SELF-GOVERNMENT. 141 CHAPTER III. TEMPERANCE, OR SELF-GOVERNMENT. THIS duty is strongly recommended by the light of nature; and revelation enforces it by the weight of its high authority: "Let your moderation be known unto all men;" "Live soberly." 328. This moderation is to be used in reference to bodily enjoyments; to sorrow for the loss of our friends or of property; and to the indulgence of the desires and affections of the mind. (1.) We are to exercise temperance in our bodily gratifications. Much of what we owe to ourselves as rational and accountable beings is included in this view of moderation. There is no part of our duty which requires more continued self-denial in its practice. This subject has been treated with sufficient fullness in Book II. chap. IV. sect. III., on the government of the appetites and passions. That section it may be profitable to review in this connection. (2.) Temperance, or self-government, implies moderation in the indulgence of sorrow on account of the loss of friends or of property. Reason, indeed, suggests this. No extreme of sorrow can be of avail in restoring to us the blessings of which, by the providence of God we are deprived; and it becomes us, even on this ground, to restrain those painful emotions which bereavements naturally awaken. But Christianity enforces this duty on higher grounds, and by the most persuasive and powerful motives and examples. (3.) In self-government, is included moderation in indulging the desires of the mind. In the proper regulation of these desires consists a large part of true morality; also, in seeking their gratification only in subordination to the divine authority, and to the higher ends of our being. According to the affections and desires habitually entertained in the heart, will be the tenor of the conduct; and no reformation, therefore, can be effectual, which aims not at the thorough melioration of the inward, as well as the outward man. See Book II. chap. V. [Dewar, vol. ii. pp. 471, 472.] 328. In regard to what objects is moderation to be exercised? CHAPTER IV. FORTITUDE. 329. FORTITUDE is that virtue, in the exercise of which we are enabled to conduct ourselves with propriety in regard to the difficulties and dangers of life; so as neither to betray ourselves by unreasonable fear, nor rashly to put ourselves in the way of evil. It is by fortitude that we can guard from injury those rights which the Creator has given us, and prepare to meet the evils which threaten us from a distance. It is the same virtue which keeps the mind from sinking under present and unavoidable calamities, and animates it to endure, with patience and resignation to the will of God, what it can neither control nor remove. It is clearly connected with self-control, without a considerable share of which, none can be eminently good or great. [Dewar, vol. ii. pp. 497, 498.] 329. What virtue under the name of fortitude is it our duty to cultivate and exercise? CHAPTER V. ON THE FORMATION OF GOOD HABITS. 330. THE obligation to form good habits arises from the fact that man has been made capable of forming habits, and is very much the creature of habit, and hence it is of great importance that this law of his nature should be turned to a good account. 331. The end of education should be, not merely the communication of knowledge-this is but one of its advantages—but the training of the mind, the calling forth REGARD TO OUR OWN HAPPINESS. 143 of good dispositions, and the suppression of the bad, and the formation of those habits that will prepare for the successful discharge of the duties of life. It will not be attempted to enumerate here the different habits, to the formation of which we should give our attention. The subject will be introduced again in the next chapter, and has been considered in Book II. chap. II. sect. III. 332. INDUSTRY is specially important. This is of the greatest value to man in regard to everything that tends to elevate him in goodness, in greatness, or in happiness. "All is the gift of industry: * * Whate'er exalts, embellishes, and renders life delightful." 330. Whence arises to man the obligation to form good habits? 331. What then should be the principal object of education? 332. But what habit is there which deserves special notice, from its direct influence on our religious and moral improvement, on the equability of our temper, and on the permanence of our happiness? CHAPTER VI. PRUDENCE, OR A SUITABLE REGARD TO OUR OWN HAPPINESS. SECTION I.-NATURE OF THE DUTY, AND THE MANNER OF PERFORMING IT. 333. THE virtue of prudence implies a steady regard, in the conduct of life, to the happiness and perfection of our own nature, and a diligent study of the means by which these ends may be attained. 334. It is merely a constitutional principle, and inseparable from the nature of man as a rational and sensitive being. Its moral character depends on the direction it is allowed to take, and its deference to higher principles and rules of action. It is regarded by all men as a duty to promote their own happiness, and we censure those who neglect to do this. The sanctions of law, both human and divine, imply an obligation to regard our own happiness. This duty is implied in the fundamental law of morality, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." It is therefore our duty to promote our own happiness no less than that of our neighbor. It is also an inspired injunction, “Do thyself no harm." It must also be considered right to exercise any of our constitutional principles, under certain restrictions. 335. If we could at once gratify all the propensities of our nature, that would be our highest possible happiness, and what we might call our sOVEREIGN GOOD; but that cannot be; for our own propensities and desires are often inconsistent, so that if we comply with one, we must contradict another. He who is enslaved to sensuality, cannot at the same time enjoy the more lofty pleasures of science and virtue; and he who devotes himself to science or adheres to virtue, must often act in opposition to his inferior appetites. The ambitious man cannot labor for the acquisition of power, and taste the sweets of indolence at the same time. The miser, while he indulges himself in the contemplation of his wealth, must be a stranger to the pleasures of beneficence. The gratification of all our appetites and desires at once is, therefore, impossible. 336. Since all the desires and appetites of our nature cannot be gratified at once, it is necessary for us to form to ourselves or to adopt some plan or system of conduct, in subordination to which all other objects are to be secured. To ascertain what this system ought to be, is a problem which in all ages employed the speculations of philosophers. Among the ancients, the question concerning the sovereign good was the principal subject of controversy which divided the schools; and it was treated in such a manner as to involve almost every other question of ethics. It is obvious, from what has been said above, that some degree of self-denial must be practiced by every man, whether good or bad--by the ruffian as well as the saint; and man's greatest possible happiness must be, at least in the present state, not a complete gratification of all our propensities, but the most comprehensive gratification of which we are capable. EPICUREAN SYSTEM. 333. What is implied in the duty of prudence? 145 334. Has the desire of happiness (the principle of self-love) any moral character is it an object either of approbation or of blame? 335. Is happiness to be attained by giving every appetite and desire the gratification they demand? 336. Since all the appetites and desires of our nature cannot be gratified at once, how is the largest amount of happiness to be secured? SECTION II.—SYSTEMS OF THE GRECIAN SCHOOLS, IN RELATION TO HAPPINESS. 337. THE opinions entertained by the ancients respecting the sovereign, or supreme good, may all be reduced to three: those of the Epicureans, of the Stoics, and of the Peripatetics. To one or other of these three opinions may be referred all merely human schemes of happiness. 338. The fundamental principle of the Epicurean system was, that bodily pleasure and pain were the sole ultimate objects of desire and aversion. These were desired and shunned on their own account; other things were desired and valued according to their tendency to procure the one of these, or to save us from the other. This system placed happiness in ease of body and tranquillity of mind, but much more in the latter than in the former, insomuch that Epicurus affirmed a wise man might be happy in the midst of bodily torments. It is a system which tends avowedly to recommend a life of indolent and selfish indulgence, and a total abstraction from the concerns and duties of the world. Hence many of the disciples of Epicurus brought so much discredit on their principles by the dissoluteness of their lives, that the word Epicurean came gradually to be understood as characteristical of a person devoted to sensual gratifications. The influence of these principles on the manners of the later Romans has been remarked by many writers, and was foreseen, ages before, by their virtuous and enlightened ancestors. This fact, which has not been sufficiently attended to, deserves the serious consideration of those who call in question the effect of speculative opinions on national character. [D. Stewart's Works, vol. v. pp. 494, 495.] 339. In opposition to the Epicurean doctrine already stated, the Stoical system placed the supreme good in rectitude of conduct, without any regard to the event. It did not, however, as has been supposed, recommend G |