In The Montello 4 the same principle was applied to the Fox River of Wisconsin, although its navigability was interrupted by rapids and falls around which portages had to be made.

Federal admiralty jurisdiction is not affected by the fact that at the time of the accruing of the cause of action the vessel or vessels concerned are on a voyage between ports of the same State.5

In later cases the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States has been construed to extend to cases arising on canals.6

In the first of the cited cases it was held that the canals are navigable waters within the meaning of admiralty law; in the latter that canal-boats are ships or vessels within the meaning of the same law.

It has also been held that repairs made to or injuries sustained by, a ship while in dry dock are maritime in character, but the dry dock not being itself used for the purpose of navigation is not a subject of salvage service or of admiralty jurisdiction."

Admiralty jurisdiction does not carry with it general political jurisdiction over navigable waters

It has been held in an unbroken line of cases that the grant to the United States of admiralty jurisdiction does not, in itself, carry with it any general or political jurisdiction. That is to say, unless Congress has expressly so legislated the State courts still have exclusive cognizance of crimes committed upon their navigable waters, and upon the seas within a maritime league of the shore. In 4 20 Wall. 430; 22 L. ed. 391.

5 The Belfast, 7 Wall. 624; 19 L. ed. 266, overruling previous cases as to this.

6 Perry v. Haines, 191 U. S. 17; 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 8; 48 L. ed. 73. 7 Cope v. Vallette Dry Dock Co., 119 U. S. 625; 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 336; 30 L. ed. 501.

the leading case of United States v. Bevans Marshall points out that the delegation to the Federal judiciary carries with it, indeed, a legislative power to render that jurisdiction effective, but it does not operate to take the navigable and territorial waters of a State from without the general jurisdiction of the State in the manner that districts purchased by the Federal Government, with the consent of the legislature of a State, for the erection of forts, arsenals, etc., are so removed.

Admiralty courts

During the colonial period admiralty jurisdiction in this country was exercised by vice-admiralty courts created by commissions from the British High Court of Admiralty, authority being given to the colonial authorities by their charters to establish these tribunals. After the Declaration of Independence, however, each of the States, in the exercise of their several sovereignties, established admiralty courts with varying powers. In 1777 Congress appointed a standing committee to entertain appeals from the State courts in cases of maritime prizes. Under the Articles of Confederation there was established by Congress a "Court of Appeals in cases of Capture,' to which appeals might be taken from the State admiralty courts.

Under the present Constitution admiralty jurisdiction is wholly withdrawn from the States and vested exclusively in the Federal courts.

By the Judiciary Act of 1789 this jurisdiction was vested in the district courts, where it has since remained.

Section 711 of the Revised Statutes provides that the district courts shall have jurisdiction: "Of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; saving to suitors,

83 Wh. 336; 4 L. ed. 404.

in all cases, the right of a common-law remedy, where the common-law is competent to give it."

In all prize cases an appeal lies direct from the district to the Supreme Court. In other admiralty cases an appeal lies to the Circuit Courts of Appeals.

State legislative powers with reference to admiralty matters It will be observed that the act vesting admiralty jurisdiction in the district courts saves to suitors, in all cases, their right to a common-law remedy, where that law is competent to give it. The effect of this provision is not to permit the State courts to exercise in any way admiralty jurisdiction, but to give to the suitor the option of pursuing in those courts any common-law right that he may have.9

But in no case may a State court entertain a suit in the nature of an admiralty proceeding, that is, to enforce a maritime lien in rem against a vessel. This is determined in The Moses Taylor 10 and Hine v. Trevor.11

But though the State courts may not exercise admiralty jurisdiction, it has been held that the State legislatures may by statute create maritime rights, which the Federal district courts, sitting as admiralty tribunals, will enforce. In other words, the State law-making body may create admiralty rights which the State courts may not enforce as such, but which the Federal courts may."

12

Legislative powers of Congress flowing from admiralty and maritime jurisdiction

The Constitution does not in express terms confer upon

'Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U. S. 99; 23 L. ed. 819.

10 4 Wall. 411; 18 L. ed. 397.

11 4 Wall. 555; 18 L. ed. 451.

12 The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558; 22 L. ed. 654; The Glide, 167 U. S. 606; 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 930; 42 L. ed. 296; The Hamilton, 207 U. S. 398; 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 133; 52 L. ed. 264.

Congress the power to legislate with reference to matters maritime, but the grant to the judiciary of jurisdiction over all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, a jurisdiction which has, as we have seen, been held to be exclusive, has been construed to give to the Federal legislature a power over the law which the Federal courts are thus called upon to interpret and apply.13

Though, as appears from the foregoing, Congress, and to a certain extent the State legislatures as well, have the power to fix the substantive law which the Federal admiralty courts are to apply, it is not within the power of these law-making bodies to determine the sphere of admiralty jurisdiction. This, it has been held, is a purely judicial function.

13 Ex parte Garnett, 141 U. S. 1; 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 840; 35 L. ed. 631; Providence & N. Y. S. S. Co. v. Hill Mfg. Co., 109 U. S. 578; 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 379; 27 L. ed. 1038.

CHAPTER XLVII

IMPEACHMENT

Constitutional provisions

The constitutional provisions for impeachment are contained in the clauses cited in the footnote.1

It is to be observed that the Constitution makes no mention as to what persons shall be subject to impeachment. According to English precedent all citizens are subject to impeachment, and it was at first asserted by some that the same is true in this country. The limitation of impeachment to the President and the Vice-President and to civil officers of the United States would, however, seem to be implied in the provision that these persons shall be removed from office on impeachment, and that judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from office and disqualification to hold office under the United States, and it is now generally agreed that only civil officers may be impeached.

Who are civil officers

Military officers are not subject to impeachment. No attempt has ever been made to impeach any officer of the army or navy, and, therefore, there have been no pronouncements upon this point. But there has been no question as to this doctrine.

Members of Congress are not officers of the United States, not being commissioned by the President. This

1 Art. I, § 2, cl. 5; Art. I, § 3, cl. 6; Art. I, § 3, cl. 7; Art. II, § 2, cl. 1; Art. II, § 4.