declared: "There is no reasonable ground for interfering with the liberty of person or the right of full control by determining the hours of labor in the occupation of a baker. . . . The mere assertion that the subject relates, though but in a remote degree, to the public health, does not necessarily render the enactment valid. The act must have a more direct relation as a means to an end, and the end itself must be appropriate and legitimate, before an act can be held valid which interferes with the general right of an individual to be free in his person and in his power to contract in relation to his own labor."

In general it may be said that while, by a legitimate exercise of the police power, the conduct of individuals and the use by them of their property may be regulated, or, in some cases, their property even destroyed, as for example, when a building is torn down to prevent the spread of a conflagration, the State is never justified in a direct taking of property for its own use, nor in ordering the transfer of property from one individual to another person. In Noble State Bank v. Haskell, Justice Holmes did, indeed, say that "an ulterior public advantage may justify a comparatively insignificant taking of private property for what is, in immediate purpose, a private use,' but, on motion for rehearing he took care to say he had not intended to give a new or wider scope to the police power, for that, in fact, in the case at hand, there had been no unconditional taking at all. The cases cited, he said, were to establish, "not that property might be taken for a private use, but that, among the public uses for which it might be taken, were, some which, if looked at only in their immediate aspect, according to the proximate effect of the taking, might seem to be private.”

Equal protection of the laws

The United States is not expressly forbidden by the

Constitution to deny to anyone the equal protection of the laws, as are the States by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment. It would seem, however, that the broad interpretation which the prohibition as to "due process of law" has received is sufficient to cover very many of the acts which, if committed by the States, might be attacked as denying equal protection. Thus it has been repeatedly declared that enactments of a legislature directed against particular individuals or corporations, or classes of such, without any reasonable ground for selecting them out of the general mass of individuals or corporations, amounts to a denial of due process of law as far as their life, liberty or property is affected. One of the requirements of due process of law, as stated by the Supreme Court, is that the laws "operate on all alike, and so not subject the individual to an arbitrary exercise of the powers of government."

In Smyth v. Ames21 the authorities are reviewed, and from them the general conclusion drawn that a State law "establishing rates for the transportation of persons or property by railroad that will not admit of the carrier earning such compensation as under all circumstances is just to it and to the public, would deprive such carrier of his property without due process of law, and deny to it the equal protection of the laws." Throughout this case, indeed, the requirement of due process of law is treated as necessarily including equal protection within its scope.

Obligations of contracts

No specific inhibition is laid upon the Federal Government by the Constitution with reference to the impairment of the obligation of contracts. That government is, however, forbidden by the Fifth Amendment to deprive persons of property without due process of law or to 21 169 U. S. 466; 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 418; 42 L. ed. 819.

take private property for a public use without just compensation. In so far, then, as contract rights may be treated as property they are protected from direct impairment by Federal action. This was definitely declared, as we have earlier seen in the first legal tender decision of Hepburn v. Griswold. 22

Contracts are not, however, protected from any indirect impairment of their obligation when this incidentally results from the exercise by Congress of a legislative power constitutionally given it. Thus in Knox v. Lee, 23 with reference to the due process of law requirement of the Fifth Amendment, the court say: "That provision has always been understood as referring only to a direct appropriation and not to consequential injuries resulting from the exercise of lawful power. It has not been supposed to have any bearing upon or to inhibit laws that indirectly work harm and loss to individuals.. A new tariff, an embargo, a draft or a war, may inevitably bring upon individuals great losses, may indeed render valuable property almost valueless. They may destroy the worth of contracts."

22 8 Wall. 603; 19 L. ed. 513.

23 12 Wall. 457; 20 L. ed. 287. See, also, Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U. S. 700; 25 L. ed. 496.

CHAPTER XXXVII

PROHIBITIONS LAID UPON THE STATES

The prohibitions upon State action imposed by the Federal Constitution are of two kinds: (1) those that arise from the fact that their exercise would be inconsistent with the powers possessed by the Federal Government; and (2) those specifically laid down in the Federal Constitution. These limitations upon the powers of the States incidental to the general nature of the Federal Government and to the powers possessed by it are treated in their appropriate places in this treatise. In this chapter there will be considered the express limitations upon the States as enumerated in the Constitution. These are found in § X of Art. I, and in the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments.

Various other clauses of the Constitution, as, for example, §§ I, II, and IV of Art. IV and Art. VI, by imposing specific obligations upon the States may be said to create corresponding limitations, but these are elsewhere considered in this work.

That the prohibitions of the first eight amendments, like those contained in § IX of Art. I of the Constitution relate exclusively to the Federal Government, and place no restrictions upon State actions has been uniformly held since the first declaration of the principle in Barron v. Baltimore.1 That the adoption of the Fourteenth did not operate to alter this doctrine has been pointed out

17 Pet. 243; 8 L. ed. 672.

2

in this treatise. The specific prohibitions laid upon the States with reference to slavery and involuntary servitude, due process of law, and the equal protection of the laws, have been considered in the preceding chapter.

Bills of credit

The first clause of § X of Art. I of the Constitution declares that "no State shall ... emit bills of credit; [or] make anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts."

In Craig v. Missouri,3 decided in 1830, the Supreme Court was for the first time called upon to determine squarely what constitutes a "bill of credit;" within the meaning of the constitutional prohibition. In this case was questioned the power of the State to issue certain interest bearing certificates, not declared legal tender, but receivable at the treasury or any of the loan offices of the State in discharge of taxes or payment of debts due to the State. Certain property of the State was pledged to their redemption, and the governor was authorized to negotiate a loan of silver or gold for the same purpose. These certificates, it was provided, might be loaned to citizens of the State upon real estate or personal security. These certificates, the Supreme Court held, Justices Thompson, M'Lean and Johnson dissenting, to be bills of credit, and as such illegally emitted. In his opinion Marshall says: "To 'emit bills of credit' conveys to the mind the idea of issuing paper intended to circulate through the community for its ordinary purposes, as money, which paper is redeemable at a future day."

Having adverted to the characteristics of the certificates in question, their denominations, from ten dollars to fifty cents their receivability for taxes, etc., as indicat

2 P. 71.

34 Pet. 410; 7 L. ed. 903.