and be paid from the treasury such sum as the secretary of the treasury shall deem just and reasonable, upon the certificate of the judge before whom such cases are tried or disposed of."

Resting upon an extremely narrow and technical construction of the words last quoted, it is said that the treasury department has ruled that the provisions of this section apply only to cases actually instituted, thereby defeating the broad purpose and just ends sought to be obtained by the statute. There was no need of a new statute to give the district attorney fees in cases instituted; but there was need of compelling him to bring no suits until full examination first had in his office. If suits were to be brought on all reports made, however frivolous, and thereby his and other costs incurred to the detriment of the public treasury, and the outrage of the citizen, the statute in question would not have been passed. To prevent so lamentable a condition of affairs, and to secure an honest and diligent investigation, congress provided that for such investigation proper compensation be awarded, without compelling the unjustifiable and expensive process of useless litigation. But it is urged that the language of section 838 is confined in terms to a "certificate of the judge before whom such cases are tried or disposed of;" and hence the district attorney, who by the section is required to make due "inquiry and examination" to avoid wrongful suits, must loose all compensation, or bring suits regardless of their merits. Such an interpretation seems suicidal. In very narrow sense no "case" is tried or disposed of by a judge until formally instituted in court; yet many accusations and proceedings, through habeas corpus, or before commissioners, etc., are "disposed of" without technical trial. The term "case," as used in the statute, was intended to cover, and does cover, all complaints. reported by revenue officers to the district attorney, which might be subject to the final determination of the court, by trial or other action therein. They have come within the reach of judicial administration, and are within the purview of the statute. If this be not so, then the mischief sought to be cured will still exist with increased force.

It is held, therefore, that the expenses and services of the district. attorney's office in examining revenue reports, when no judicial action thereon is thereafter formally instituted, fall within the rule for compensation prescribed. True, the judge must be satisfied as to said expenses and services in order to certify what is "just and reasonable." Some of the cases involve as large a measure of "inquiry and examination" as if they had passed through indictments to a final trial, with heavy costs for witnesses and jury service; all of which can be saved to the government, and consequently are within the purview of the statute.

What is meant, under section 838, by "cases tried or disposed of before the judge?" Section 824 fixed the fees of the district attorney in case formally prosecuted before the court. Hence, if section 838

is to be limited to such cases, then there is no ground for the action of the judge, unless section 824 is to be construed to override the provisions of section 838. If the latter section is designed to cover all "cases" instituted in court formally, and no others, then what becomes of the fixed rates under section 824? May the the judge disregard statutory fees? What are tried, etc., before the judge as contradistinguished from the court? If the views suggested limiting compensation to "cases" formally instituted, are to prevail, then a direct conflict between those sections is presented. The two sections are reconcilable. They pertain to different matters. Section 824 fixes rates of compensation when suits, etc., are formally instituted, and section 838 provides for the compensation to be given when suits. are not instituted on revenue reports made, but disposed of by the district attorney in his office. Section 838 must be limited to the latter "cases," and is designed to provide therefor. Otherwise section 824 is in conflict. The purpose of the statute is to fix fees in prescribed cases under section 824, and to leave to the judge, under section 838, the determination of the proper measure of compensation in cases disposed of in the district attorney's office, which, though not formally before the court, may be brought there. Otherwise the judge might allow, under section 838, compensation regardless of section. 824. In one sense cases are not determined by the judge as such, but by the court. Certainly narrow distinctions of that nature should not defeat the clear intent of the statute.

It is not necessary to enter upon a discussion, heretofore presented to this court, of the constitutional validity of acts of congress devolving on judges, eis nominibus, the functions of auditors. It must suffice that the measure of compensation should be largely measured by rates named in section 824. Taking those rates as a guide, I have examined the account in open court. Until the act of February 22, 1875, (Supplement, p. 145, c. 95,) the acts of congress seemingly contemplated the immediate auditing by the judge, without formal proceedings in open court. Since that act all accounts for fees, etc., whether under section 824 or 838, should be considered as within the act of February 22, 1875. Hence I have caused this account to be presented in open court, and after consideration thereof the court. orders the same approved.

In re BAKER.

(Circuit Court, D. Rhode Island. February 13, 1885.)

1. ENLISTMENT OF MINOR IN ARMY-DISCHARGE ON HABEAS CORPUS.

A minor who has been enlisted in the army without the written consent of his parents or guardians entitled to his custody and control, will be released on habeas corpus issued on petition of such parents or guardians.

2. SAME-JURISDICTION OF COURT-MARTIAL-DESERTION.

In such case, a court-martial cannot retain jurisdiction of the enlisted man under charges of desertion.

Habeas Corpus.

Darius Baker, for relator.

Cyrus M. Van Slyck, for respondent.

CARPENTER, J. This is a writ of habeas corpus issued on the petition of Augustus E. Baker and Augustus T. Baker, and directed to Clement L. Best, colonel of the Fourth Artillery, commanding him to produce the body of the said Augustus E. Baker. The return, and the proofs, which are not disputed, show that Baker enlisted in the army on the eighteenth day of December, 1884; that he afterwards deserted the service, and was apprehended and returned to Fort Adams; and that charges of desertion have been filed against him pursuant to the forty-seventh article of war, (Rev. St. § 1342,) and that he is now held for trial on said charges. The proofs further show that he was, at the time of his enlistment, and still is, under the age of 21 years; that the relator, Augustus T. Baker, is his father, and is entitled to his custody and control, and has never consented to the enlistment. The forty-seventh article of war is as follows:

"Any officer or soldier, who having received pay, or having been duly enlisted in the service of the United States, deserts the same, shall, in time of war, suffer death or such other punishment as a court-martial may direct; and in time of peace, any punishment, excepting death, which a court-martial may direct."

The language of Rev. St. § 1117, is as follows:

"No person under the age of twenty-one years shall be enlisted or mustered into the military service of the United States without the written consent of his parents or guardians: provided, that such minor has such parents or guardians, entitled to his custody and control.”

The relators contend that the enlistment, being made contrary to law, is absolutely void; that, consequently, Baker has not, at any time, been "duly enlisted in the service of the United States," and has not been capable to commit the crime of desertion; and that a court-martial has no jurisdiction over him on such charges; and that, finally, the respondent has no right to restrain him, either to service under his enlistment, or for punishment for the offense with which he is charged. On the other hand, it is contended on behalf of the military authorities that the enlistment is voidable only, and not void, and that the recruit remained subject to military authority, and hence

liable to punishment for violation of the articles of war, until such time as the contract of enlistment should be avoided, and, consequently, that he may be lawfully restrained by the respondent, at least until the judgment of the court-martial shall be pronounced on the pending charges.

In cases where there was no statutory prohibition against the enlistment, and where the contract was sought to be avoided on the sole ground that it was made by a person under age, it is well settled that the recruit is to be taken to be an enlisted man, and subject to punishment for violation of his duty as such, until the contract shall be avoided by proper proceedings. This rule is plainly laid down by Judge LOWELL, In re Wall, 8 FED. REP. 85, and is abundantly supported by the cases there cited. It is to be noted, however, that in Wall's Case, as well as in all the cases there cited, with two exceptions, to which reference will be hereafter made, it appeared that there was no statute prohibiting the enlistments. Those cases are not, therefore, of authority here. In Com. v. Fox, 7 Pa. St. 336, the prisoner had enlisted in the army, and had deserted and surrendered himself, and it appeared that he was the minor son of the relator, who had never consented to the enlistment. He was discharged from custody. It seems also to be a clear inference from the language of Judge WALLACE, In re Davison, 21 FED. REP. 618, that a similar order would have been made in that case if the parent of the soldier entitled to his custody and control had made application for his discharge. In U. S. v. Hanchett, 18 FED. REP. 26, the soldier, in a case similar to this, was discharged on his own application. On the other hand, it is to be noted that in McNulty's Case, 2 Low. 270, the prisoner, who had enlisted in the marine corps contrary to the prohibition of the statute, was discharged on the ground, as stated in the opinion, that the enlistments were "voidable by the minors themselves, or by their parents, as well as by the government;" and this case was referred to in Wall's Case, cited above, as authority for the decision there made. It seems, therefore, to be declared in both cases that an enlistment such as that now in question is not to be held absolutely void. If such a conclusion had appeared to be deliberately expressed by the learned judge who delivered the opinion in both those cases, it would undoubtedly be entitled to much consideration, although not necessary to the decision of the cases then in hand. But it appears to me that the opinions do not contain clear evidence of such deliberate conclusion. In the first place, the opinion in McNulty's Case contains no discussion, and no express statement, as to whether the enlistment is voidable in distinction from being void; and it seems to me, from the reading of the whole opinion, that when the argument of the case had progressed so far in the mind of the judge as to reach the conclusion that the enlistment was voidable, from which it necessarily followed that the prisoner must be discharged, the consideration of the further question, whether it was not also absolutely void, may have been postponed.

In the second place, it is a significant observation that in Wall's Case the authority of Com. v. Fox is denied, on the express ground that in that case the judges found that the statute made the enlistment absolutely illegal. It does not indeed appear that the authority of that case would have been followed if it could not have been distinguished; but it seems extremely probable that the case would have been distinctly overruled if the judge, on consideration of McNulty's Case, had deliberately determined to announce the doctrine here contended for on behalf of the military authorities.

It seems to me that the effect of the statute is to make the enlistment absolutely void, and that it must be so held on the application of any person who is not estopped from setting up the prohibition. In this case, the application being made both by Baker and by his father, I do not find it necessary to decide whether he could be discharged on his own application alone. My conclusion is that the enlistment is void as to the father, and must be so held on his application. It follows that Baker was not "duly enlisted," that he could not commit the crime of desertion, and that the court-martial cannot retain jurisdiction under the pending charges. He will therefore be discharged.

In re MILLER.

(Circuit Court, W. D. Pennsylvania. February 18, 1885.)

1. EXTRADITION-TREATY WITH GREAT BRITAIN OF 1842-HOLDING FUGITIVE

CRIME.

Under the treaty of 1842, between the United States and Great Britain, an extradited fugitive may be held by the receiving government on his prior conviction and sentence for a non-extraditable crime.

2. SAME-DEFENSE-GOOD FAITH OF EXTRADITION PROCEEDINGS.

In the tribunals of his own country the surrendered fugitive cannot question the good faith of the extradition proceedings.

Habeas Corpus.

J. T. Maffett and Wm. R. Blair, for petitioner.

E. A. Montooth, contra.

ACHESON, J. The petitioner claims his discharge on the ground that he is unlawfully held in custody in violation of the tenth article of the treaty of 1842 between the governments of the United States. and Great Britain. Briefly, the facts of the case are these:

The petitioner was convicted of burglary in the court of oyer and terminer of Clarion county, Pennsylvania, and thereupon was sentenced on August 23, 1881, to undergo an imprisonment for the period of seven years in the Western Penitentiary of Pennsylvania, to which prison he was duly committed. In December, 1881, he escaped therefrom and fled to Canada. Burglary not being an extradition crime,