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IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.

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(3.) An argument against the contemporaneous death of the body and soul, and a presumptive argument therefore for the continued existence of the soul, notwithstanding the death of the body, has been formed of this sort: "Man at the age of twenty retains not a particle of the matter in which his mind was invested when he was born. Nevertheless at the age of eighty years, he is conscious of being the same individual he was as far back as his memory can go; that is to say, to the period when he was four or five years old. Whatever it be, therefore, in which this consciousness of identity resides, it cannot consist of a material substance, since it had been destroyed. It is, consequently, an ethereal spirit: as it remains the same throughout all the alterations that take place in the body, it is not dependent on the body for its existence, and it is calculated to survive the ever-changing frame in which it is encased."

(4.) It is argued, that if the present were the only state of human existence, the designs of the Creator, in the formation of man, would not be conformable to the usual operations of his wisdom. The noblest being with which we are acquainted just begins to evolve faculties which are never permitted to arrive at their full vigor, or to display their full beauty. Other animals reach the maturity and utmost limits of their powers. Far otherwise is it with man. He is possessed of many faculties which, in the present life, are never or but partially exerted. This we know to be the case with those who die young, or uninstructed, that is, with the greatest part of mankind: and this is the case in some measure with all.

It seems to be a law pervading sentient beings that they must reach all that perfection, and enjoy all that happiness of which their nature is susceptible: and why should man be considered an exception to that law? But as man's capacity for improvement is not exhausted in this world, there is reason from the analogy of nature to suppose that in a future state his faculties will be fully expanded and attain maturity. Is it not unreasonable also to suppose that a creature endowed with such noble faculties, and capable of such progressive and high improvement should, at once and forever, be arrested in his progress toward perfection?

(5.) It is remarkable that the wisest men in all ages,

and the greatest part of men in all nations, have believed that the soul will survive the body, however some o. them may have disfigured this belief by vain and incredible fictions.

Whence could the universal belief of the soul's immortality arise? It is true that all men have believed that the sun and starry heavens revolve about the earth; but this opinion is easily accounted for, being warranted by what seems to be the evidence of sense. It is also true that most nations have, at one time or other, acknowledged a plurality of gods; but this is a corruption of an original true opinion: for it is highly probable-nay, it appears from history-that a belief in one God was the more ancient opinion, and that Polytheism succeeded to it, and was a corruption of it. Now, it is not at all surprising that, when a true opinion is introduced among mankind, it should, in ignorant ages, be perverted by additional and fabulous circumstances.

But the immortality of the soul is not a corruption of an original true opinion, nor does it derive any support from the evidence of sense: it is itself an original opinion, and the testimony of sense seems rather to declare against it. Whence, then, could it arise?

Not from the artifice of priests or of politicians, in order to keep the world in awe, as some have vainly pretended; for there never was a time when all politicians and priests were wise and the rest of mankind fools, nor when they were all of the same opinion and concurred in the same design. It may be added that mankind have never yet adopted any opinion universally, merely upon the authority of politicians, philosophers, or priests.

This opinion, therefore, must have arisen from a natural suggestion of the human understanding, or from a divine revelation communicated to our first parents, and by them transmitted to their posterity. In either case this opinion will be allowed to be of the most respectable authority.

(6.) All men are formed with a natural desire and expectation of immortality. The thought of being reduced into nothing is shocking to a rational soul. These hopes and expectations are not the effect of education; for with a very few exceptions they are found in all ages and countries. Neither do they arise from self-conceit or

FREE AGENCY OF MAN.

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pride, but take their rise from the original frame of human nature; and if so, their author is God himself, and they must be founded in truth. He would not inspire his creatures with hopes and wishes, that have nothing in nature to gratify them.

(7.) The apprehensions of wicked men in regard to the punishments of a future state have equally a foundation in nature. They seem to have been implanted by the Creator, to restrain men from crime in this life, and to operate as a motive to virtue; and they answer this purpose to a valuable extent.

(8.) Another argument is founded on the unequal distribution of good and evil in the present life. This argument is noticed in a preceding chapter, and needs not to be repeated here.

These and other arguments render highly probable the doctrine of man's future existence after death: but no absolute certainty can be attained respecting it, except by examining the pages of that invaluable communication from God, which has "brought immortality to light;" not only declaring the fact, but disclosing the circumstances of man's future being, and thus furnishing the most powerful motives to rectitude of conduct in the present life.

So, when the tomb's dull silence finds an end,
The blessed dead to endless youth shall rise;
And hear the archangel's thrilling summons blend
Its tone with anthems from the upper skies.

There shall the good of earth be found at last,
Where dazzling streams and vernal fields expand-
Where Love her crown attains-her trials past-
And, fill'd with rapture, hails the "better land."

WILLIS G. CLARK.
[Beattie; Fergus; S. S. Smith.]

III.-Free Agency and Accountability of Man.

It has been shown in a previous chapter, that man is under a moral government. To fit him for this state he is constituted a free agent. He is endowed with intellectual and active powers; he has judgment to know the meaning of a commandment, and ability to obey it.

By moral government, we understand the establishment and operation of laws for the direction of rational beings, and the enforcing those laws by rewards and punish

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ments. The subject of such a government must be a

free agent.

56. By the liberty of a moral agent, we understand a power over the determinations of his own will.

Every man has a conviction that he is free, and acts toward others in the persuasion that they also are free. Our deliberations, purposes, and promises, all suppose this liberty in ourselves; and our advices, exhortations, and commands suppose it in others. On this subject philosophers may talk; but consciousness and experience decide. I am conscious of freedom. I can weigh motives and desires; I can judge which are most consonant_to sound reason, and to my best interest; and yet can decline regulating my conduct by them. I can choose and refuse. I can act agreeably to the convictions of my understanding, or I can pursue a different course. Advice and exhortation may influence conduct, but they do not impair liberty. The same is the case with motives; they may prompt to action, but they do not act.

A necessary agent, whose actions are as irresistibly determined by desires or motives as a stone in falling to the ground is by the great law of gravitation, cannot be the subject of moral government. He is incapable of virtue and vice, and unfit for reward and punishment.

57. Moral responsibility is the subjection of a moral agent, that is, one capable of moral conduct, to rewards and punishments. Moral accountability is the liableness of a subject of law to the approbation or disapprobation of the lawgiver, on the ground of right, equity, and truth.

Man is placed under the precepts and sanctions of law, as has been briefly shown on preceding pages. One of the great characteristics of that law is utility; or, in other words, it prescribes what the Deity, in his boundless wisdom, saw would be best, not merely for one or a few individuals, but for all; best for all if all were to obey it. Abundant proof of this position will be found in the latter part of this volume, in the comments on the Ten Commandments.

58. This law, to some extent, is intimated to us by reason and the moral faculty, and by an observation of the course of nature.

Reason (the faculty by which we distinguish truth from error, and combine means for the attainment of ends),

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pondering all the phenomena, instructs us to revere the Deity; to exercise justice, candor, and mercy toward our fellow-men; and to cherish temperance, fortitude, and diligence in our several avocations.

But, for the discovery of the great outlines of the will of God and duty of man, we are not left to the exercise of reason alone.

Conscience, or the moral faculty (that by which we distinguish between right and wrong), comes in to the aid of reason; and by reason and conscience all men may perceive the great features of moral law. Accordingly, there are certain dispositions and actions which have been always applauded or commended, and others which as generally have been the subjects of censure and detestation. All men approve of piety, benevolence, integrity, veracity, temperance, fortitude, industry: all men disapprove of contrary dispositions and conduct. Reason and the moral faculty may be perverted. This perversion however results from the abuse of free agency; and for it, mankind have themselves to blame.

Man is a free agent; but his body, his mind, and nature around him, are so constituted, that if he exercise his freedom in an irregular, capricious manner, in defiance of the dictates of reason and conscience, he must suffer a corresponding loss of happiness, or degree of pain.

59. IV. Man, even in his present state, is happy or unhappy, rewarded or punished, as he obeys or disobeys the law. This demonstration of a moral government has been treated in Book I. chap. 3. See also Fergus on Nature and Revelation, Book III. chap. 5.

60. V. Exercise and trial are powerful means of improvement, and sources of happiness. The constitution of nature, and the government of the Creator, are such as to call forth our bodily exertions, and to solicit and encourage the exercise of our intellectual and moral capacities. Under these trials, if we act wisely, we shall make the most rapid progress in improvement. In this progress, the present life soon comes to a close; but we are immortal beings, and we have reason to think that there is an intimate connection between the present and the future, and that the great scheme, which is evidently going on at present, will be continued in a future state of being.

[Fergus.]

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