The acceptance of the foregoing doctrine, it was held, does not prevent the United States from providing that children born abroad of American citizens shall be considered citizens of the United States. CHAPTER XIII NATURALIZATION: EXPATRIATION Naturalization by statute Each country determines, by its own municipal law, the persons to be admitted to its citizenship. Since the adoption of the Constitution, it has been recognized that citizenship of the United States may be obtained in two ways-by birth within the country, and by naturalization. As has been already learned, up to the time of the Dred Scott decision there was doubt whether birth within the United States or naturalization by the General Government was sufficient to endow one with either Federal or State citizenship. By that decision this doubt was resolved in the negative, it being held that no one by mere birth becomes a citizen of the United States, and that one could become a Federal citizen only by becoming first a citizen of a State, though it was also held, it will be remembered, that a State could not, by making an African negro one of its own citizens, thereby endow him with the general constitutional privileges of Federal citizenship. By the Fourteenth Amendment, however, it was declared that national citizenship is no longer dependent upon State citizenship, and that mere birth within the United States, even though of alien parents, or naturalization by Federal law, is sufficient to create national citizenship; and that residence in a State is sufficient to render one a citizen of that State. It lies within the legislative discretion of Congress to determine the mode of naturalization, the conditions upon which it will be granted, and the persons and classes of persons to whom the right will be extended; but, as was said in the Wong Kim Ark case, not to restrict the civil and political rights of naturalized citizens beyond the limits provided in the Constitution. Except as limited by the Constitution it is within the power of Congress to determine the civil and political rights which naturalized citizens shall enjoy, and to make these rights less than those possessed by native-born subjects. The due process of law clause of the Fifth Amendment, however, would prevent any very great discrimination as to their civil rights, and this limitation is reinforced by the obligations of international comity. The Constitution itself provides that only a native-born citizen shall be eligible to the Presidency or Vice Presidency. In the United States the granting of naturalization is held to be a judicial act.1 Congress by statute determines the courts which shall exercise the right to naturalize, and to such courts the function is exclusively confined. Congress may authorize, and for many years has authorized, State courts to entertain naturalization proceedings, but there is, of course, no power on the part of the Federal Government to compel the exercise by such State courts of the power so granted. It has been held that naturalization has a retroactive effect to the extent of removing liability to forfeiture of lands held during alienage.2 The naturalization of a father operates as a naturalization of his minor children if they are dwelling within the United States.3 In the same case in which this is held, it is also held that the declaration by a father of an inten 1 Spratt v. Spratt, 4 Pet. 393; 7 L. ed. 897. 2 Manuel v. Wulff, 152 U. S. 505; 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 651; 38 L. ed. 532. 3 Boyd v. Nebraska, 143 U. S. 135; 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 375; 36 L. ed. 103. tion to become naturalized gives to his children who attain their majority, before their father's naturalization is completed, an inchoate citizenship which, however, upon majority, may be repudiated. When territories are annexed either by treaty or by conquest, the status of the inhabitants is determined at the will of the annexing States. In all cases, however, in the absence of any treaty stipulations to the contrary, the annexation of a territory transfers to the annexing State the allegiance of its inhabitants, and makes them, from the point of view of other nations, the citizens of that State. Whether or not, however, they become its citizens in the strictest constitutional sense depends upon the municipal will of that country. This branch of the subject will be treated in the chapter dealing with "Citizenship in the Territories and Dependencies." Besides naturalization by general acts, by treaty, and by conquest, there have been many instances in the United States of naturalization of specific individuals or groups of individuals by special acts of Congress.4 By statute it is provided that "all children heretofore born out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States, whose fathers were or may be at the time of their birth citizens thereof, are declared to be citizens of the United States; but the right of citizenship shall not descend to children whose fathers never resided in the United States." 5 The application of this principle to persons born in countries which, like the United States, claim as their own citizens all persons born within their limits, is to create a double citizenship. This is true, especially, of course, with reference to England. Double citizenship is also created in those cases in 4 See Van Dyne, Citizenship of the United States, Chapter VI. 5 Rev. Stat., § 1993. which one country naturalizes citizens of another country which does not admit the right of the individual to expatriate himself without the consent of the State of his natural allegiance. The difficulties and conflicting claims arising out of these cases of double allegiance have been numerous, and have usually been settled, each case upon its own merits, by way of compromise and upon doctrines of comity, rather than by the establishment of any very general principles. Thus it has been held upon numerous occasions by the executive branch of our government that our law cannot operate to relieve such persons from their allegiance to the countries in which they are born so long as they remain in such countries. It has also been generally held that where a naturalized American citizen returns to his native country, he may be held bound by such obligations, as, for example, the rendition of military service, as may have been due by him at the time of his departure from his native country.6 Expatriation Until comparatively recent times, except in the United States, the right of a citizen to cast off his natural allegiance, the allegiance into which he is born, was generally denied by the States of the world. This denial was made, but not always enforced in practice, in England down to the time of her Naturalization Act of 1870. Since the first years of the Constitution the legislation of Congress upon the subject of naturalization has implied the right of expatriation. By the act of 1868 which is still in force, the right of expatriation was explicitly declared in the most unqualified manner.7 6 Cf. W. S. Tingle, Germany's Claims Upon German-Americans in Germany, Philadelphia, 1903. 7 Rev. Stat., §§ 1999, 2000. |