necessity; and when the most serious attention is rendered to those moral truths that are adapted to operate favorably upon the habits and character; and when the will is surrendered to the suggestions of conscience.

It is to be looked for only in connection with, and in furtherance of, our own most vigorous exertions as rational and moral beings to secure moral harmony in our mental operations and conduct.

96. From every occurrence in life we should take occasion to practice some virtue, and cherish some good habit. Few occurrences are so uninteresting as to call forth no affection; most of them excite either a good or a bad one. Adversity may make us discontented, or it may teach humility and patience. Affliction may dispose either to pious resignation, or to impious repining. Prosperity may inflame sensuality and pride, or may supply the means of exercising moderation, beneficence, and gratitude to the Giver of all good. Injury may provoke hatred and revenge, or call forth the godlike virtues of forbearance and forgiveness. Solitude may infuse laziness, or afford leisure for industry. The bustle of busy life may form habits of cunning or candor, of selfishness or generosity.

On these, and all other occasions, we must shun the criminal, and embrace the virtuous, affection. We should study our own temper, and so anticipate the events of life as to be always ready to turn in this manner every occurrence to a good account, and make it subservient to the cultivation of our moral nature. [Abercrombie.]

72. What is the primary and most essential element in the due regulation of the will?

73. What is the highest class of truths, or motives?

74. Is there any obligation resting upon us to acquire a correct knowledge of these truths?

75. How are the truths of natural religion disclosed?

76. What claims have the truths of revealed religion to our regard?

77. How far is a man responsible in relation to the evidences of revealed religion, and the moral causes embraced in it?

78. What duty in regard to attention is binding upon us?

79. Is such attention a voluntary act?

80. What is the consequence of neglecting this voluntary process?

81. What other course of peculiar interest is sometimes adopted?

82. What other mental condition is yet to be mentioned in connection

with this subject

83. What is the moral character of such a mental state?

84. What is meant by a moral habit?

85. How are habits of vice formed?

THE APPETITES.

86. To what conduct does the principle of habit apply?

87. How then is character originated?

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88. What practical inference is to be drawn from the fact that character arises from individual actions?

89. How must habits of an injurious character be subdued?

90. What other condition of mind deserves attention?

91. What foreign aid is most efficacious toward a moral reformation? 92. What probability is there that the Deity would furnish such needful and appropriate aid to fallen man?

93. To what moral fact does this reasoning direct our attention?

94. How far do sound philosophy and Christianity concur in regard to this change?

95. When may this needful divine aid be looked for?

96. What practical use should be made of the various occurrences of human life?

CHAPTER III.

THE APPETITES.

97. THE appetites are tendencies toward certain bodily things, and cravings for these things when they are withheld.

98. The strongest of these appetites are those which are common to man and brutes. These are the appetite for food (hunger and thirst), by which the individual is sustained; and the appetite of sex, or that by which the species is continued. Without them, reason would have been insufficient for these important purposes.

99. To the appetites just mentioned, may be added, the desire of rest after labor; the desire of sleep after long waking; the desire of warmth and shelter, of air and exercise.

Beside our natural appetites, we have some acquired ones: such is the appetite for tobacco, for opium, and other intoxicating drugs.

100. Those which we possess in common with the lower animals, are implanted in us for important purposes; but they require to be kept under the most rigid control, both of reason and the moral faculty. When they are allowed to break through these restraints, and become leading springs of action, they form a character the lowest in the scale, whether intellectual or moral.

Though our appetites are possessed by us in common with the inferior animals, yet, their operation is exalted and modified, in consequence of the other principles with

which in our nature they are allied, so that, where considerations of duty and expediency are regarded, their indulgence is accompanied by other and higher sources of enjoyment. [See Dewar, vol. i. pp. 363–368.]

The proper regulation of appetite is the triumph of civilization and religion. There are many circumstances which clearly show it to be the intention of the Creator, that our appetites should be indulged with moderation, and under those restraints which reason prescribes.

97. What is meant by the term appetite?

98. What are the strongest of these appetites? 99. What other appetites may be mentioned?

100. Are the animal appetites to be indulged without restraint?

CHAPTER IV.

THE AFFECTION S.

101. THE affections are tendencies or cravings directed toward persons as their immediate objects; while appetites are directed toward things. The direct and ultimate

effect of the affections, is the communication either of enjoyment or of suffering to any of our fellow-creatures; and hence by some authors they are distinguished into benevolent and malevolent; by others into benevolent and defensive. They lead us to a particular conduct toward other men without reference to any principle except the intuitive impulse of the emotion itself.

102. Affection and passion are the same in kind; but they are different in degree. Affection is exercised with decency and moderation; but passion is affection carried to such excess, that it disturbs our reason, lessens, or entirely takes away from us our power of self-command, agitates even the body, and hurries us to action by an almost irresistible impulse.

103. The affections consist of two classes, the Benevolent, and the Defensive or Irascible. These, for the sake of brevity, may be designated by the terms Love, and Anger.

101. What are the affections?

102. How is an affection distinguished from a passion? 103. What are the principal affections?

BENEVOLENT AFFECTIONS.

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SECTION I.-THE BENEVOLENT AFFECTIONS.

THE term Love is sometimes used to describe the bodily desires, as when we talk of a love of wine, or a love of the pleasures of the table. But the more direct and proper sense of the word is that in which it denotes an affection toward a person.

104. Love is variously modified according to the persons to whom it is directed: thus, there is conjugal love, the love of husband and wife; parental (paternal and maternal) love; filial love, the love of children toward their parents; fraternal love, the love of brothers and sisters toward each other; other kinds of family affection; friendship, the love by which friends are especially drawn to each other; public spirit, or the love of our fellow-citizens; patriotism, the love of our fellow-countrymen ; universal benevolence, or philanthropy, the love that is borne to the whole human race, and to every member of it; love to God, or piety.

The benevolent affections are spoken of, figuratively, as the heart. A man's heart is hard or cold, when these affections are feeble and dull in him; he is warm-hearted, when they are strong; and open-hearted, when they are readily bestowed on those around him.

105. The exercise of all our benevolent affections is accompanied with an agreeable emotion, which shows that the design of the Creator is to communicate happiness to his intelligent creatures in connection with the exercise of virtuous dispositions. The object of the Deity in connecting agreeable emotions with the exercise of benevolence is, to induce us to cultivate, with peculiar care, a class of our active principles so immediately subservient to the happiness of human society.

106. It has been questioned whether there be in man any feeling of pure benevolence, which aims at the good of others only, without any view to the gratification of one's self.

By doing good to others, it is true, indeed, that we do most effectually gratify ourselves; for what can give a person more pleasure, than to reflect that he has been instrumental in promoting a fellow-creature's happiness? Yet every good man may be sensible that he often does good, and wishes well, to others, without any immediate C

view to his own gratification, nay, without thinking of himself at all.

In fact, if we had not feelings purely benevolent, we could not gratify ourselves by doing others good. Children have been known to sacrifice their inclinations to the happiness of those they loved, when they themselves believed that their own interest would, in every respect, suffer by doing so.

It is not asserted, indeed, that all children, or all men, are so disinterested: it is only asserted that pure benevolence is to be found in human nature; a doctrine, which, though to many it may seem self-evident, has been much controverted, and which there are men in the world, who, judging of all others by themselves, will never heartily acquiesce in.

107. When a benevolent affection turns our attention upon its object in a tranquil manner, it is regard. The affection, in a more marked form, is love. When it implies a sensitive and vigilant solicitude for the good of its object, it is tenderness; when it absorbs the thought, so that reason is disregarded, it is fondness; when this is the case, the affection is no longer a virtue; still less is it so, when love becomes doting, overweening, passionate.

108. When benevolent feeling is exercised toward a person in view of some good received from him, the words by which such feeling is expressed are thanks. A better expression of the feeling consists, however, in doing acts of gratitude, in returning good for good.

109. Gratitude itself is a natural and virtuous affection; but the acts which it prompts must be limited by rules of duty. A man who does what is wrong in nature for benefits received, makes his benefactor the director of his actions, instead of directing them himself as morality requires. Hence he is said to sell himself; and to be venal.

110. Benevolent affections regarding a particular person, and not necessarily leading to action, are good-will; when they produce a current of cheerful thoughts, they are good-humor; when they lead a man to comply readily with the wishes of others, or to seek to give them pleasure, we have good-nature.

When this disposition is shown on the part of a su perior, we term him gracious and benign. When a person's good-nature makes it easy to address him, he is