Public Choice III

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Cambridge University Press, 17. 2. 2003. - 768 страница
This book represents a considerable revision and expansion of Public Choice II (1989). As in the previous additions, all of the major topics of public choice are covered. These include: why the state exists, voting rules, federalism, the theory of clubs, two-party and multiparty electoral systems, rent seeking, bureaucracy, interest groups, dictatorship, the size of government, voter participation, and political business cycles. Normative issues in public choice are also examined. The book is suitable for upper level courses in economics dealing with politics, and political science courses emphasizing rational actor models.

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Ауторска права

Чести термини и фразе

action Alesina allocation allocative efficiency approval voting assume assumption axioms behavior benefits Borda count Buchanan budget bureaucrats campaign candidates Chapter choose citizens club coalition Coase theorem collective decision committee competition constitutional stage contract contributions costs countries cycle defined democracy democratic discussion distribution Downsian economic effect election electoral equilibrium example existence expenditures favor Figure growth ideal point incentive income increase indifference curves individual interest groups issue space legislation legislature literature logrolling marginal marginal utility maximize median voter median voter theorem normative optimal Ordeshook outcome Pareto Pareto set Pareto-optimal parties percent players policies position possible predictions preferences presidential probability procedure proposal Public Choice quantity rational choice redistribution rent seeking representative simple majority rule social choice social welfare function strategy Table theorem theory Tullock unanimity rule underground economy unemployment utility functions variables voting rule welfare winning

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Библиографски подаци

НасловPublic Choice III
Cambridge surveys of economic literature
АуторDennis C. Mueller
Издањеилустровано, поново одштампано издање, ревидирано
ИздавачCambridge University Press, 2003
ISBN0521894751, 9780521894753
Дужина768 страница
  
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