CHAPTER IV. ON PROVIDENCE. 48. PROVIDENCE is the action or conduct of God in upholding by his power the universe which he has created, and of regulating all beings and events in it by his wisdom. It is the care which God takes of all things, to uphold them in being, and to direct them to the ends which he has determined to accomplish by them, so that nothing takes place in which he is not concerned in a manner worthy of his perfections, and which is not in unison with the counsel of his own will. 49. (1.) The first argument in proof of such a providence is drawn from the acknowledged perfections of God. As these prove that he is qualified to undertake the management of his creatures and all their affairs, so they furnish sure ground for the conclusion, that he has not dismissed them from his care. For instance: omniscience brings before him the minutest object as well as the greatest, and the most secret as well as open actions; his power is as unlimited as his knowledge, and can act equally well and with equal ease upon any and every part of the universe; his wisdom and goodness are also unlimited, and fully qualify and dispose him to exert the providence that has been asserted; his justice also requires him to exercise a moral government over his intelligent creatures, and of course to observe and control their actions. (2.) A second argument is founded on the dependent nature of creatures. Unlike God, they have no ground of existence in themselves; they cannot of course by their own will or power prolong it a moment; it depends on the will and power of God every successive moment, and this is the doctrine of Scripture. (3.) A third argument is founded on the order which is maintained in the universe. When we contemplate this immense system, so wonderful in its contrivances, so constant in its movements, so admirably balanced, and proceeding from age to age without the slightest confusion, can any rational man suppose that there is no presiding mind by which it is governed? The evidence is particularly strong to those who are more intimately acquainted with nature, and know that, in the motions of some of the heavenly bodies, there are occasionally apparent irregularities, but that means are provided for correcting them, so that they return to their proper place. 50. To this reasoning it is objected, that the order which prevails throughout the universe, may be accounted for by the laws of nature, without an immediate interposition of the Deity, and proves only the wisdom of its original constitution. But what is the true meaning of a law of nature as applied to inanimate things? It signifies merely the stated, regular order in which they are found to subsist. Matter can neither put itself in motion, nor stop itself when in motion; and every modification which it undergoes is the effect of some external power. What then are laws of nature? They are the particular modes in which the Deity exerts his power, which, being uniform, are accounted natural, while any deviation from them is pronounced to be miraculous. If this be a just description of them, and none can dispute it, it follows that they are so far from accounting for the order which is maintained in the universe, that they necessarily imply the actual and constant interposition of the Creator, and as irresistibly suggest the idea of a lawgiver, as do the laws of any human society. The truth is, that the laws of nature, if understood to be different from the operations of the Deity, are a name, and nothing more, with which simpletons may be amused; but certainly no man of common sense, who is inquiring into the cause of the stability of the universe, will deem it satisfactory to be answered with a sound. For some other arguments, refer to what is advanced in the last chapter in proof of the moral government of God, which implies the doctrine and the fact of providence. 51. These arguments prove not merely a general superintendence of the affairs of the universe, but a particular care exercised toward every constituent part of it. Some maintain only a general providence, which consists in upholding certain general laws, and exclaim against the idea of a particular providence which takes a concern in individuals and their affairs. It is strange that the latter opinion should be adopted by any person who professes to bow to the authority of Scripture-which declares that a sparrow does not fall to the ground without the knowledge of our heavenly Father, and that the hairs of our heads are all numbered; or by any man who has calmly listened to the dictates of reason. If God has certain designs to accomplish with respect to, or by means of men, how can his intention be fulfilled without particular attention to their circumstances, their movements, and all the events of their life? "There is no argument for a general (says H. More), but is also an argument for a particular providence, unless we can prove that the whole is not made up of parts; that generals are not composed of particulars; that nations are not compounded of families; that societies are not formed of individuals; that chains are not composed of links; that sums are not made up of units; that the interests of a community do not grow out of the well-being of its members." 52. It is again objected, that a particular providence is inconsistent with the liberty of man, and with the general laws which divine wisdom has established. To this objection it is sufficient to reply, that God, having a perfect knowledge of the laws of nature, and of the operations of the human mind, and having the power of influencing the train of ideas in the mind of man, is undoubtedly able to direct his conduct without suspending, or interfering with the general laws of nature, or with the freedom of the human mind. [Prof. Dick's Lectures on Providence.] 48. What is meant by the providence of God? • 49. What are some of the arguments in proof of such a providence? 50. What objection is usually brought against the third argument for a particular providence? 51. Do these arguments prove a particular, or only a general providence? 52. What other strong objection is advanced against the doctrine of a particular providence? CHARACTERISTICS OF MAN. 29 BOOK II. THE ACTIVE AND MORAL POWERS OF MAN, AND REMARKS UPON THEIR DUE REGULATION. CHAPTER I. GENERAL PRELIMINARY VIEW OF THE CHARACTER AND CONDITION OF MAN. 53. I. THE characteristics by which man is distinguished from the other inhabitants of this world are two: he is rational, and immortal. 54. While the inferior animals are under the guidance of instinct, he is endowed with nobler principles. Beside appetites, which he has in common with the brutes, he is dignified with intellectual, active, and moral powers, which they do not possess. Reason, memory, and imagination; desires, affections, and a moral faculty, are wonderfully combined in his nature, and form a singular and interesting being. He can observe, compare, and judge; he can vary his means, and suit his operations to the circumstances in which he is placed. He can turn in upon himself, and trace the operations of his own mind. He can survey the vast system of the universe; discover the laws by which it is governed; and learn the attributes of the Creator and Governor, from the works of his hand. He can surround himself by a new creation, and combine in endless variety the objects with which he is acquainted. He remembers the past; and the lessons of experience not only furnish him with instructions for the regulation of his present conduct, but also enable him to anticipate what he may expect from the future. He hopes, and he fears; he loves, and desires, and pursues; he dreads, and he shuns. His moral faculty indicates the path of duty, and it applauds or condemns. His intellectual, active, and moral powers are finely ad justed to each other, and form a being capable of much present enjoyment, and of vast improvement in intellectual and moral excellence. How absurd is it to allege that undesigning chance produced such an intelligent and contriving being as Man! II. Arguments for the Immortality of Man. 55. (1.) Our first argument shall be derived from a conviction of our immortality that seems to be implanted in the human mind, and which is confirmed by the voice of nature in her external phenomena. Oh, listen, man! A voice within us speaks that startling word, By angel fingers touch'd, when the mild stars Thick clustering orbs, and this our fair domain, Oh, listen, ye, our spirits; drink it in From all the air! "Tis in the gentle moonlight; As one vast mystic instrument, are touch'd By an unseen, living Hand, and conscious chords Quiver with joy in this great jubilee. The dying hear it; and as sounds of earth R. H. DANA. A portion of this argument, thus exquisitely set forth by Dana, will be amplified under some of the following heads. (2.) Bishop Butler, in his Analogy, has shown that there is nothing in the circumstances of the death of the body, or in the analogy of nature around us, to render man's future existence improbable. On the contrary, he shows that the analogy of nature makes it probable, that as we are conscious that we are now living agents, so we shall go on to be such, notwithstanding the event of death, which, it is likely, may only serve to bring us into new scenes, and a new state of life and action, just as naturally as we came into the present. |