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rebelling against what appeared to them to be the authority of God. "There is nothing unclean of itself (no meat); but to him that esteemeth anything to be unclean, to him it is unclean." The apostle Paul (Rom. xiv. 14) is speaking of an action which was not sinful in itself, and yet he declares that it was sinful to the man whose conscience pronounced it to be such. The judgment of conscience does not change the nature of actions, but it changes them to us; because the authority of God seems to us to be interposed either to command or to forbid. In the case to which Paul referred, the sin did not consist properly in the action itself, but in doing it with the persuasion that it was sinful.

[Lectures by Dr. John Dick, vol. ii. p. 270.] 190. The value of conscience as a moral guide has been overrated by some writers in consequence of neglecting to consider the fact that man is in a state of moral depravity, and thus exposed to the undue influence of his appetites and passions, of prejudices and temptations, that tend to obscure and pervert his moral judgment, and to weaken the authority, or rather the power of conscience.

In the account, for instance, that is given, by Dr. Abercrombie, of conscience, as the presiding and regulating power in the moral constitution of man, there does not appear to be an adequate impression of the degree in which that faculty has been affected by the entrance of sin into our world. It would seem to be regarded as having escaped the general depravation, and as still sitting the uncorrupted censor of all the other powers and passions of the soul. But this surely is a great mistake.

191. To the question whether conscience has, in common with other powers, suffered depravation, Dr. Wardlaw, in his Christian Ethics, furnishes a full reply, which in substance is as follows::

Where is "conscience toward God?" What are the results of its authority? Let the speedy and universal loss of the original knowledge of the true God answer the question. Let the polytheistic superstitions of heathenism, with all their fooleries, impurities, and cruelties; let the skeptical theism, and the presumptuous atheism of philosophy; let the manifest and conscious ungodliness of the whole race of mankind answer the question. D*

Even in its dictates toward fellow-creatures, too, how sadly is it under the domination of the appetites, and passions, and selfish desires; how constantly liable to be swayed and bribed to wrong decisions; and how much in danger are even its right judgments of being set aside. by the power of such interfering influences. If conscience has not become depraved, how comes it, that this faculty has not, everywhere and always, with authoritative voice, said to man, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God, with all thy heart?" How comes it that it has not always condemned the absence of this love as the most deeply criminal of all the breaches of moral obligation?

The apostle Paul says, "The carnal mind is enmity against God." If, in saying so, he gives the character of human nature, there must, in this enmity, be a tendency to influence the decision of the judgment respecting the affections and the conduct due to God; and this depraved state of man must vitiate, more or less, the judgment of mankind on the fundamental principles of morals.

192. Conscience must therefore have a rule. It must be directed by some higher rule than itself. This rule is not the example of others, although wise and good, because the best of men are imperfect, and are liable to errors and infirmities.

It may be added that the opinion of men is not the rule of conscience, any more than their example, because they may mislead us, either from design or from their own previous error. Hence in the Scriptures we are commanded to call no man master, and to give this honor to Christ alone. The true rule of conscience, or of moral obligation, will be exhibited in another chapter.

Conscience is only a subordinate rule, to which we are properly under obligation to yield obedience, only when it is conformable to the supreme rule; and the obligation of which we speak, results solely from the supposition of its conformity. An appeal may always be made from its decisions to the Scriptures; and as soon as a difference is discovered between its dictates and those of Scripture, the sentence which it has pronounced is made void.

Hence it is plain that the plea of conscience will not avail to exempt us from guilt and punishment.

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188. While it thus appears that a man ought to make his conduct conform to his conscience, and that he is guilty if he act against his moral judgment of what is right, is a man, on the other hand, who acts according to his conscience, always right?

189. What practical direction may guide us in obeying the voice of conscience?

190. What error in the treatment of this subject has been committed by writers, in the main correct?

191. What evidence is there that conscience has, in common with other powers, suffered depravation?

192. Since it appears that conscience is an incompetent and unsafe guide to correct conduct, what becomes necessary?

SECTION VI.-INFLUENCE OF REASON ON OUR MORAL DECISIONS.

193. (1.) THE office of reason appears to be, to judge of the expediency, propriety, and consequences of actions, which do not involve any feeling of moral duty.

(2.) In regard to the affections a process of reasoning is often necessary, not only respecting the best mode of exercising them, but also, in many cases, in deciding whether we shall exercise them at all.

(3.) In cases in which an impression of moral duty is concerned, an exercise of reason is still, in many instances, necessary for enabling us to adapt our means to the end which we desire to accomplish.

(4.) Reason is employed in some cases in which one duty appears to interfere with another; likewise in judging whether, in particular instances, any rule of duty is concerned, or whether we are at liberty to take up the case simply as one of expediency or utility.

(5.) Reason is also concerned in judging of a description of cases in which a difference of moral feeling arises according to the circumstances in which an individual is placed. Thus we attach a difference of moral sentiment to the act of taking away the life of another,-when this is done by an individual under the impulse of revenge, by the same individual in self-defense or by a judge in the discharge of his public duty.

(6.) We often speak of man as acting upon reason, as opposed to passion. This only means, that he acts upon a calm consideration of the motives by which he ought to be influenced, instead of being hurried away by a desire or an affection which has been allowed to usurp undue influence. [Abercrombie.]

193. What is the influence and office of reason in guiding us to a just decision with regard to our moral conduct?

BOOK III.

THE PRINCIPLES AND RULE OF MORAL ACTION AND OBLIGATION.

CHAPTER I.

THE DISTINCTIONS OF RIGHT AND WRONG IMMUTALLE AND ETERNAL.

THE being and perfections of God having been proved, it follows that He is the proprietor of all things, and that He is the supreme moral governor of all: we have also shown that there are in the human constitution, in the history of the world, or in the acts of divine providence, abundant intimations of a supreme moral government to which we are accountable.

[See further, Dewar, Moral Phil. vol. ii. pp. 1-25.] In the preceding chapters it has been shown that man has been made capable of approving certain actions as right, and of disapproving others as wrong. From the constitution of our nature we cannot but mark a difference between virtue and vice, and approve of the one as morally good, and disapprove of the other as morally evil.

194. It is alleged by many skeptical writers, that the distinctions of virtue and vice are mere perceptions or emotions of the mind, and have no existence separate from it. There are also some authors, professedly friendly to the interests of religion, who deny the immutability of moral distinctions, and maintain that they have their sole origin in the enactments of will and power.

Of this description is Dr. Paley, who has followed some writers who preceded him in their most dangerous statements, and has deduced from these statements their most exceptionable consequences.

195. Dr. Paley's system advocates the following principles: Whatever is expedient is right. It is the utility of any moral rule alone which constitutes the obligation of it. Actions are to be estimated by their tendency. To be obliged to do an action, according to his view, is

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to be urged to it by a violent motive, resulting from the command of another. This motive, he tells us, can be only self-love, as we are under no obligation to do anything which does not contribute to our interest; so that on the supposition of there being no future state, an action by which we could get nothing would be perfectly indifferent to us. What makes the difference, according to him, between prudence and duty is, that in the one case we consider what we shall get or lose in this world, and in the other, what we shall get or lose in the next. A man, therefore, who does not believe in a future world, or who does not carry his views to it, can have no perception of duty.

196. His system has contributed much to the prevalence of a loose and unscriptural morality. It has led men to disregard the law of God as the only measure and rule of morals, and to substitute, in room of it, their own views of expediency.

197. This question, therefore, whether the distinctions of right and wrong are necessary and inevitable, is to be regarded as fundamentally important in relation to the interests of morality and religion; and is to be answered in the affirmative-that is, it is to be maintained that moral distinctions have a real existence, independent of our perceptions.

198. The argument in favor of this position may be briefly stated thus: The Deity is as necessarily holy and good, as he necessarily exists; he cannot do what is at variance with his infinite goodness and rectitude.

By the will of Deity must be understood, not anything arbitrary, but the act of a mind possessing infinite intelligence as well as power, infinite rectitude as well as goodness. His will does not create moral distinctions, but is the expression of distinctions which eternally and unchangeably exist, and which are founded in his own naThe boundless perfection of his nature is not the effect of his will, but his will is the effect, and, when revealed, the announcement of his supreme and necessary

ture.

moral excellence.

This is the view which is everywhere given of God in Scripture.

To suppose then that the will of God is the sole origin of the distinctions of right and wrong, shows that the