emnly and unqualifiedly made between the contracting parties, it is matter of history that on the part of the Bey of Tripoli, its provisions were totally disregarded. It was upon its face a treaty of peace and amity—it was in practice, but a mere pretext for the most unwarrantable demands upon the United States on the part of the Tripolitan Government.

[APRIL, 1834. terms, every declaration evincing a fixed purpose to adhere, on our part, to treaty stipulations, were disregarded. "Give, give or my corsairs shall destroy your commerce," was the undisguised language of the Bashaw.

We prepared for the conflict; and the accidental loss of our frigate Philadelphia was among

The effect produced by this capture is equally well known. "It was a jubilee in Tripoli; the Pacha and his court did not attempt to conceal their exultation. So extravagant were his calculations, that he would not, after that event, listen to any proposal of peace and ransom, for a less sum than one million of dollars."

the first events which succeeded the declaration From 1797 until 1801, when there was a of war. The way and manner of her falling formal declaration of war made by the Bashaw into the possession of the enemy is known to of Tripoli against our own republic, instead every member of this committee. The vessel of that protection and security promised by was dislodged from the rocks; taken and capthe treaty, every depredation which rapacity tured; her officers and crew loaded with chains and violence could suggest, was committed and most unfeelingly incarcerated in their comupon our commerce. Every exorbitant exac-mon prison. tion and pecuniary tribute was demanded which "Description," in the language of one of the their cursed lust for gold could induce. With- sufferers, can convey but an inadequate idea out the shadow of right-without any justifia- of the horrors of our imprisonment: we were ble pretence, not only was our commerce and confined in a dungeon in the centre of the castle, navigation interrupted, our property taken to into which no air or light could find access, satisfy the uncontrolled passion of the Bashaw but through a small iron grate in the terrace or himself, but also our native citizens, the sons ceiling." Such was the condition of our unof our own soil, were captured and incarcerated, fortunate countrymen who fell thus accidentally until the cruel and merciless exactions of the into the possession of our relentless enemy. Tripolitan Government were answered. Thus it was that, in three short years, more than three hundred thousand dollars were extorted from us to soften the heart of the tyrant, to court the favor of Tripoli by degrading the spirit and humbling the pride of America. Tribute was a word not sanctioned in our national vocabulary. "Millions for defence, not Well have I said, then, Mr. Chairman, that a cent for tribute," was our universal sentiment. we were engaged in a contest of no ordinary The claims of the Bashaw, made without right, character, and with a nation of no ordinary powand against the highest authority of his Gov-ers. It becaine necessary, sir, to break down ernment, were contemned and openly resisted, the demands of her mad passions; to bring her but to no effect. War was at length declared; | back to a sense of common justice; to awaken the standard of American liberty was razed to the ground; no alternative was left. To submit to the exactions of unlicensed despotism must have been at the sacrifice of our national honor. It was impossible. The sentiment of Mr. Jeffer- The bare recital of the events which imson, the Chief Executive Magistrate, communi-mediately succeeded the capture of the Philadelcated to Congress in December, 1801, was but the sentiment of the whole American people. That distinguished statesman, in his annual Message remarked, "To this state of general peace with which we have been blessed, one only exception exists. Tripoli, the least considerable of the Barbary States, had come forward with demands unfounded either in right or in compact, and had permitted itself to declare war, on our failure to comply before a given day. The style of the demand admitted but one answer." An American squadron was ordered into the Mediterranean to maintain those rights sacredly guarantied by the treaty of 1797; to protect our commerce; to secure our citizens from capture; and to defend the honor of our country. An appeal was made to the virtue, the valor, the pride, and the patriotism of our republic, "to carry the war with spirit and with effect into Africa."

We were engaged in a controversy of no ordinary character, and with a nation of no ordinary means. Every overture pacific in its

something like principle; or, if not, effectually to alarm her fears, by giving to her evidence of the truest heroism, and of the purest patriotism.

phia, cannot fail, even at this late period, to fill the heart with sorrow and sadness. At that time, when the wrongs done our country and our brave men, were fresh and full in recollection, the arm of every naval hero in the Mediterranean must have been nerved; every heart and soul must have been animated. Honor and pride must have stimulated to action, and called for vengeance on the treacherous foe.

It should be remembered, that, up to the 7th of February, 1804, (more than seven years after the treaty with Tripoli,) the conduct of the Bashaw and his court evinced a determined and unprovoked hostility. The course which was left to our brave men, then in the Mediterranean, was plain, and of which they were duly sensible. To treat with the Government of Tripoli would be unavailing; to meet and to conquer her corsairs would be equally ineffectual: but to carry the war home; to make the enemy tremble in his castle; to let him witness our fixed and determined purpose; to make

APRIL, 1834.]

Relief of Mrs. Susan Decatur.

[H. OF R.

and such is the evidence in the case. It was, then, a capture, and every right vested in the captors which would have vested had the capture been made upon the high seas, "jure belli." Before I examine further this position, I would advert for a moment to the effect produced at Tripoli by the capture and destruction of the Philadelphia, and by the events which followed close upon that brilliant achievement.

him sensible of our valor, and of our entire de- | entire control themselves. Such was the order, votedness to the cause of our common country, would alone answer the great design. Influenced by such high considerations, Decatur applied to the commanding officer of the squadron for leave to enter with such a vessel as he might select, the harbor of Tripoli, to board and to capture the Philadelphia, there safely moored. The proposition was received, well weighed, maturely considered, and deliberately acceded to. Nothing short of this could bring down the proud and towering spirit

of the Bashaw himself.

An order was issued, and this order executed; it was faithfully executed; and that constitutes the foundation of the claim now set up for remuneration, by the captors of the Philadelphia; and yet it has been contended, and is now gravely contended here and elsewhere, that the order of Commodore Preble conflicts with the legal and equitable rights of the captors. I will transcribe, literally, the order which emanated from Commodore Preble.

[The order read.]

Such was the order-an order most faithfully executed; the execution of which has given to our country an elevated naval character among the nations of the earth.

"The tone of confidence and triumph continued until this daring enterprise illuminated the castle of the Bashaw with the blaze of Decatur's trophy. "The sensation produced by the achievement was indescribable: consternation and dismay were depicted on every face. But the best evidence of its impression was the frequent conferences of the Pacha with the consuls-his undisguised desire to make peace, and his propositions to that effect, on terms much more moderate; even for $200,000 did he then offer to ransom our captured freemen. results of this capture were of incalculable advantage to the nation. They led to an honorable peace -to the abolishment of tribute to the liberation of the suffering captives-to future peace and honor -and to a gallant, ambitious spirit in the navy."

The

The effect produced upon our brave countrymen, then immured in Tripolitan dungeons, can better be conceived than described. It could

not fail to reanimate their hopes, to lighten their burdens, and to strengthen their confidence. One ray of light, emitted from the towering mast of the burning Philadelphia, breaks in upon their dark and comfortless cells they could not but feel its cheering influence; they could not but be thereby better fitted to bear every privation, and to submit to every suffering which the deep-rooted malice, and the humbled pride of their own and of their country's eneiny, should presume to inflict.

It will be admitted that the subsequent capture of the Tripolitan gun-boats in August, 1804; the brilliant success attending the land operations of General Eaton and his army, and the self-immolation upon the altar of patriotism of the intrepid Somers and his comrades--whose fates are told on the proud monument erected to perpetuate their fame and glory, now standing in the front of this Capitol-more or less contributed to that highly favorable treaty which was made with Tripoli in June, 1805, sixteen months only after the capture of the Philadelphia. By the 2d article of that treaty, it is expressly stipulated, that

And what, Mr. Chairman, is the fair import, the liberal and just construction of this written command? It is nothing more and nothing less than a direction to Decatur to board the Philadelphia, and, if he meets with resistance, to carry all by the sword; in other words, to overcome the enemy-to obtain the entire control, the absolute possession of the vessel-to divest the enemy of all right, and to make her the means (if, in the exercise of a sound discretion, he can) of destroying the Bashaw's vessels in the harbor; or, if he can, without risking too much, he might make the guns of the vessel the instruments of destruction, not only to the shipping, but to the castle of the Bashaw. It was not possible for Decatur to fulfil the order which was given him, without first driving the enemy from the vessel, and acquiring an undisputed control and possession-without having, to all intents and purposes, captured her from the Tripolitans. I am aware that it was part of the order to burn the Philadelphia: I am aware that the destruction of the vessel was regarded as an object of great importance: and I cannot for a moment doubt that, were it not for such an additional direction, Decatur "The Bashaw of Tripoli shall deliver up to the would have brought her in triumph and in safety American squadron, now off Tripoli, all the Ameriout of the harbor of Tripoli, and attached her cans in his possession; and as the number of Amerito the American squadron then in the Mediter-cans in possession of the Bashaw of Tripoli amounts ranean. Be that as it may, the order was first to three hundred persons, more or less, and the numto board-to break down all opposition-to ber of Tripoline subjects in the power of the Americarry all by the sword-to conquer the enemy, and to capture the vessel; and it could not have been possible for the crew of the Intrepid to have set fire to the Philadelphia, and thereby difference between the prisoners herein mentioned." to burn and to destroy her, until they had divest- No one will or can doubt, then, the direct ed the foe of the possession, and had obtained the and substantial benefit which the capture of

cans, to about one hundred, more or less, the Bashaw of Tripoli shall receive from the United States of America the sum of $60,000, as a payment for the

H. or R.]

Relief of Mrs. Susan Decatur.

[APRIL, 1834.

the Philadelphia and subsequent events pro- | tended; it was the order of the agent of the duced to our country. While that vessel was Government which alone prevented the Philain the possession of the Pacha and his court, delphia, after her capture, from being again nothing less than a million of dollars could attached to our navy. purchase the ransom of her crew. By the treaty of June, 1805, he gave up all for the sum of sixty thousand dollars, and agreed that there shall be, from the conclusion of the treaty, a firm, inviolable, and universal peace, and a sincere friendship between the President and the citizens of the United States of America on the one part, and the Bashaw, Bey, and subjects of the regency of Tripoli, in Barbary, on the other, made by the free consent of both parties, and on the terms of the most favored nations. Stipulations which have been inviolably observed: our commerce has been, from that time, undisturbed; our trade has remained uninterrupted; and the name of an American citizen has never failed since to command respect in that State in Barbary. No tribute in money or in stores has been exacted. The memorable successes and events of 1804 gave us an influence and a character with that and every other Barbary Power, which has, since that period, been felt and acknowledged.

I have already adverted to some of the circumstances which attended the capture of the Philadelphia, and which of itself produced such a revolution in the temper and mind of the Bashaw of Tripoli. I have already adverted to the circumstances under which the enterprise was carried on, by whom the plan was conceived, and by whom it was executed.

Regarding the taking of the Philadelphia as a legal capture, I will proceed to show what rights the captors thereby acquired. For I contend that the subsequent destruction of the vessel, by order of Commodore Preble, cannot impair any right which was vested by the capture itself. And as it respects the captors, it is wholly immaterial whether the order was given for the destruction anterior to the engagement, or during the engagement, or after the capture had been achieved. We were at war with Tripoli; the great end and aim of every battle was to annoy the enemy to the greatest possible extent. The question, and the only question, is, was the enemy deprived of so much of her naval force, by the power of our arms: was the Philadelphia captured? No one who reads the evidence can doubt the fact. The moment when the flag of the enemy was struck, that moment the right to the capture vested in the captors. The moment the stripes were raised above the crescent, that moment the interest of the Bashaw ceased, and the interest of the captors commenced.

The right had vested when the flag of the enemy was struck. Suppose the captors had run the Philadelphia out of the harbor, and attached her to the American squadron, contrary to the orders of the commodore; suppose that they had safely brought her into port, would not the vessel have been adjudged in our courts of admiralty as good prize, and would not her value have been distributed as prize money among the captors according to the provisions of the prize act? I think there could be no doubt of the fact-and why so? Not from the circumstance of running the Philadelphia from Tripoli to Syracuse. Not from the circumstance of bringing her into an American port. Those circumstances could not add to or take from the title of the captors. If the captors had not received orders to burn, but Decatur himself, (in the exercise of sound discretion,) after he had acquired the entire control of the vessel, to prevent her recapture, had burnt and destroyed her, there could be no doubt, in that case, that the instant the torch was applied the right and title was in the captors.

If the captors had brought the Philadelphia out of the harbor, and on her homeward passage had effected an insurance of the vessel, and the same had been lost, could any doubt exist as to the right of the captors to claim the benefit of the policy? Certainly not. What gave the right? The capture. If the captors had violated any of the revenue laws of a neutral power, in the management of the vessel captured, and she had been condemned, the original owners could set up no claim to her-all their right and interest had been divested by the capture.

It will be remembered that, at the time of her capture, the United States were at war with Tripoli, and that up to June, 1805, hostilities existed between the two nations. It will also be remembered that, in 1813, and in 1814, we were at war with England. And the first case to which I would call the attention of the committee, will be found in the third volume of the laws, p. 590. An act of Congress was passed in March, 1804, for the relief of the cap tors of the Moorish armed ships Meshouda and Mirboha. Those vessels had been captured by the John Adams, under the command of Commodore Rodgers, and of the Philadelphia, then under the command of Commodore Bainbridge. The vessels captured were in force inferior to the vessels making the capture. And the act provides that the sum of $8,594 50, being one moiety of the value of the armed ship Meshouda, To the captors, then, belonged the value of captured by the frigate John Adams, and rethe Philadelphia, at the time and place of her turned to the Emperor of Morocco, be appropri capture, unless there had been subsequent acts ated for the expense of prize money due to the on their part, amounting to a voluntary captors; and that the sum of $5,000 be approabandonment of the prize. This is not con-priated for defraying the expense of prize money