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2,341,000; in home ports, 490, of 2,419,000 tons. The shipbuilding industry in Germany, so far as merchant ships were concerned, had been stagnant since the first of the war. English shipyards, meanwhile, had been working at capacity with merchant bottoms and were turning out vessels at the rate of 1,000,000 tons a year. American yards had not yet reached capacity, but when they did, within a few months, they were expected to exceed the British output. Both British and American merchant ships were standardized. It was with these ships, protected by destroyers, the most deadly foe of the submarine, that the United States and the Entente nations expected to defeat the U-boat campaign.

Up to the end of 1916, the war marine losses of the Allies and neutrals had amounted to 4,500,000 gross tons sunk and 300,000 tons damaged by mines, torpedoes and gunfire. During 1915 and 1916 about 3,700,000 tons of new shipping had been put into service, and not far from 1,000,000 tons of ships captured from the Central Powers had been converted to the purposes of their enemies. On the balance, therefore, up to the end of 1916, had it not been for the immense demands of the Navy and Army for supply and transport ships, there would not have been any great call for the services .of a "shipping controller." But some 70 per cent. of the total British tonnage available for the Allies had been requisitioned for purely war purposes, so that the amount left-British, Allied, and neutral-for carrying on the international commerce of the world was reduced to a bare half of what had been at work upon the same task in the year before the war. This was the situation at the end of 1916. At the outbreak of the war Germany owned 5,500,000 tons gross as against the 21,000,000 tons of the British Empire. The Central Powers put together could not have mustered more than 6,600,000 tons in comparison with Allied shipping of 28,500,000 tons, and neutral shipping of 11,300,000 tons.

By April 20, approximately 3,000 German residents of the United States were believed to be under close surveillance because of their activities in behalf of the German Government before the United States entered into the war, or because of their still active pro-German sympathies. The

Department of Justice had a largely increased field-force of investigators keeping so close a watch on suspects that it became possible to arrest virtually every man under suspicion within twenty-four hours. Suspects were located in every State of the Union. Most of them had been under surveillance prior to the entrance of this country into the war, but hundreds of names had been added to the list as auxiliary workers. In addition to 500,000 civilian employees on the Government's pay-roll in all departments actively engaged in reporting information to the bureau, all sheriffs and their deputies throughout the country were cooperating with the Department to the extent of reporting information which might aid in detecting and apprehending persons working against the interests of the United States.

For many weeks Germany failed to take seriously the entry of the United States into the war. Not until July were there any sure indications that the landing of our troops in France, the defeat of a submarine attempt to intercept transports, and the general financial, military, and naval preparations under way in this country, had made any impression on her. There was now less flippant belittlement of what was being said and done in this country and less confidence that, in any case, Germany could force a peace upon her enemies in Europe before America could get help enough over the sea to rescue them. In place of that, there had ensued a tone of wrath and bluster, which was a sure sign of waning confidence and growing fear. There were also indications that the light of truth about what had been done, what was still being done, and what was liable. to happen, was slowly making its way among the German people.

By the first week in June it was decreed that all exports from the United States of food products and basic supplies should be restricted under what was known as the Espionage Law. The proclamation put the restriction in effect July 15, after which date it would be impossible to export to any country of the world, without an export license, coal, coke, fuel oils, kerosene and gasoline, including bunkers, foodgrains, flour and meal therefore, fodder and feeds, meats. and fats, pig-iron, steel billets, ship-plates and structural

material, scrap iron and scrap steel, ferro-manganese, fertilizers, arms, ammunition, and explosives. While the restrictions applied to all the world, it was understood to be the intention of the Exports Council to grant licenses freely where it was established beyond a doubt that supplies were not reaching Germany. The restrictions applied chiefly to neutral countries. It had been shown that, notwithstanding

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AN AMERICAN LUNCHEON IN LONDON Left to right-the Italian Ambassador, Premier Lloyd George, Ambassador Walter H. Page, Col. H. W. Thornton

the growing scarcity of food products, during May exports of foodstuffs in crude condition and food-animals were valued at $56,424,000 by the Department of Commerce, an increase of about $20,000.000, and exports of foodstuffs partly or wholly manufactured, at $75,184,000, an increase of $13,000,000. During May exports to the Netherlands. were valued at $9,670,000, an increase of about $500,000;

exports to Norway at $9,061,000, an increase of $4,300,000; and exports to Spain at $8,415,000, also an increase.

The proclamation of the President covered a very broad field of export trade; but there was no doubt that conditions fully justified it. The countries named included practically all that were reached by American trade, both belligerent and neutral. The necessity of such a measure had become sufficiently obvious. There was great danger of a shortage in Europe of the most essential supplies, so long as the war lasted, especially on the part of Great Britain and France, which had been for nearly three years engaged in this struggle, with a continual exhaustion of resources, or of the means of making them available. So far as food products and materials derived from the soil were concerned, very close calculation would have to be made, with prudent foresight and prevention of waste.

By July 9 it became obvious that there would be a billion bushels increase over last year's production in the principal food-crops, which was the response American farmers had made to President Wilson's mid-April appeal that upon them "rests the issue of the war and the fate of nations." The extent of the response was disclosed when a production of 6,093,000,000 bushels of principal food-crops was forecast in the Department of Agriculture's report. This year's corn crop was to be the largest in our history, except one. Four, and possibly five, other crops promised to make new high records. The corn crop showed an increase of 541,000,000 bushels over the previous year, with a total of 3,124,000,000 bushels. The total acreage was 14 per cent. larger. The combined winter and spring wheat crops would be 38,000,000 bushels more, with a total of 678,000,000 bushels.

One beefless day a week (not including the traditional piscatorial Friday), the issuance of "war-bread" to patrons as well as to employees, and the removal of cheese from the free-lunch dietary, were features of a plan presented to Herbert C. Hoover on July 10 by the Hotel Association of New York City. Among details agreed upon were these:

"Individual service of bread and butter of uniform weight; rolls to weigh an ounce or a little more. Adulteration of wheat bread and rolls by at least 10 per cent. of some other flour. Most of the

assorted rolls served at breakfast to be of flour other than wheat. Stale bread and trimmings from toast to be used in making warbread according to a specified receipt. Use of smooth bread instead of rough bread, which causes the use of too much butter. Printing of the following on the menus of all hotels: Mr. Hoover urges the use of less wheat, pork products, butter and all fats, also beef, and to substitute and use freely sea food, fresh vegetables, and fruits. Economy in the non-restricted foods is not necessary or desirable at the present time."

In a proclamation, issued early in August, upon the further restriction of exports, President Wilson repeated his statement of July 9 that there was to be "no prohibition of exports," and made it clear again that "the normal course of trade would be interfered with as little as possible." To avoid unnecessary interference, it was good sense to discriminate between the neutral European lands from which transshipments to Germany are easiest, and distant neutrals and nations at war with Germany. The new proclamation was not, strictly speaking, supplementary to the original one of July 9, but constituted a comprehensive order which definitely took its place. All the goods listed in July were listed. again in August. Virtually all commerce had been brought under the Export Council.

In the summer more than one hundred neutral ships were waiting at Atlantic ports for export licenses. Four-fifths of them came from Holland. In New York Harbor a line of them extended for some miles up the Hudson River. A large majority had cargoes of wheat and fodder that had been placed on board before July 15, when our embargo became effective. The grain in them was rotting. The Dutch Government and the owners of the ships refused to unload it. They rejected our Government's proposition that they send the ships to Australia, where 150,000,000 bushels of wheat awaited transportation. These ships could not be permitted to carry cargoes of American grain to Holland, or any other European neutral country. This had been the decision of our Exports Council before Sweden's unneutral aid to Germany in the case of Argentina's ships was brought to light. These ships were not to receive clearances until they complied with American restrictions on the nature and quantity

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