SECTION IV.-THE MORAL CULTURE OF THE BENEVOLENT

AFFECTIONS.

128. Ir may be said that we have not the power of generating or directing our affections, and of forming our own character.

129. We reply that this objection involves much too large an assertion. It is very far from being true, that we have no power over our own affections or our own character. The universal voice of mankind recognizes the existence of such a power, by the condemnation which it awards to the want of benevolent affections. This implies that a man's affections are, in some way, subject to his own control.

130. The will is not in contact with the emotion or affection, but it is in contact with the idea of that object which awakens the emotion; and therefore, although not in contact with the emotion, it may be vested with an effectual control over it. It cannot bid compassion into the bosom, apart from the object which awakens it; but it can bid a personal entry into the house of mourning, and then the compassion will flow apace: or it can bid a mental conception of the bereaved and afflicted family there, and then the sensibility will equally arise, whether a suffering be seen or a suffering be thought of.

It is thus that we can will the right emotions into being, not immediately, but mediately: as the love of God, by thinking on God; a sentiment of friendship, by dwelling in contemplation on the congenial qualities of our friend; the admiration of moral excellence, by a steady attention to it.

It is thus too that we can bid away the wrong emotions, not separately and in disjunction from their objects, but by ridding our mind of the thoughts which excite and originate emotions. We may rid ourselves of anger, for example, by forgetting the injury, or by directing our attention to some other object. Hence the culture or regulation of the heart is mainly dependent on the regulation of the thoughts. [Chalmers' Works, vol. v. pp. 206, 207.]

128. What objection here deserves to be considered? 129. What reply shall be made to this objection? 130. In what manner can we control our affections?

INFLUENCE OF ATTENTION AND HABIT.

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SECTION V.-INFLUENCE EXERTED UPON THE AFFECTIONS BY ATTENTION AND HABIT.

I. Influence of Attention.

131. THE act of attention consists in directing the mind intensely and habitually to all the considerations which ought to guide us in the particular relation to which the affection refers. It leads us to place ourselves in the situation of others; and, with a kind of personal, almost selfish interest, to enter into their wants, their anxieties, and their feelings; and thus, in their place, to judge of the emotions and the conduct which are due from us to them. Such is the exercise of one who wishes to follow the great rule of doing to others as he would that they should do to him.

II. Influence of Habit.

132. The tendency of all emotions is to become weaker by repetition, or to be less acutely felt the oftener they are experienced.

133. The tendency of actions is to become easier by repetition, so that those which require at first close attention come to be performed without effort, and almost without consciousness.

134. An affection consists of an emotion leading to an action; and the natural progress of the mind, in the proper exercise of the affection, is, that the emotion becomes less acutely felt as the affection becomes easier and more familiar.

135. Thus, a scene of wretchedness, or a tale of sorrow, will produce in the inexperienced an intensity of emotion not felt by him whose life has been devoted to deeds of mercy; and a superficial observer is apt to consider the condition of the latter as one of insensibility, produced by familiarity with scenes of distress. But this is not so. It is that healthy and natural progress of the mind, in which the emotion is gradually diminished in force as it is followed by its proper actions; that is, as the mere intensity of feeling is exchanged for the habit of active benevolence.

136. The emotion must be steadily followed by the action which belongs to it. If this be neglected, the harmony of the moral process is destroyed, and, as the

C

emotion becomes weakened, it is succeeded by cold insensibility or barren selfishness.

137. There are two conclusions arising out of this subject. The one relates to the bad effects of fictitious scenes of sorrow, as represented on the stage, or in works of fancy. The emotion is produced without the corresponding action, and the consequence is likely to be a cold and useless sentimentalism, instead of a sound cultivation of the benevolent affections.

The second conclusion is, that, in cultivating the benevolent affections in the young, we should be careful to observe the process pointed out in the philosophy of the moral feelings. They should be familiarized with scenes of actual suffering, but this ought to be accompanied by deeds of minute and active kindness, so as to produce a full and lively impression of the wants and feelings of the sufferer. [Abercrombie.]

131. What is the nature of the influence exerted by attention, aided by a certain act of imagination?

132. What is the tendency of all emotions?

133. What is the tendency of actions?

134. What is the nature of an affection?

135. How is the proper exercise of affection illustrated?

136. What should follow emotion?

137. What important conclusions arise out of this subject respecting the cultivation of the benevolent affections?

CHAPTER V.

THE DESIRES.

138. OUR desires differ from our appetites, in not taking their rise from the body; in not operating periodically, after certain intervals; and in not ceasing on the attainment of a particular object. While pursuing the objects of desire, we are acting a part more suited to our rational nature than when yielding to the dominion of indolence or of appetite; and it is not till we pervert them from their true end that we fall in the esteem of our fellowcreatures.

139. The mental condition which we call desire ap

THE DESIRES.-DESIRE OF SAFETY.

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pears to lie in a great measure at the foundation of character; and, for a sound moral condition, it is required that the desires be directed to worthy objects; and that the degree or strength of the desire be accommodated to the true and relative value of each of these objects. If the desires are thus directed, worthy conduct will be likely to follow in a steady and uniform manner. If they are allowed to break from these restraints of reason and the moral principle, the man is left at the mercy of unhallowed passion, and is liable to those irregularities which result from such a derangement of the moral feelings.

140. The desires may indeed exist in an ill-regulated state, while the conduct is restrained by various principles; such as submission to human laws, a regard to character, or even a certain feeling of what is morally right, contending with the vitiated principle within. But this cannot be considered as the healthy condition of a moral being.

It is only when the desire itself is sound that we can say the man is in moral health. This, accordingly, is the great principle so often and so strikingly enforced in the sacred writings, "Keep thy heart with all diligence, because out of it are the issues of life." "Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God."

Thus there are desires that are folly, and there are desires that are vice, even though they should not be followed by indulgence; and there are desires which tend to purify and elevate the moral nature, though their objects should be beyond the reach of our full attainment in the present state of being.

[See Exposition of the Tenth Commandment.]

141. Our principal desires are, the desire of safety, the desire of having, the desire of society, the desire of superiority, the desire of knowledge, the desire of moral improvement, the desire of action, the desire of happiness, the desire of esteem.

(1.) The Desire of Safety.

142. The desire of safety is originated by a knowledge of our exposure to the effects of the conflicting desires of other men. The instinctive love of life, the instinctive desire to avoid privation, pain, and constraint, are ex

panded and unfolded by memory, reflection, and foresight, so that life, ease, and comfort become objects to which man tends with conscious thought, as well as from blind impulse. He is not satisfied with present safety, but is anxious to have security for the future.

(2.) The Desire of Property.

143. This desire is apparent in all stages of society. Food, clothing, weapons, tools, ornaments, houses, carriages, ships, aré universally objects of his desire. At first these things are desired as a means of gratifying his natural appetites, or his affections; of supporting and sheltering his family; of repelling and mastering his enemies. But afterward he delights to consider them as connected with himself in a permanent and exclusive manner, and to look upon them as his, as his own, as his property. The things which he thus looks upon as his own he is disturbed at the prospect of losing, and is angry at any one who attempts to take them from him.

144. The pursuit of wealth derives its moral character from the end for which it is sought. A man may desire wealth as a means of luxury and sensuality: and in such a case the desire of wealth is opposed to temperance, rather than to justice.

Or, it may be desired as a means of benevolent action, or of right action in many other ways. A person's power of doing good, of many kinds, depends much upon the station and influence which wealth bestows. The desire of wealth for this purpose is virtuous.

145. Though wealth may be desired for ends which make the desire virtuous, the progress of men's habits is such that, when sought at first as a means, it is afterward desired as an end. The desire to acquire money is then unlimited; and is covetousness, avarice.

(3.) The Desire of Society.

146. The most prominent forms in which this desire appears are, the desire of family society, and of civil society, images of which may be seen in the instincts of animals of the former, in pairing animals; of the latter, in gregarious animals. This desire springs up in early childhood, before the dawn of reason.