL OF OUR TRAINS OF THOUGHT. 135 form the happiness, and the crimes which occasion the misery of mankind, originate in that silent and secret recess of thought which is hidden from every human eye. 310. Too many suppose that thought may lawfully be unrestrained. Passions, they may perhaps admit, require government and restraint, because they are violent emotions and disturb society. But with their thoughts, they plead, no one is concerned. By these, so long as they are not disclosed, no offense can be given, and no injury committed. To enjoy, unrestrained, the full range of imagination, appears to them the native right and privilege of man. 311. Had we to do with none but our fellow-creatures, such a sentiment might be specious; but in the sight of the Supreme Being, thoughts often bear the character of good or evil, as much as actions, and they are especially the subjects of divine jurisdiction, because they are cog nizable at no other tribunal. Again, the regulation of our thoughts is of prime consequence from their direct influence on conduct. Actions are, in truth, thoughts ripened into consistency and sub stance. 312. Our thoughts are not always the offspring of choice; often they are inevitably impressed upon the mind by surrounding objects. Often they start up, as of themselves, without any principle of introduction which we are able to trace. But after an allowance is made for thought arising under such circumstances, a multitude of cases occur, in which we are no less accountable for what we think than for what we do. As, first, when the introduction of any train of thought depends upon ourselves, and is our voluntary act; by turning our attention toward such objects, awakening such passions, or engaging in such employments, as we know must give a peculiar determination to our thoughts. Next, when thoughts, by whatever accident they may have been originally suggested, are indulged with deliberation and complacency. Though the mind has been passive in their reception, and therefore free from blame, yet, if it be active in their continuance, the guilt becomes its own. They may have intruded at first, like unbidden |