framers of such a supposition have erroneous views of the necessary and eternal excellence of the divine nature. Ir such distinctions were erected, and depended, on mere power and enactment, would it not follow, that had God so willed it, what we regard as the differences between moral actions would have been entirely reversed, and good would be put for evil, and evil for good? According to this scheme, there is no justice, no truth, no benevolence essentially in God or in the universe; and the attempt of ascertaining what are the moral attributes of the Deity is rendered unnecessary, since whatever he is, is determined by an act of his will.

How contrary this is to Scripture and to enlightened reason, it is needless to say. It is because the moral excellences of his nature are infinite and unchangeable, that it is the duty of every intelligent creature, antecedent to all law and all enactment, to love him supremely; and it is on the same ground that His will must ever be the expression of what is holy, and just, and good. He is, indeed, so absolute that he can do whatever he pleases; but so just that he cannot be pleased to do any unrighteous thing.

We are formed capable of perceiving, and of feeling moral truth; but it is truth which has an existence independently of our perceptions and feelings. Every theory therefore which represents moral distinctions as having no existence apart from the mind that perceives them: that is, which teaches us to regard morality as altogether a matter of sensation or feeling, appears to have a skeptical and dangerous tendency. That a being endowed with certain powers is bound to love and obey the Creator and Preserver of all, is truth, whether I perceive it or not; and we cannot conceive it possible that it can ever be reversed. [Dewar, vol. ii. pp. 26-33.]

194. Are these distinctions of right and wrong, of virtue and vice, which are thus observed and felt by the human mind, founded in the nature of things and consequently immutable and eternal-in other words, are they included in necessary truth, which is as independent of my constitution, as the equality of the three angles of a triangle to two right angles?

195. What principles are at the foundation of Dr. Paley's system of morals?

196. What, consequently, has been the influence of Dr. Paley's system of moral philosophy?

197. The question returns: Are the distinctions of right and wrong necessary, immutable, and founded in the nature of things?

198. What briefly is the argument in favor of this position?

RULE OF MORAL OBLIGATION.

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CHAPTER II.

RULE OR LAW OF MORAL OBLIGATION.

199. THE rule, or law, of moral obligation, is the rule or standard by which human conduct ought to be regulated, and conformity to which is virtue or rectitude.

200. This Rule may be ascertained by answering the fundamental question, whether man be a subject of the government of the Deity? If the moral government of God be granted, and the consequent subjection of man to that government, it evidently follows, without an intermediate link of reasoning, that the rule by which his conduct is to be regulated must be THE WILL OF THE SUPREME Governor.

The two propositions, indeed, that man is a subject of the Divine Governor, and that the will of the Divine Governor is his law, must be regarded as of the same import. If there be a God, he must rule; and if he rules, His will must be law.

201. So far as the law, or rule, of duty is concerned, the only legitimate inquiry is, what is the true way, or ways, of ascertaining, with certainty and correctness, the will of the Supreme Legislator.

202. The moral rectitude or virtue of a subject of God's moral government consists in conformity of principle and conduct, of heart and life, to the will of the Governor; a governor who is necessarily supreme, and whose will, to all his intelligent creatures, is infallible and unimpeach

able law.

In accordance with this statement the sacred scripture asserts that "sin is the trangression of law," the law of God; of course virtue must consist in conforming to that law. It also asserts that "to fear God and keep his commandments is the whole duty of man." "Thus saith the Lord," is regarded as a sufficient and final law.

It also asserts that the will, or command of God is the rule of obedience to all intelligent creatures. It is the rule to angels; "Bless the Lord, ye his angels, that excel in strength, that do his commandments, hearkening unto the

voice of his word." It was the rule to our Savior when

he sojourned among men. "My meat," he said, "is to

do the will of him that sent me, and to finish his work." To the rule which directs angels, and which directed our Redeemer, it is right that we should conform.

203. This will of God is wise and just, and there would be impiety in supposing that there could be any obliquity or irregularity in the conduct which it prescribes.

As it is wise and righteous, so it is good and beneficent, always aiming at our welfare, as well as the glory of our Maker; for the tendency of all the commands which it issues is to promote the order and happiness of the uni

verse.

It is the will of the Creator, to which creatures should bow with profound reverence. It is the will of a Master, whom his servants ought to obey. It is the will of a Father, which his children should regard not only with respect, but with gratitude.

204. Some notions of morality are found among those who do not enjoy the advantages of revelation; and these are accompanied with a sense of obligation: that is, there is a conviction in the minds of men that they ought to do some things, and ought not to do other things. There remain treatises on morals drawn up by the Greeks and Romans, in perusing which, while we observe many defects, we cannot but admire the progress which they had made in the investigation of the various classes of relative duties.

It is evident too, that conscience performed its office among them, not only from particular instances of its power in disquieting and alarming certain distinguished transgressors, but from express references to it, and their recorded declarations, that some actions were pleasing, and others were offensive to the gods.

205. The speculative morality of the heathen may be conceived to have been handed down to them by tradition, to be in part the voice of that law which we must believe was given to our first parents, and revived by subsequent revelations, still speaking to men by the lips of their progenitors and teachers, who have inculcated from age to age the precepts which had been delivered to themselves by a preceding race.

It may be supposed, again, to be, in part, the result of

FITNESS OF THINGS.

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reasoning; a discovery made by the mental faculties employed in contemplating the principles, feelings, and instincts of human nature, and the circumstances in which it is placed, and in deducing inferences from them. This, however, is the work only of a few superior minds, and will not account for the existence of moral sentiments all classes of men.

among

Another source of their knowledge of moral rules, is the capacity of the human mind for perceiving the propriety and impropriety of certain actions, and for making them the objects of approbation and disapprobation.

[Wardlaw.]

199. What is understood by the rule or law of moral obligation? 200. How is this rule to be ascertained?

201. What then, in all theories of morals, so far as the rule of duty is concerned, is the only legitimate inquiry?

202. In what then does the virtue or moral rectitude of a subject of God's moral government consist?

203. What are the characteristics of this supreme rule of obligation? 204. Is the will of God made known by the light of nature?

205. How may the speculative morality of heathen be more particularly accounted for?

CHAPTER III.

ORIGIN, OR ULTIMATE GROUND, OF MORAL RECTITUDE, AND OBLIGATION.

206. To the question, Why should I pursue one course of action rather than another? the following answers are returned :-One says, Because it is right; another, Because it is conformable to reason and nature; a third, Because it is conformable to truth; a fourth, Because it is agreeable to the fitness of things: and a fifth, Because it contributes to the general good.

I. Fitness of Things as a Ground of Obligation.

207. From its abstruseness, the fitness of things could never be intended as the ground of obligation to mankind at large, for they are incapable of understanding it. Moreover, it properly constitutes no moral obligation

at all.

There is no moral obligation but from a law, and

no law except from the will of a superior. If a man act contrary to the fitness of things, you may pronounce him unreasonable, but you cannot call him criminal. He may subject himself to inconvenience or suffering; but he is only unwise. The truth is, that the fitness of things as a rule of duty is an expression without meaning, and is used in an intelligible sense only when used to denote the institution of things by the will of the Creator, from which the duties of his creatures naturally flow. But when thus explained, the fitness of things and the will of God signify the same thing; the fitness, the relation, or the order of things, being the medium by which he has intimated his will. [Dick's Lectures.]

II. Obligation as resulting from Utility.

208. It is the doctrine of Paley that "actions are to be estimated by their tendency;" that "whatever is expedient is right;" that "it is the utility of any moral rule alone which constitutes the obligation of it." But in regard to this doctrine we remark (1.), that to hold utility to be the foundation of morals, is to ascribe to men more comprehensive views than they actually possess; we are not competent judges of what is, upon the whole, good for the world. It is a principle too unwieldy for our grasp, and extremely apt to be abused by the substitution of particular for general good.

(2.) If expediency be the only rule of action, and if every man is to judge for himself (as Paley admits) concerning the utility of his own conduct, may not the perjurer, and the assassin, and others, be persuaded, each in his own mind, that his actions are, in their consequences, beneficial, and entitled to reward?

Expediency has been alleged in justification of the greatest inhumanity and injustice. It has been acted on by persecutors and tyrants in every age. It has been the rule of conduct to all who have found a courtly morality convenient. The Inquisition referred to it for its vindication in the cruelties which it inflicted, and in the fires which it kindled. That society which is most dangerous to the virtue and happiness of mankind-the Jesuitshave made this the foundation of their pernicious maxims, their intriguing counsels, and unchristian compliances.

In the preceding chapter was shown the necessity of