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dition precedent to dividing out the moneys of the Treasury to the States? Mr. W. said that he could not see that it was, while he could see the most fearful evils which might arise from this debtor and creditor relation between the States and this Government. He could foresee incalculable evils which might grow out of the conflicting and contrary interests of the different States, whenever it should be proposed by the Federal Government to make the call for this money, and thus attempt to render the promises to pay operative. He was compelled further to apprehend, in consequence of these propositions, should they be adopted, an early agitation of the tariff controversy, and the revival of local questions which have so recently tried the strength of this Union more severely than it had ever before been tried, and given to our institutions a shock which every patriot would long remember, and labor, to the utmost of his power, to avoid in future. His second objection, Mr. W. said, was against the rule of distribution adopted. It was directed to be made according to the representation of each State in the Senate and House of Representatives. He must suppose, if Congress possess the power, under the constitution, to divide out the moneys in the public Treasury to the States, or to the people of the States, that the rule of distribution must follow that which governs the collection of the same money. That rule is the rule of representation and taxation; is the rule of federal numbers; is the rate of representation, as nearly as may be, by which the States are represented in the House of Representatives. It has never before been proposed to include the Senate in any calculation of equality between the States. The constitution has in no instance included it; and he must think that its inclusion here was against the spirit and against the express provisions of that instrument. How had this money been accumulated? By taxation, direct or indirect. From whom had it been collected? From the people of the States. The constitution prescribed the rule by which, and by which only, Congress might tax them; and that was in proportion to their federal numbers. If the money is not wanted for the uses of the Federal Government, to whom does it belong? and to whom should it be returned? Most certainly to the people from whom it has been collected, and in the same proportions which governed its collection from them. It should be distributed, then, upon the federal numbers of the States, or upon their representation in the House of Representatives alone; and the representation in the Senate, which has no relation to the population or tax-paying liabilities of the States, should not be included.

Another argument against the adoption of this rule of distribution, of the strongest character, was to be found in the certainty it would create that the money would never be called for, even to avoid direct taxation. By this rule, all the small States would obtain a large

[SENATE.

amount of the money to be distributed, beyond the proportion to which their federal numbers would entitle them. Sixteen of the twentyfour States would gain, and eight only would lose. Present, then, in this body, where the States are represented equally, the alternative of a direct tax, or a call upon the States for this money, and which do you think, Mr. President, would be adopted? Would the sixteen States prevail, or the eight? and if the sixteen, which alternative would they choose? That, of course, which the interests of the States represented here, and holding the majority, should dictate. What would be that interest? In the distribution of the money to be repaid, they will have received a proportion much greater than their proportion of federal population, because the rule of distribution included their representation in the Senate. If, then, they consent to the call for repayment, they must return the money received. On the contrary, if these States adopt a direct tax, they have only to raise a sum equal to their exact proportions in the scale of federal numbers, and therefore will be direct gainers by preferring the tax and rejecting a call for the money.

Mr. W. said he must, in justice to himself, state that the fact, that the rule proposed to be adopted would work the greatest injustice to his own State, had very little influence with him in urging this objection. If a distribution was to be made, and New York was to be a recipient, it was his duty to contend for her rights; but in debt as she was, if all her citizens entertained his feelings and opinions upon this subject, they would look, as they most safely might, to her wealth, to her enterprise, to her immense advantages and resources, to pay her debts and carry her on to her high destiny, and would not prostrate her before the national Treasury, for the miserable boon of a few hundred thousand dollars. Were he permitted to advise, his State would never accept the money proposed to be entrusted to her upon the terms prescribed.

Mr. W. said he had but one single further suggestion to make, and he would resume his seat. He wished to inquire of those gentlemen who had voted for the land bill, and who now proposed to support the propositions offered by the Senator from South Carolina (Mr. CALHOUN) to distribute the surplus revenue among the States, whether the two measures would, or would not, conflict with each other? whether they were, or were not, intended as antagonist measures? That bill provides for the distribution of the proceeds of the sales of the public lands on specified days, and extends through the year 1837. These propositions make the same disposition of all the revenues in the Treasury, over a given sum to be named, upon specified days, without regard to the sources from which the moneys may have been derived, and extends its action through the year 1841. If he was not mistaken, the distributions under the two bills were to take place, in some in

SENATE.]

Public Deposits-Mr. Calhoun's Plan.

stances at least, on the same day. What he wished gentlemen to inform him was, which bill would take the money; for he supposed either would take all which could be called surplus. The rule of distribution was very different in the two cases, and he would be glad to learn whether it was intended, by this measure, to repeal in effect the land bill. His inquiries were particularly directed to the author of this scheme for distribution, and he should await his answer.

SATURDAY, May 28.

Resignation of Mr. Hill.

[MAY, 1836. would prefer to increase the imposts to refunding their quota, on the ground that the increase of the duties would promote the interests of manufactures. I cannot agree with the Senator that those States would assume a position so utterly untenable as to refuse to refund a deposit which their faith would be plighted to return, and rest the refusal on the ground of preferring to lay a tax, because it would be a bounty to them, and would consequently throw the whole burden of the tax on the other States. But, be this as it may, I can tell the Senator that, if they should take a course so unjust and monstrous, he may be assured that the other States would most unquestionably resist the increase of the imposts; so that the Governlet-ment would have to take its choice, either to go without the money, or call on the States to refund the deposits. But I so far agree with the Senator as to believe that Congress would be very reluctant to make the call; that it would not make it till, from the wants of the Treasury, it should become absolutely necessary; and that, in order to avoid such necessity, it would resort to a just and proper economy in the public expenditures as the preferable alternative. I see in this, however, much good instead of evil. The Government has long since into a profusion, a waste, and an extravagance departed from habits of economy, and has fallen in its disbursements, rarely equalled by any free State, and which threatens the most disastrous consequences.

The CHAIR communicated the following ter of resignation from the Hon. ISAAC HILL; which was read:

WASHINGTON, May 28, 1836. SIR: Having been elected by the citizens of New Hampshire to the office of Chief Magistrate of that State, without waiting a formal official communication of the canvass; and it being expedient that I should enter on the discharge of the duties of the new office during the ensuing week, I communicate to you, and through you to the Senate, information that on Monday next I shall resign my seat in the Senate.

With the best wishes of happiness to yourself, and to the Senators with whom I have been associated,

I am, with great respect,

Your obedient servant,

Hon. MARTIN VAN BUREN,

ISAAC HILL.

Vice President of the United States. Public Deposits-Mr. Calhoun's plan. The Senate then proceeded to the consideration of the bill to regulate the deposits of the public money.

After some words from Mr. WRIGHT, in explanation,

Mr. CALHOUN said: After bestowing on the subject the most deliberate attention, I have come to the conclusion that there is no other so safe, so efficient, and so free from objections, as the one I have proposed-of depositing the surplus that may remain at the termination of the year in the treasuries of the several States, in the manner provided for in the amendment. But the Senator from New York objects to the measure, that it would, in effect, amount to a distribution, on the ground, as he conceives, that the States would never refund. He does not doubt but that they would, if called on to refund by the Government, but he says that Congress will in fact never make the call. He rests this conclusion on the supposition that there would be a majority of the States opposed to it. He admits, in case the revenue should become deficient, that the southern or staple States would prefer to refund their quota, rather than to raise the imposts to meet the deficit; but he insists that the contrary would be the case with the manufacturing States, which

But I am happy to think that the ground on which the objection of the Senator stands may be removed, without materially impairing the provisions of the bill. It will require but the addition of a few words to remove it, by giving to the deposits all the advantages, without the objections which he proposes by his plan. It will be easy to provide that the States shall authorize the proper officers to give negotiable certificates of deposit, which shall not bear interest till demanded, when they shall bear the usual rates till paid. Such certificates would be, in fact, State stocks, every way similar to that in which the Senator proposes to vest the surplus, but with this striking superiority: that, instead of being partial, and limited to a few States, they would be fairly and justly apportioned among the several States. They would have another striking advantage over his. They would create among all the members of the confederacy reciprocally the relation of debtor and creditor, in proportion to their relative weight in the Union; which, in effect, would leave them in their present relation, and would of course avoid the danger that would result from his plan, which, as has been shown, would necessarily make a part of the States debtors to the rest, with all the danger resulting from such relation.

The next objection of the Senator is to the ratio of distribution, proposed in the bill, among the States, which he pronounces to be unequal, if not unconstitutional. He insists that the

MAY, 1836.]

Public Deposits-Mr. Calhoun's Plan.

[SENATE.

true principle would be to distribute the sur- in favor of some of the small States, particularplus among the States in proportion to the rep-ly the old, whose population is nearly stationresentation in the House of Representatives, ary; but, among the new and growing members without including the Senators, as is proposed in the bill; for which he relies on the fact, that, by the constitution, representation and taxation are to be apportioned in the same manner among the States.

of the confederacy, which constitute the greater portion of the small States, it would not give them a larger share of the deposits than what they would be entitled to on the principle of direct taxes. But the objection of the Sen

The Senate will see that the effect of adopt-ator to the ratio of distribution, like his objecing the ratio supported by the Senator would be to favor the large States, while that in the

bill will be more favorable to the small.

tion to the condition on which the bill proposes to make it, is a matter of small comparative consequence. I am prepared, in the spirit of concession, to adopt either, as one or the other may be more acceptable to the Senate.

The State I in part represent occupies a neutral position between the two. She cannot be considered either a large or a small State, form- It now remains to compare the disposition of ing, as she does, one twenty-fourth part of the surplus proposed in the bill with the others the Union, and of course it is the same to her I have discussed; and, unless I am greatly dewhichever ratio may be adopted. But I prefer ceived, it possesses great advantages over them. the one contained in my amendment, on the Compared with the scheme of expending the ground that it represents the relative weight surplus, its advantage is, that it would avoid of the States in the Government. It is the the extravagance and waste which must result weight assigned to them in the choice of the from suddenly more than quadrupling the exPresident and Vice President in the electoral penditures, without a corresponding organizacollege, and, of course, in the administration tion in the disbursing department of the Govof the laws. It is also that assigned to them ernment to enforce economy and responsibility. in the making of the laws by the action of the It would also avoid the diversion of so large a two Houses, and corresponds very nearly to portion of the industry of the country from its their weight in the judicial department of the present useful direction to unproductive objects, Government; the judges being nominated by with heavy loss to the wealth and prosperity the President and confirmed by the Senate. In of the country, as has been shown; while it addition, I was influenced in selecting the ratio would, at the same time, avoid the increase of by the belief that it was a wise and magnani- the patronage and influence of the Government, mous course, in case of doubt, to favor the with all their corruption and danger to the libweaker members of the confederacy. The erty and institutions of the country. But its larger can always take care of themselves, and, advantages would not be limited simply to to avoid jealousy and improper feelings, ought avoiding the evil of extravagant and useless to act liberally towards the weaker members disbursements. It would confer positive beneof the confederacy. To which may be added, fits, by enabling the States to discharge their that I am of the impression that, even on the debts, and complete a system of internal imprinciple assumed by the Senator, that the dis-provements by railroads and canals, which tribution of the surplus ought to be apportioned on the ratio with direct taxation, (which may be well doubted,) the ratio which I support would conform in practice more nearly to the principle than that which he supports. It is a fact not generally known, that representation in the other House, and direct taxes, should they be laid, would be far from being equal, although the constitution provides that they should be. The inequality would result from the mode of apportioning the representatives. Instead of apportioning them among the States, as near as may be, as directed by the constitution, an artificial mode of distribution has been adopted, which in its effects gives to the large States a greater number, and to the small a less, than that to which they are entitled. I would refer those who may desire to understand how this inequality is effected, to the discussion in this body on the apportionment bill, under the last census. So great is this inequality, that, were a direct tax to be laid, New York, for instance, would have at least three members more than her apportionment of the tax would require. The ratio which I have proposed would, I admit, produce as great an inequality

VOL. XII.-49

would not only greatly strengthen the bonds of the confederacy, but increase its power, by augmenting infinitely our resources and prosperity.

I do not deem it necessary to compare the disposition of the surplus which is proposed in the bill with the dangerous, and, I must say, wicked scheme of leaving the public funds where they are, in the banks of deposit, to be loaned out by those institutions to speculators and partisans, without authority or control of law.

Compared with the plan proposed by the Senator from New York, it is sufficient, to prove its superiority, to say that, while it avoids all of the objections to which his is liable, it at the same time possesses all the advantages, with others peculiar to itself. Among these, one of the most prominent is, that it provides the only efficient remedy for the deep-seated disease which now afflicts the body politic, and which threatens to terminate so fatally, unless it be speedily and effectually arrested.

I have now, said Mr. C., stated what, in my opinion, ought to be done with the surplus. Another question still remains-not what shall,

SENATE.]

Public Deposits-Mr. Calhoun's Plan.

[MAY, 1836.

but what will, be done with the surplus? With | proportion of the whole amount as her Senators a few remarks on this question, I shall conclude what I intended to say.

and Representatives in Congress bear to the whole number of members of both Houses. The sums are to be refunded to the Treasury of the United States at such times as Congress shall by law provide.

Mr. B. said he would waive for the present any constitutional doubts which may exist in regard to the power of Congress to distribute among the several States the surplus revenue derived from taxation. He would merely remark that, if we do not possess the power to make such a distribution, he could not perceive by what authority we could make the loan proposed by the gentleman. If you have not the power to give the principal, whence can you derive your power to give the interest? To loan the States this money, without interest, is to make them a donation of an annuity equal to six per cent. per annum, for an indefinite period, on the sums which they may respectively receive. In any constitutional view of

There was a time, in the better days of the republic, when to show what ought to be done, was to ensure the adoption of the measure. Those days have passed away, I fear, forever. A power has risen up in the Government greater than the people themselves, consisting of many and various and powerful interests, combined into one mass, and held together by the cohesive power of the vast surplus in the banks. This mighty combination will be opposed to any change; and it is to be feared that such is its influence that no measure to which it is opposed can become a law, however expedient and necessary, and that the public money will remain in their possession, to be disposed of, not as the public interest, but as theirs may dictate. The time, indeed, seems fast approaching, when no law can pass, nor any honor be conferred, from the Chief Magistrate to the tide-waiter, without the assent of this power- the subject, he could not perceive how the inful and interested combination, which is steadily becoming the Government itself, to the utter subversion of the authority of the people. Nay, I fear we are in the midst of it, and I look with anxiety to the fate of this measure as the test whether we are or not.

terest could share a different fate from that of the principal. This was not to be a mere deposit with the States for safe keeping; it was intended by all that the money should be used by the States in the construction of internal improvements, in the payment of their debts, and in accomplishing every object which they might deem useful. If we possess the power to loan the public money to the States in this manner, we might at once give it to them absolutely.

If nothing should be done; if the money, which justly belongs to the people, be left where it is, with the many and overwhelming objections to it, the fact will prove that a great and radical change has been effected; that the Government is subverted; that the authority The leading objection which he had to this of the people is suppressed by a union of the system was, that its direct and continuing tenbanks and Executive-a union a hundred times dency, at least until 1842, would be to create a more dangerous than that of church and state, bias in the Senators and Representatives of the against which the constitution has so jealously States in Congress in opposition to the fair and guarded. It would be the announcement of a efficient administration of the federal Governstate of things, from which, it is to be feared, ment. The Senator from South Carolina, feelthere can be no recovery-a state of boundless ing the force of this objection, has attempted corruption, and the lowest and basest subservi- to obviate it by stating that the strong tendency ency. It seems to be the order of Providence of the action of this Government was towards that, with the exception of these, a people may consolidation, and this proposition would be recover from any other evil. Piracy, robbery, useful as a counteracting force. Mr. B. would and violence, of any description, may, as history now neither dispute nor affirm the proposition proves, be followed by virtue, patriotism, and of the Senator in regard to the central tendency national greatness; but where is the example of this Government; but this he would say, that, to be found, of a degenerate, corrupt, and sub-in avoiding Scylla, we must take care not to servient people, who have ever recovered their virtue and patriotism? Their doom has ever been the lowest state of wretchedness and misery; scorned, trodden down, and obliterated forever from the list of nations. May Heaven grant that such may never be our doom!

Mr. BUCHANAN said he would make a few remarks upon the plans proposed by the Senators from South Carolina and New York, for disposing of the surplus in the Treasury; and, first, in regard to that of the Senator from South Carolina. He proposes to loan the balance remaining in the Treasury at the end of each year, until June, 1842, (after deducting therefrom $3,000,000,) to the several States, without interest; each State receiving such a

rush into Charybdis. He thought the counteracting power of the gentleman's bill would be so excessive that it might drive us into the opposite extreme, and thus become dangerous.

Mr. B. said he greatly preferred the distribution proposed by the land bill to that of the Senator from South Carolina. The same objection did not exist to it. It assumed as a principle that the nett proceeds of the sales of the public lands belonged to the States. It withdrew from this Government the entire fund. It would leave us to administer the Government out of the other means which still remained. It was a fixed and certain mode, and did not seek to distribute a mere surplus of what might remain in the Treasury after

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we had provided for other objects. Besides, the money was granted absolutely, and not loaned to the States. But he did not intend to discuss the merits or demerits of the land bill upon the present occasion.

THURSDAY, June 2.

Incendiary Publications.

On motion of Mr. CALHOUN, the Senate took up the bill to prohibit the circulation, through the mails, of incendiary publications.

Mr. GRUNDY moved to amend the bill by striking out all after the enacting clause, and inserting a substitute.

[SENATE.

Mr. NILES also spoke in favor of the bill. Mr. BENTON opposed the passage of the bill. Mr. KING, of Alabama, again vindicated the bill and the banks, and urged especially the distressing results to the District of the failure of the bill, or of any great and sudden change in the currency of the District.

After some further remarks from Mr. WALKER,

The question was taken on the passage of the bill, and decided as follows:

YEAS.-Messrs. Black, Buchanan, Calhoun, Clay, Crittenden, Cuthbert, Davis, Ewing of Ohio, Goldsborough, Hendricks, Hubbard, Kent, King of Alabama, Knight, Leigh, Naudain, Nicholas, Porter, Prentiss, Rives, Southard, Swift, Tallmadge, Tom

NAYS.-Messrs. Benton, Ewing of Illinois, King of Georgia, Linn, McKean, Mangum, Morris, Niles, Robinson, Ruggles, Shepley, Wall, White, Wright

-14.

Mr. CALHOUN moved to amend the amend-linson, Walker, Webster-26. ment by providing that where incendiary publications are sent to the States where such publications are prohibited by law, they shall be delivered to such persons as may be appointed to receive them, and when there are no such persons appointed to receive them, they shall be burnt; or otherwise disposed of, under the regulations of the Post Office Department.

On taking the question, this amendment was lost-yeas 15, nays 15, as follows:

YEAS.-Messrs. Black, Brown, Calhoun, Clay, Cuthbert, Goldsborough, Grundy, Kent, King of Alabama, King of Georgia, Moore, Nicholas, Rives, Walker, White-15.

NAYS.-Messrs. Benton, Buchanan, Davis, Hendricks, Hubbard, Morris, Prentiss, Robinson, Shepley, Southard, Swift, Tallmadge, Tomlinson, Webster, Wright-15.

After remarks from Messrs. MORRIS, CALHOUN, KING of Georgia, and GRUNDY, the question was taken on Mr. GRUNDY's substitute; and it was agreed to without a division.

The amendment of the committee was concurred in, and the question on ordering the bill to be engrossed for a third reading was carried -yeas 18, nays 18, as follows; the Chair voting in the affirmative:

YEAS. Messrs. Black, Brown, Buchanan, Calhoun, Cuthbert, Goldsborough, Grundy, King of Alabama, King of Georgia, Moore, Nicholas, Preston, Rives, Robinson, Tallmadge, Walker, White, Wright-18.

NAYS.-Messrs. Benton, Clay, Davis, Ewing of Illinois, Ewing of Ohio, Hendricks, Hubbard, Kent, Morris, Niles, Prentiss, Ruggles, Shepley, Southard, Swift, Tomlinson, Wall, Webster-18.

TUESDAY, June 7.

District Banks-Recharter and Restrictions. The bill to extend the charters of certain banks in the District of Columbia, was taken up; and the question being on the passage of the bill,

Mr. WRIGHT spoke against the passage of the bill.

Mr. KNIGHT made a few remarks in reply.

After transacting some other business,
The Senate adjourned.

WEDNESDAY, June 8.

Incendiary Publications.

On motion of Mr. CALHOUN, the Senate proceeded to consider the bill to prohibit deputy postmasters from receiving and transmitting certain papers described therein, in the States in which they are, or may be, prohibited by law.

A discussion arose, in which Mr. WEBSTER,
Mr. BUCHANAN, Mr. DAVIS, Mr. GRUNDY, Mr.
CLAY, and Mr. CALHOUN took part-when,
The question being on the passage of the

bill

Mr. CUTHBERT rose to request that the Senate would, by the postponement of the subject for a short time, allow him an opportunity of being heard on it when his health was better.

Mr. C. then moved to lay the bill on the table; which motion was lost.

The bill was then rejected by the following

vote:

YEAS.-Messrs. Black, Brown, Buchanan, Calhoun, Cuthbert, Grundy, King of Alabama, King of Georgia, Mangum, Moore, Nicholas, Porter, Preston, Rives, Robinson, Tallmadge, Walker, White, Wright-19.

NAYS.-Messrs. Benton, Clay, Crittenden, Davis, Ewing of Illinois, Ewing of Ohio, Goldsborough, Hendricks, Hubbard, Kent, Knight, Leigh, McKean, Morris, Naudain, Niles, Prentiss, Ruggles, Shepley, Southard, Swift, Tipton, Tomlinson, Wall, Webster -25.

THURSDAY, June 9.

Limitation on Sessions of Congress.
The following Message was received from the
President of the United States:
To the Senate of the United States:

The act of Congress "to appoint a day for the annual meeting of Congress," which originated in

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