FEBRUARY, 1835.]

Executive Patronage and Government Expenses.

[SENATE.

Mr. CALHOUN said this is not the first time makes them. He chooses from the circle of his that the measure, now under consideration, has friends and supporters, and may dismiss them, and been before the Senate. It was introduced upon all the principles of human actions will dismiss eight years ago, on the report of a select com- them, as often as they disappoint his expectations. mittee then raised on Executive patronage, as His spirit will animate their actions in all the elecone of the measures then thought necessary to tions to State and federal offices. There may be exceptions; but the truth of a general rule is proved curtail what, at that time, was thought to be by the exception. The intended check and control the excessive patronage of the Executive. The of the Senate, without new constitutional or statuparty then in opposition, and now in power, tory provisions, will cease to operate. Patronage then pledged themselves to the community that, will penetrate this body, subdue its capacity of reshould they be elevated to power, they would sistance, chain it to the car of power, and enable the administer the Government on the principles President to rule as easily, and much more securely, laid down in the report. Mr. C. said that it with than without the nominal check of the Senate. was now high time to inquire how this solemn If the President was himself the officer of the peopledge, which, in his opinion, imposed a sacred ple, elected by them, and responsible to them, there obligation, has been redeemed. Has the plight- would be less danger from this concentration of all ed faith been kept which the committee gave power in his hands; but it is the business of states in the name of the party? Before I undertake men to act upon things as they are, not as they would wish them to be. We must then look forward to answer this question, it may be proper to to the time when the public revenue will be doubled; inquire who constituted that committee, and when the civil and military officers of the federal what the position they occupy? The chairman Government will be quadrupled; when its influence was Mr. Benton, now a member of the Senate over individuals will be multiplied to an indefinite and of the present committee. The name of extent; when the nomination by the President can Mr. Macon, then a Senator from North Carolina, carry any man through the Senate, and his recomso well known to the country, stands next; mendation can carry any measure through the two Mr. Van Buren, now Vice President; Mr. Dick-Houses of Congress; when the principle of public erson, now Secretary of the Treasury; Mr. Johnson, now a member of the other House from Kentucky; Mr. White, (then as now of Tennessee,) Senator from Tennessee; Mr. Holmes, of Maine; Mr. Hayne, of South Carolina; Mr. Findley, of Pennsylvania; then distinguished members of this body.

Such was the committee, which then and now stands so high in the confidence of the party now in power. Hear what their report says upon this subject of Executive patronage. Here an extract from the report was read, as follows:

"To be able to show to the Senate a full and perfect view of the power and workings of federal patronage, the committee addressed a note, immediately after they were charged with this inquiry, to each of the Departments, and to the Postmaster General, requesting to be informed of the whole number of persons employed and the whole amount of money paid out, under the direction of their respective Departments. The answers received are hereunto submitted, and made part of this report. With the Blue Book, they will discover enough to show that the predictions of those who were not blind to the defects of the constitution are ready to be realized; that the power and influence of federal patronage, contrary to the argument in the Federalist,' is an overmatch for the power and influence of State patronage; that its workings will contaminate the purity of all elections, and enable the federal Government, eventually, to govern throughout the States, as effectually as if they were so many provinces of one vast empire.

action will be open and avowed-the President wants my vote, and I want his patronage; I will vote as he wishes, and he will give me the office I wish for. What will this be, but the government of one man? and what is the government of one man but a monarchy? Names are nothing. The nature of a thing is in its substance, and the name soon accommodates itself to the substance. The first Roman Emperor was styled Emperor of the Republic, and the last French Emperor took the same title; and their respective countries were just as essentially monarchical before as after the assumption of these titles. It cannot be denied or dissembled, but that the federal Government gravitates to the same point, and that the election of the Executive by the Legislature quickens the impulsion.

"Those who make the President must support him. Their political fate becomes identified, and they must stand or fall together. Right or wrong, they must support him; and if he is made contrary to the will of the people, he must be supported not only by votes and speeches, but by arms. A violent and forced state of things will ensue; individual combats will take place; and the combats of individuals will be the forerunner to general engagements. The array of man against man will be the prelude to the array of army against army, and of State against State. Such is the law of nature; and it is equally in vain for one set of men to claim an exemption from its operation, as it would for any other set to suppose that, under the same circumstances, they would not act in the same manner. The natural remedy for all this evil would be to place the election of President in the hands of the people of the United States. He would then have a power to support him which would be as able and as willing to "The whole of this great power will centre in the aid him, when he was himself supporting the interest President. The King of England is the fountain of the country, as they would be to put him down of honor;' the President of the United States is the when he should neglect or oppose those interests. source of patronage. He presides over the entire Your committee, looking at the present mode of system of federal appointments, jobs, and contracts. electing the President as the principal source of all He has 'power' over the 'support' of the individ- this evil, have commenced their labors at the beginuals who administer the system. He makes and un-ning of this session, by recommending an amend

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Executive Patronage and Government Expenses.

ment to the constitution in that essential and vital particular; but in this, as in many other things, they find the greatest difficulty to be in the first step. The committee recommend the amendments, but the people cannot act upon it until Congress shall propose it, and peradventure Congress will not 'propose' it to them at all.

[FEBRUARY, 1835.

law been repealed? Has the election of the President been given to the people? Has the exercise of the dismissing power by the President which was then pronounced to be a dangerous violation of the constitution, been restored to Congress? All these pledges have "It is no longer true that the President, in deal- been forgotten. Not one has been fulfilled. ing out offices to members of Congress, will be lim- And what justification, I ask, is offered for so ited, as supposed in the Federalist, to the inconsider- gross a violation of faith? None is even atable number of places which may become vacant by tempted; the delinquency is acknowedged; the ordinary casualties of deaths and resignations; and the only effort which the Senator from on the contrary, he may now draw, for that purpose, Missouri has made to defend his own conduct upon the entire fund of the Executive patronage. and that of the administration, in adopting the Construction and legislation have accomplished this practice which he then denounced, is the plea change. In the very first year of the constitution, a of retaliation. He says that he had been fourconstruction was put upon that instrument which teen years a member of the Senate; and that, enabled the President to create as many vacancies as during the first seven, no friend of his had he pleased, and at any moment that he thought received the favor of the Government; and conproper. This was effected by yielding to him the tends that it became necessary to dismiss those kingly prerogative of dismissing officers without the in office to make room for others who had been formality of a trial. The authors of the Federalist for so long a time beyond the circle of execuhad not foreseen this construction; so far from it, tive favor. What, Mr. C. asked, is the printhey had asserted the contrary, and, arguing logically from the premises that the dismissing power was ciple, when correctly understood, on which this appurtenant to the appointing power,' they had defence rests? It assumes that retaliation is maintained, in No. 77 of that standard work, that, as a principle in its nature so sacred that it justithe consent of the Senate was necessary to the ap-fies the violation of the constitution, the breach pointment of an officer, so the consent of the same body would be equally necessary to his dismission from office. But this construction was overruled by the first Congress which was formed under the constitution; the power of dismission from office was abandoned to the President alone, and, with the acquisition of this prerogative alone, the power and patronage of the presidential office was instantly increased to an indefinite extent; and the argument of the Federalist against the capacity of the President to corrupt the members of Congress, founded upon the small number of places which he could use for that purpose, was totally overthrown. So much for construction. Now for the effects of legislation; and without going into an enumeration of statutes which unnecessarily increase the Executive patronage, the four years' appointment law will alone be mentioned; for this single act, by vacating almost the entire civil list once in every period of a presidential term of service, places more offices at the command of the President than were known to the constitution at the time of its adoption, and is, of itself, again sufficient to overthrow the whole of the argument which was used in the Federalist."

It is impossible, said Mr. C., to read this report, which denounces in such unqualified terms the excess and the abuses of patronage at that time, without being struck with the deplorable change which a few short years has wrought in the character of our country. Then we were sensitive in all that related to our liberty, and jealous of patronage and Governmental influence; so much so, that a few inconsiderable removals, three or four printers, roused the indignation of the whole country-events which would now pass unnoticed. We have grown insensible, become callous and stupid.

But let us turn to the question which I have asked. How has the plighted faith of the party been fulfilled? Have the abuses then denounced been corrected? Has the four years'

of plighted faith, and the subversion of principles the observance of which had been declared to be essential to the liberty of the country. The avowal of such a principle may be justified at this time by interested partisans; but the time must arrive when a more impartial tribunal will regard it in a far different light, and pronounce that sentence which violated faith and broken pledges deserve. Mr. C. said the bill now before the Senate affords an opportunity to the dominant party to redeem its pledge, as late as it is, and to avert, at least in part, that just denunciation which an impartial posterity will otherwise most certainly pronounce upon them. He hoped that they would embrace the opportunity, and thereby prove that, in expelling the former administration, they were not merely acting a part, and that the solemn pledges and promises then given were not electioneering tricks, devoid of sincerity and faith. I consider it, said Mr. C., as an evidence of that deep degeneracy which precedes the downfall of a republic, when those elevated to power forget the promises on which they were elevated; the certain effect of which is to make an impression on the public mind that all is juggling and trickery in politics, and to create an indifference to political struggles, highly favorable to the growth of despotic power.

Mr. BENTON replied at much length.

Mr. SOUTHARD said that the proposition then before the Senate had relation entirely to the bill which had been proposed by the select committee as one of the means by which executive power was to be restrained. When he said this, his object was to draw the attention of the Senate to the subject under consideration, not to meet any statements with regard to financial matters. The simple proposition was, was it

FEBRUARY, 1835.]

Executive Patronage and Government Expenses.

599 [SENATE.

But had this been the No. The period of four years had been selected as the period when the enemy was to be prostrated, and friends sustained. This mode of executing the act had defeated all the intentions of its framers. It had introduced a different system, with regard He was of to the tenure of office, from that contemplated by those who passed the law. opinion that it would be wise in Congress to dispense with those provisions which tended to make the whole band of office-holders servile suppliants of the Executive, destitute of that independence of character, that manly feeling, which should characterize every public officer. Mr. S. here read from the bill the provisions requiring the President to lay before Congress the accounts of all district attorneys, marshals, and other disbursing officers, &c.

The object was to exhibit to the Senate the appointing power, the number of those who should fail to render their accounts, and to give to those who should be unfortunate time to repair the accident which deprived them of the ability to make a correct settlement of their accounts.

If an officer therefore, should be a defaulter in September, the account being made up to January, would leave him time to correct the evil, if the default should be the effect of unforeseen accident, and not of criminal conduct. This part of the bill was so plain that he would not detain the Senate longer in commenting on it. The third section of the bill provided, "That, in all nominations made by the President to the Senate, to fill vacancies accasioned by removal from office, the facts of the removal shall be stated to the Senate at the same time that the nomination is made, with a statement of the reasons for such removal."

proper that the bill should pass? The first sec-worthy individuals. tion of the bill supplied two sections of the bill operation of the act? passed in 1820, and the second section provided that Congress shall be aware who are public defaulters, declaring that the commissions of such shall expire. The last provision required that the President should assign to the Senate his reasons, when he removes a public officer from office. He approved of the first provision of the bill, because he believed that the act of May, 1820, placed too much power in the hands of the President, and had accomplished none of the intentions for which it was framed. The act required that certain officers should be appointed for the term of four years, and the intention was to bring those officers (who were disbursing officers) before the Executive at the end of every four years, in order that, if their official conduct had not been correct, he might, by failing to renominate, get rid of them without the formality of a removal. The object certainly was a good one, but it had tended to increase the power of the Executive to an extent not anticipated at the time of the passage of the law. The law went into operation immediately preceding the presidential election, and every four years afterwards the officers appointed under it were to go out of office if not reappointed. Now, could any man not see that all these officers would feel themselves dependent on the Executive, who had the power to leave them out or renominate them. The law as it stood placed every man, who was not above being bribed by office, in the market, feeling and acting on the principle that he was to support the man who would keep him in office. Pass the bill before the Senate, Each and the result will be far different. office-holder would be independent, and would look solely to a faithful discharge of his duty for his continuance in office. As the law now stood, it was made to operate on the whole band of officers of the Government, as well on the other officers as on the disbursing agents for whom it was originally intended. Each one not influenced by pure motives would say to the Executive," Will you retain me in office if I This effect of that law which support you? it was now proposed to repeal must be apparent to every Senator, and he thought, if they would follow it up, it would produce on their minds a deep conviction that the statute book ought to be relieved from it. It was the intention of those who framed that law to bring the officers of the Government before the Executive at the end of every four years, in order that they might be dismissed if found unworthy. But it certainly never was intended that an officer who had fairly disbursed the public money, and faithfully discharged the duties of his office, should be turned out in order to make room for a political partisan. It was intended to secure a greater accountability in the disbursing agents, and, by bringing their conduct more frequently in review, to secure to the Government the services of the most trust

He valued that provision of the bill very much. He would not, at that time, enter into the subject of removals from office. It had long been a subject of difference with politicians, and had occupied their attention at an early period of the Government. But this section did not interfere with this power of removal. It required simply that the President should state to the Senate, when he removed an officer, that he had removed him, and why. Was there any thing that should make the Executive reluctant to communicate such reasons to his constitutional advisers? We are bound to presume, (Mr. S. said,) that he has acted under the best considerations. All that was asked of him was to state that he had removed a public officer, and his reasons for so doing, in order that the Senate, the co-ordinate appointing power, (he said co-ordinate power, because no appointment could be made without the concurrence of the Senate,) might judge of the propriety of appointing another individual to In the the office thus vacated. The history of this power of removal was not common. early periods of our history it was almost unknown. It continued unknown until Mr. Jefferson's time, and had not been exercised at all by

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Executive Patronage-Removal from Office.

[FEBRUARY, 1835. one of his predecessors. The Senate would un- | and made it imperative to make ten years' derstand him as referring to the administration residence. This made the condition on which of Mr. Adams. There was not one removal the land was given worse than to a common from office during the presidency of that gentle-purchaser. He proposed to make it, what it ought to be, a generous gift. The people were The Senator from Missouri (Mr. BENTON) poor, and, consequently, unable to buy implehad complained that this report, which ema-ments of husbandry. He proposed to move nated from the committee, presented a great an amendment to the bill, which would enable variety of bills, which were there framed, to them to mortgage their land for the puchase limit the executive prerogative; without being of tools. Every year their condition would calculated to accomplish any other useful pur- improve, and at the end of ten years they pose. In looking at the report this morning, would be comfortably settled. he did not see any grounds for making this complaint. There was one bill proposing an amendment to the constitution, which did not meet with the gentleman's concurrence. But because he disapproved of one measure of the committee, did it follow that no other was worthy of approbation? He apprehended that the gentleman from Missouri would not reject his own measures (for he was on the committee, and approved of every bill with the exception of the one just named) because more was not done. Of the other bills proposed by the committee, one was for the regulation of the newspapers in which the laws of the United States and the public advertisements shall be inserted. Did the gentleman see no practical good to result from this bill? Another was to regulate the appointment of postmasters. The provisions in this bill had just been passed by the Senate by a unanimous vote, in the bill to reorganize the Post Office Department; and it was not, therefore, necessary to pass such provisions as were contained in this second bill of the committee, after one had passed the Senate for that purpose. The next bill was for the regulation of the appointment of cadets and midshipmen. He could not answer for what was the practice of the Departments now, with regard to such appointments, but he well knew what was the practice some time ago; and it was to carry the provisions of this very bill into effect. In conclusion, he trusted, therefore, that these bills would find favor with those who had heretofore supported similar meas

ures.

SATURDAY, February 14.

Polish Exiles.

On motion of Mr. POINDEXTER, the bill to amend the act of last session, which was reported last session by the Committee on Public Lands, making a grant of land to certain exiles from Poland, was taken up.

Mr. POINDEXTER said that these exiles were in an unfortunate condition, and if the bill was not taken up now, it might probably not be of use to them.

Mr. KING, of Alabama, felt a difficulty in opposing the bill, but the Senate should take care not to encourage a hungry class of speculators. There had been already some experience on this subject. A number of military men, who were exiled from France, had a grant of a township of land made to them, under certain conditions, and that grant was the occasion of more trouble and of more fraudulent speculations than most men would have anticipated. Let it be a donation to them; and when the land is given, let them keep it. If they were to mortgage their land they might never go there. Their mortgage would be perfect, and they might never redeem it. In the case of the French emigrants, Congress had to give up the land, and let them take it at the usual price. If the Senator were to look at the bill with his usual attention, he would find it to be a bill that would do them no good, and be the means of throwing the land into the hands of speculators. If the Senate would allow it to lie on the table for a day or two, it might be duly considered.

Mr. POINDEXTER assented to the proposition, and the bill was accordingly laid on the table.

Executive Patronage.-Removal from Office. The Senate proceeded to the special order, being the bill to repeal the act to fix the number and compensation of certain officers.

[Mr. EWING spoke at length upon the question of removals, maintaining that the constitution does not confer on the President alone the power of removal -that it is a mere matter of legislative provision, subject to be vested, modified, changed, or taken away at their will; and if it is not regulated at all by law, it vests in the President, in conjunction with the Senate, as part of the appointing power.]

Mr. KANE said he did not rise to enter into the debate, nor to discuss the particular question relative to the organization of the Government, which had already been decided, and the decision of which had been acquiesced in for half a century. That question he would not discuss then, unless fairly brought up. Among his objections to the bill was, not that it proMr. POINDEXTER said that the first section posed to take away any power from the Execof the bill, as reported last session, by which utive, but because, with the admission of a was made to these exiles a grant of land, re-distinct power on the face of the bill, it proquired the actual habitation and cultivation of the land. The House had amended the bill,

poses that the Executive should lay before the Senate the reasons for its exercise, when he

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Executive Patronage-Removal from Office.

[SENATE.

chose to exercise it. It was distinctly admitted | such enumeration, the President would, in virin the bill that the Executive possessed a specific tue of his office, have possessed all executive power, and that it required him to lay before powers; for, if such were the case, the constithe Senate his reasons before he exercised it. tution, as was remarked by the Senator from What would you do, asked Mr. K., with these Ohio, (Mr. EWING,) would be very deficient in reasons when you got them? Would the what a constitution should be for a well-reguSenate do as it did when it got from the Secre-lated Government. Let it be recollected that tary of the Treasury his reasons for the this was not intended to be a constitution of removal of the public deposits? The bill, he unlimited powers, but that the powers granted repeated, admitted that the President possessed by it, both legislative and executive, were the power of removal from office, and yet, by express and limited; for it declared that all some undefined process, it was proposed to powers not granted by it should be withheld. make him responsible to the Senate for its The idea that the Executive possessed powers exercise. The first section of the bill provided in virtue of his office, had led to continual for the alteration of the tenure of office, as held assumptions of power on the one hand, while heretofore for a limited time, and made the it was resisted on the other, and the fluctuations tenure of office dependent on the will of the of executive power had generally ended in new Executive, requiring of him to assign his reasons encroachments. This enumeration of executive to the Senate before he makes a removal. The power, before alluded to, was intended by the third section (said Mr. K.) provides, "That in framers of the constitution as a security against all nominations made by the President to the executive encroachments; and for this purSenate, to fill vacancies occasioned by the pose it was defined as strictly and as precisely exercise of the President's power to remove as the nature of language would permit; but, the said officers mentioned in the second sec- define and define as you may, you cannot so tion of this act, the fact of the removal shall mark executive powers as to be the same be stated to the Senate, at the same time that to all minds; your definition cannot be made the nomination is made, with a statement of with that mathematical precision as to be the reasons for which such officer may have beyond doubt or misconception, and therefore been removed." the nature of executive powers will be viewed differently by different eyes.

Now, Mr. K. did not intend to discuss that question. With the admission of certain executive powers in the bill, it proposed to make the President responsible to the Senate, and require him to give his reasons before he exercised them. Then, he asked, what would the Senate do with those reasons when they got them. It was an idle provision in the bill to say that the President should give his reasons to the Senate for the exercise of a power which it was admitted he possessed. He could see much more propriety in requiring of the President to give his reasons for the exercise of his constitutional powers to the people of the United States, but he did not see any propriety in requiring him to give such reasons to the Senate. For these reasons he would vote against the bill.

Mr. BIBB rose to state, in a very few words, his reasons for supporting this bill. It was

It had been objected by the Senator from Illinois, (Mr. KANE,) that this bill, whilst it conceded to the President the power to remove from office, at the same time attempted to require that he should state the causes of such removal to the Senate. Well, sir, (said Mr. B.,) I admit that the bill does not profess to take away the power of removal. The committee did not think it proper to interfere further than to provide that the President should state his reasons for the removals he might make. The gentleman had asked what the Senate would do with those reasons, when they got them. He would answer, that that matter was to be determined by the Senate. It was not for him to inquire into what subsequent Senates might do; it was sufficient for him that the single circumstance of requiring of the President to communicate

well known that he was one of those who did to the Senate his reasons for the exercise of not deny that the President possessed the the power of removal, would be a sufficient power of removal from office. He had express-check against the abuse of that power. Was ed the opinion that the President did possess this power, and that opinion he still retained. But while he believed that the power of removal from office was vested in the President of the United States, he still believed that the power to regulate removals rested with the Congress of the United States. The constitution said that the executive power should be vested in a President of the United States; but, as this much would only be vague and indefinite, it goes on to say what those powers are-to express, in precise terms, the powers that shall be given to the President. By this enumeration, it excludes at once the idea that, without

there no difference between suffering a man to act under a secret, hidden motive, governed by mere partiality or prejudice, and his acting for causes which he was bound to proclaim to the world? Was it not an important point to make the Executive examine and consider well the charges against a public officer, that he might take good care that the charges were well founded and of sufficient weight, before he removed him from office? The committee had endeavored to avoid any interference with the executive power; but, at the same time, to put such sufficient checks and balances on it as experience recommended, to prevent its abuse.