177. Do our moral judgments and emotions involve a sense of obligation?

178. To what object does a sense of moral obligation refer?

179. How does it appear that a sense of duty is not resolvable, as some suppose, into a regard to our own happiness, but is an ultimate and distinct feeling?

SECTION IV.-SUPREMACY OF CONSCIENCE.

180. It is manifest, both from reason and Scripture, that the authority of conscience is great. When a man believes, upon due deliberation, that a certain action is right, that action is, right to him; and he is to be held guilty if he violates his conscience; if he does one thing while his sense of obligation is directed to its contrary.

181. That conscience has a natural right to regulate the whole human system is evident from the following considerations:

(1.) It may be innocent or praiseworthy in certain circumstances, to counteract our bodily appetites and refuse to gratify them; but to counteract the dictates of conscience, is felt to be blamable.

(2.) The dictates of conscience are universally regarded as more sacred than the principles of taste, and of a higher character. These may be violated, and yet the violator is not viewed as committing a crime; not so the violator of the dictates of conscience.

(3.) The supremacy of conscience is often asserted with awful power, when, in the midst even of outward prosperity, it makes the transgressor miserable, and when the transgressor is about to die and has nothing to fear from man.

182. The conclusion is, that to allow no more to this part than to other parts of our nature; to let it guide and govern only occasionally, in common with the rest, as its turn happens to come,-this is not to act conformably to the constitution of man.

And though conscience may lose its power when borne down by evil habits or tumultuous passion, as the strongest man by being kept long in fetters may lose the use of his limbs, yet conscience still retains its authority, that is, its right to govern. It prescribes measures to every appetite, affection, and passion, and says to every other principle of action, so far thou mayst go, but no farther.

Hence it may be seen how foolishly those men argue who give way to all their passions without reserve, and

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excuse themselves by saying, that every passion is natu-
ral, and that they cannot be blamed for doing what nature
prompts them to do. It is only a part, and that confess-
edly an inferior part of their nature, that prompts them
to such indulgence. Their nature, as a whole, remon-
strates against such indulgence. It is therefore unnatural,
in the proper sense of that word, and therefore to be
condemned and abandoned.
[Beattie's Mor. Science.]

"Mad! (thou reply'st, with indignation fired)
Of ancient sages proud to tread the step,
I follow nature.-Follow nature still,

But look it be thine own:" Is conscience, then,
No part of nature? Is she not supreme?
Thou regicide! O raise her from the dead!
Then follow nature; and resemble God.

YOUNG.

Dr. Chalmers well remarks:-"We do not urge the proposition that conscience has in every instance the actual direction of human affairs, for this were in the face of all experience. It is not that every man obeys her dictates, but that every man feels he ought to obey them. It is not the reigning, but the rightful authority of conscience, that we, under the name of her supremacy, contend for." [Works, vol. i. pp. 316, 317.]

183. The practical reason for insisting so much upon the natural authority of conscience, is, that it seems in a great measure overlooked by many, who are by no means the worst sort of men. It is thought sufficient to abstain from gross wickedness, and to be humane and kind to such as happen to come in their way. Whereas, in reality, the very constitution of our nature requires, that we bring our whole conduct before this superior faculty; wait its determination; enforce upon ourselves its authority, and make it the business of our lives, as it is absolutely the whole business of a moral agent, to conform ourselves to it. This is the true meaning of that ancient precept, reverence thyself.

[Butler's Preface to his Sermons on Human Nature.] 184. The teaching of the sacred volume is in conformity to the foregoing remarks. In the 14th chapter of Romans it is declared-"One believeth that he may eat all things: another, who is weak, eateth herbs. One man esteemeth one day above another: another, esteemeth every day alike." Here, then, are differences, nay, contrarieties of conscientious judgments. In these circum

stances, Paul says to the parties, "Let every man be fully persuaded in his own mind;" that is, let every man be careful to satisfy himself that what he is doing is right. The situation of these parties was, that one perceived the truth upon the subject, and the other did not; in the one, the sense of obligation was connected with an accurate, in the other, with an inaccurate opinion.

Thus again: — "I know, and am persuaded by the Lord Jesus, that there is nothing unclean of itself;" therefore, absolutely speaking, it is lawful to eat all things; "but to him that esteemeth anything to be unclean, to him it is unclean." That is, it is wrong for any man to violate his own sense of duty. To the doubter, the sin of eating was certain, though the act was right in itself.

Again, as a general rule, "He that doubteth, is condemned if he eat, because he eateth not of faith; for whatsoever is not of faith is sin;" that is, whatever we do which we are not sure is right, is wrong.

[Hodge on Romans xiv.] 185. Men sometimes make light of the authority of conscience. They exclaim: "Every man pleads his conscientious opinions, and that he is bound in conscience to do this or that; and yet his neighbor makes the same plea, and urges the same obligation, to do just the contrary."

186. The alleged fact contained in this remark is true; but it only proves that conscience is not an unerring standard of action, is not alone a safe guide; but it is far from proving that conscience is not an authoritative principle, to which we are bound to yield obedience.

Historical Illustration.

187. A jeweler, of good character and considerable wealth, having occasion, in the way of his business, to travel at some distance from the place of his abode, took along with him a servant, in order to take care of his portmanteau. He had with him some of his best jewels, and a large sum of money, to which his servant was likewise privy.

The master having dismounted, the servant, watching his opportunity, took a pistol from his master's saddle, and shot him dead on the spot; then robbed him of his

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jewels and money; and, hanging a large stone to his neck, he threw him into the nearest canal.

With this booty, he made. off to a distant part of the country, where he had reason to believe that neither he nor his master was known. There he began to trade, in a very low way at first that his obscurity might screen him from observation, and, in the course of a good many years, seemed to rise by natural progress of business into wealth and consideration: so that his good fortune appeared at once the effect and the reward of industry and virtue.

Of these he counterfeited the appearance so well that he grew into great credit, married into a good family, and, by laying out his sudden stores discreetly, as he saw occasion, and joining to all a universal affability, he was admitted to a share of the government of the town, and rose from one post to another, till at length he was chosen chief magistrate.

In this office he maintained a fair character, and continued to fill it with no small applause, both as a governor and judge; till one day as he sat upon the bench with some of his brethren, a criminal was brought before him, who was accused of murdering his master.

The evidence came out full, the jury brought in their verdict that the prisoner was guilty, and the whole assembly waited the sentence of the president of the court (which he happened to be that day) with great suspense. Meanwhile he appeared to be in unusual disorder and agitation of mind; his color changed often, and at length he arose from his seat, and coming down from the bench, placed himself just by the unfortunate man at the bar, to the no small astonishment of all present.

"You see before you," said he, addressing himself to those who sat on the bench, a striking instance of the just awards of heaven, which, this day, after thirty years' concealment, presents to you a greater criminal than the man just now found guilty." He then made an ample confession of his guilt and of all the aggravations of his crime. "Nor can I feel," continued he, "any relief from the agonies of an awakened conscience, but by requiring that justice be forthwith done against me in the most public and solemn manner."

We may easily suppose the amazement of the whole

assembly, and especially of his fellow judges. However, they proceeded, upon his confession, to pass sentence upon him and he died with all the manifestations of a penitent mind. [Beauties of History.]

180. What authority belongs to conscience as a director of individual conduct?

181. How does it appear that this faculty has a natural right to regulate the whole human system?

182. What conclusion may be drawn from these facts?

183. What is the practical reason for insisting so much upon the natural authority of conscience?

184. What is the teaching of Scripture respecting the authority of conscience?

185. In what way do men sometimes make light of the authority of conscience?

186. What reply is to be made to such a remark?

187. What historical illustration may be given of the power of conscience?

SECTION V.-ON THE IMPERFECTION OF CONSCIENCE.

188. A MAN may act according to his conscience and yet commit a very criminal act. Thefts, frauds, homicides have often been committed in accordance with conscience. The crime, however, lies not in acting according to conscience, but in the state of mind or course of life which made that appear right which in fact was wrong.

Men often judge amiss respecting their duties in consequence of their own faults. Some take little pains to ascertain the truth; some voluntarily exclude knowledge; and most persons would possess more accurate perceptions of the moral law if they sufficiently endeavored to obtain them. And, therefore, although a man may not be criminal in performing a given act which he ignorantly supposes to be lawful, he may be punished for that ignorance or vice in which his wrong supposition originates.

189. It appears then that men ought to act at all times according to the dictates of conscience when there is no doubt or suspense in their minds: if the case is not clear, it is evident that they should wait till, by the due use of means, they have ascertained what is their duty. If conscience should pronounce anything to be a crime which is not a crime, they ought to abstain because they do not know the judgment to be erroneous, and would not be guiltless if they should act in opposition to it. The reason is, that supposing, as they may, the voice of conscience to be the voice of God, they could not transgress its orders, without expressly