On April 24 the Stars and Stripes were flung to the breeze from the Eiffel Tower in Paris and saluted by twentyone guns. This marked the opening of the ceremonies of United States Day in Paris. The French tricolor and the American flag were at the same hour unfurled together from the residence of Mr. Sharp, the American Ambassador, in the Avenue d'Eylau, from the American Embassy, from the Hôtel de Ville, and from other municipal government buildings. All over the capital street vendors did a thriving business in the colors of both Allies, while 40,000 American flags, handed out gratis by the committee, were waved by the people who thronged the neighborhood of the demonstrations. Jules Cambon, General Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Dubail, Military Governor of Paris, the members of the committee and other officials were received at 1.30 by Ambassador Sharp at his residence, whence they proceeded to the Place d'Iéna, where a bronze palm was deposited at the foot of the equestrian statue of Washington. While cannon boomed in honor of the American colors floating from the top of the Eiffel Tower, and aviators flying over the spot waved both French and American flags, "The Star Spangled Banner" was sung by Mlle. Nina May of the Opéra Comique, and the "Marseillaise' by Jean Notté of the Opéra. A plaque representing "Liberty Enlightening the World," after the statue by Bartholdi, protected by the American eagle, was presented to Ambassador Sharp as a memento of the occasion. In the Reichstag, Bethmann-Hollweg, late in March, had undertaken to remove from Germany the blame for the impending war with this country and to lay it all on us. He declared that Germany felt "neither hatred nor hostility" to the United States a statement in flat contradiction of many articles published in the German press-and it "never had the slightest intention of attacking the United States of America and had no such intention now." From which it was obvious that to the Chancellor's mind Germany's announcement that American ships would be sunk without warning, that actual sinking of them without warning, that the drowning of Americans, that insults to our Ambassador, and that detention of our citizens, were not attacks upon the United States. Reduced to its lowest terms, the German proposition was that, because England would not yield to Germany, Germany had determined to inflict and could inflict death on Americans at sea. The case was the case of Belgium over again. Since Germany wanted to get at France, Belgium had no rights; since Germany wanted to strike at England, America had no rights. There was no right in the world but that of Germany. Other peoples were to lie down and be trampled on or else they would be assassinated. Two years and a half before this crisis Bethmann-Hollweg had risen in his place in the German Parliament and told the German people and the world that the armies of the Kaiser were in Belgium because Germany was in a state of necessity and German necessity "knew no law." Now, standing in the same place, he had said with equal earnestness that Germany sought no war with the United States, and that German submarines had embarked upon their campaign of murder without malice. Germany invaded Belgium, Germany burned Louvain, German soldiers, acting under orders, raped Belgian women and massacred Belgian children, and all had been done without malice, because Germany had a purpose to achieve. As a thief might seek to rob without violence, and might prefer to pilfer without killing, so Germany had said she preferred to act in Belgium and so now she preferred to act with regard to American lives and ships at sea. She wished to achieve her ends without bloodshed, but if bloodshed had to come, the blame was on the murdered and not on her, for the German purpose, like German necessity, was above the law.1 4 Principal Sources: The Evening Post, The Literary Digest, New York, The Statist (London), Bradstreet's (New York), The Chicago Tribune; The Tribune, The Evening Sun, New York; Associated Press dispatches, The Independent, The Outlook, The World, New York; Washington dispatches, The Times (New York). III SHIP-BUILDING TO OFFSET SUBMARINES- ARRESTS OF GERMAN SUSPECTS April 2, 1917-September, 1917 NOR some weeks before Congress declared war important FOR steps had been taken for national defense. The President had called out for public service regiments of the National Guard in thirty-two States, the total number of men called out or retained (instead of being sent home from the Mexican border as had been expected) being about 52,000. The response to this call was prompt and full, the experience gained in mobilization in the Mexican campaign having been of great service. Primarily this force was to guard Government property, bridges, and other points of danger, and, if necessary, to repress acts of violence. The President ordered that the enlisted strength of the navy be brought up as rapidly as possible to its maximum-not far from 93,000 men--which meant an increase of approximately 15,000. Recruiting went on vigorously for bluejackets and marines, the emphasis placed on naval preparation being significant. Perhaps the most immediate war-need was for naval strength in order to protect our coasts, and in order, also, to undertake our share of the work of keeping the ocean lanes open to neutral commerce by suppressing submarine attacks. Home Defense Leagues were being formed. all over the country, in small towns as well as in cities. Actual and potential resources which, all told, probably never had been equaled by those of any other nation, were to be brought into the war. Into the balance against Germany were thrown a navy in strength and efficiency among the foremost afloat, an army, comparatively small, but efficient, backed by a citizenry of upward of 20,000,000 men capable of military duty, industrial resources incomparably the greatest in the world, already mobilized for public service, and the moral force of more than 100,000,000 Americans awakened to their country's peril and united behind their President. Altho much remained to be done, officials believed the nation's destinies were secure, no matter how stubborn or prolonged the pressure of German militarism, or how wide the scope of German intrigue. Army preparations remained less complete because of the uncertainty over what Congress would authorize for that branch of the service. The regulars, numbering nearly 120,000, and equipped in a way which their officers believed were a match, unit for unit, for German soldiers, were ready to respond overnight to whatever call might come. The National Guard, 150,000 strong, hardened by months of service on the Mexican border, already had many units in active service for police duty throughout the country and could be fully mobilized on short notice. Without additional authorization by Congress, the regulars and guardsmen could be recruited to a combined strength of 700,000. Detailed plans for whatever larger army might be authorized had been prepared, and great quantities of equipment for it purchased. Industrial preparations assured a great compact output of national resources with almost unlimited possibilities. The Council of National Defense, in daily conferences with the nation's leading financial, commercial, scientific, and labor chiefs, not only worked out a definite and detailed industrial mobilization plan, but secured the indorsement and pledges of the men who could put it into effect at a moment's notice. A campaign of colossal proportions to break down the German submarine blockade and keep the Entente plentifully supplied with food, clothing, and munitions, was determined upon as America's first physical stroke against her enemy. Unable as yet to send an army into the trenches, the President believed the United States could do great service to the common cause by providing a large armada of armed merchantmen to invalidate the undersea campaign, about which had been rallied the fading hopes of the Prussian militarists. For weeks officials were at work on such a plan, but not until April 12 was it revealed on how great a scale the task had been projected, or how great im portance was attached to it in the Administration's general war program. Virtually every detail had been completed, and by fall the campaign itself promised to be in full swing. Many officials believed it might secure supremacy over the submarine which would prove the decisive factor in the war. To insure maximum construction, the Shipping Board enlisted the country's entire ship-building facilities, then the greatest in the world. Upward of a hundred private plants on all coasts were to be utilized, giving the Board's orders precedence over every other class of work except the most urgent naval construction. When the war began the United States were of little account in the lists of the world's great ship-building people; now they had sprung into a position of such importance that many felt that the issue of the war might be decided in the American shipyards. Thus the United States promised to redress the balance that had been borne down against the Allies by the German U-boat attacks. In 1913 and 1914 America had not been able to compete with Great Britain in ship-building, the costs of material and labor being almost twice as great in America as in the United Kingdom. America built for her Navy in specially provided yards, and for the lake traffic standardized grain- and ore-carriers, but did very little ocean steamship work. In 1913 her total mercantile output, chiefly for the Great Lakes, was 213 steamers of 265,000 tons, and in 1914 this small amount declined to 155 steamers of 263,000 tons. For the greater part of 1915, in spite of rapidly rising prices, the American yards were almost empty, and the total output for that year was no more than 122 steamers of 230,000 tons. But by the middle of July, 1915, it was apparent that a great expansion was in sight. Orders began to flow in, especially from Norway, and new yards were fitted up and old ones increased in size. Nothing had been seen before in any way resembling the sudden boom, not even the expansion which followed the Spanish War, and endured from 1898 till 1901. Ship-building yards sprang up on both ocean coasts, on the Lakes, and on navigable rivers even far inland. By the end of 1916 no less than 47 yards were fully equipped21 on the Atlantic, seven on the Pacific, eight on the Great |