ing that sentence would follow in case they failed to effect a compromise with the department; and in making it they acted under the advice of intelligent and faithful counsel, who now make no claim of mistake or misapprehension either on their part or on the part of the prisoners.

It is not pretended that the district attorney represented to the prisoners that a plea of guilty would aid their application for a compromise, nor do they state any facts calculated to create a belief that their confession is untrue, but content themselves with saying that they are not guilty. As between their statement in their plea that they are guilty, and their present statement that they are not guilty, the circumstances under which the two statements were made justify the conclusion that the plea is true and their present statement unThe careful counsel who advised the prisoners to make the plea express no doubt of its truth. When the plea was made, the prisoners stood face to face with the prosecuting officer then ready to try them, with a large array of witnesses in attendance, gathered from distant points, at much expense, but there was no menace, duress, or influence brought to bear upon them by him. On the contrary, they proposed the course that was taken. By confessing their guilt and entering their confession of record in the form of a plea of guilty they induced the district attorney to consent to nolle the other indictments, and to afford them an opportunity to urge a compromise before the department. And now, because the district attorney yielded to their proposition, they claim the right to withdraw their confession and compel the government to reassemble the witnesses and prove their guilt. To permit such a proceeding would, in my opinion, give sanction to an abuse of the forms of law. There was

no impropriety on the part of the district attorney in giving his promise to nolle the other indictments, nor did his promise so to do afford inducement to the plea of guilty of such a character as to make it proper for the court to refuse to receive it; and the prisoners would have had good cause of complaint if, upon this ground, the court had rejected their plea when tendered, and compelled a trial of the indictments before the jury. If, upon the facts, it was incumbent upon the court to receive the plea, it is equally incumbent upon the court not to permit its withdrawal at a subsequent term, after the witnesses. have been scattered, and the ability of the government to prove its case has been thereby impaired. Neither was there any undue influence on the part of the district attorney because of his promise to delay moving sentence, in order to afford the prisoners an opportu nity to compromise the case. The statute (Rev. St. § 3229) permits a compromise of criminal cases of this character to be made by the commissioner of internal revenue, and, while any considerable lapse of time between conviction and sentence is not favored by the court, an agreement to give the prisoners reasonable delay, in order that, if so advised, they might endeavor to effect a compromise with

the department, is far from being an inducement of such a character as will justify the court's permitting the withdrawal of a plea of guilty made as this one was made. I find, therefore, no ground upon which to justify granting the prisoners' permission to withdraw their plea of guilty. As to the remainder of the application, namely, a further postponement of sentence, to enable the prisoners to renew their efforts with the department to obtain a compromise, the official announcement of the department that no further application for compromise will be entertained shows that further delay would be of no avail.

The motion is accordingly denied.

OSMER v. J. B. SICKLES SADDLERY CO.1

(Circuit Court, E. D. Missouri. May 18, 1885.)

PATENTS-HORSE-COLLARS.

Letters patent No. 157,367, issued to John M. Bright, for an "improvement in horse-collars,” held not infringed by a sweat-cloth, composed of a series of detachable sections.

TREAT, J. The Bright patent, No. 157,367, December 1, 1874, is for "a horse-collar consisting of a frame, combined with a number of detachable pads," as described therein. Defendant alleges that the same was anticipated by the Meyer patent, No. 61,016, January 8, 1867, and the Lovett & Lefevre patent, No. 133,786, December 10, 1872. In the light of the said anticipatory patents, it is more than doubtful whether the Bright patent contained any novelty of invention patentable under the law, unless rigidity of frame and consequent absence of hames, were essential. However that may be, it is apparent from whatever construction may be put on the Bright patent that the defendant does not infringe the same, as the Bright patent is for a "horse-collar with detachable pads" arranged as in his patent described. It would seem that his patent was for a collar adjusted, as by him specified, without reference to hames. Separable pads were provided for by the Meyer and Lovette patents, and consequently in the state of the art there was no room open for invention unless the Bright patent was designed for a collar to which, in the absence of hames, separable pads might be attached by buckles and straps, thereby obviating the use of hames, and producing a new

1 Reported by Benj. F. Rex, Esq., of the St. Louis bar.

collar with pads. This proposition is not urged, because the defendant uses no such collar.

The contention on the part of the plaintiff, in order to succeed, must cover all use of detachable pads, or sweat-cloths with detachable pads, made so as to relieve sore or gall spots on the neck. Such was not the scope of the Bright patent, or if it had been, could he, within the rules of the patent law, have blocked the pathway for all contrivances, whereby such beneficial results could be effected? He must be held to his special device in connection with a horse-collar, as by him stated. The defendant does not sell any such horse-collar, but only sweat-cloths independent of the collar, more like the Meyer and Lovett patents, though not exactly the same as either. Hence, without formally deciding that the Bright patent is void for want of novelty and patentability, it must suffice that under no construction of the Bright patent can the defendant be held to have infringed the same.

Bill dismissed with costs.

THE E. LUCKENBACK.1

(Circuit Court, E. D. New York. July 2, 1884.)

TUG WITH DREDGE IN Tow-NEGLIGENCE IN STARTING SUDDENLY.

See head-note to same case in the district court, 15 FED. REP. 924. The decision of the the district court in the same case affirmed.

In Admiralty.

Goodrich, Deady & Platt, for libelants and appellees.

Butler, Stillman & Hubbard, for claimants and appellants.

In this case the court (BLATCHFORD, Justice) made and filed the following findings of fact:

On or about the twenty-third of March, 1882, the libelants, being desirous of sending the dredge Brooklyn and nine scows from New York to Fall river, employed the steam-tugs Cyclops and Edith Beard (the latter being owned by the libelants) to tow them to that place. On the twenty-fourth of March, 1882, the Cyclops became disabled by an accident, and the tow was taken into New London, and the tug E. Luckenback was employed by the libelants to continue the towage to Fall river with the Edith Beard. The E. Luckenback arrived at New London about half past 3 o'clock in the afternoon of the twentyeighth of March, 1882. The dredge was about 65 feet in length and 33 feet in width. Her original width had been 27 feet, and she had been widened by pontoons, 3 feet in width being built on each side of her, her whole length. She was of the same width her whole length, and drew, as she was loaded, over 4 feet. At her stern as she was towed the timbers did not extend from side to side, but the pontoons were extensions, fastened to the side of the dredge without through timbers. In the extreme outer corner of each pontoon a post

1 Reported by R. D. & Wyllys Benedict, Esqs., of the New York bar.

of yellow pine, 18 inches square, was set. The side timbers and planking, and the stern timbers and planking, were properly secured into the corner posts. The corner posts projected above the deck of the dredge. The construction of the dredge was not unusual or improper, and the dredge was capable of standing all the usual risks and dangers of such a trip, both generally and in respect to the corner posts and the use to which they were put on the occasion.

In the dredge were an engine and boiler and machinery for dredging. The scows were from 50 to 60 feet in length, and were chiefly light. When the E. Luckenback arrived at New London she found the tow already made up. It had been made up by the libelants in such a way that at sea the dredge would be towed ahead of the scows, and the scows would ride in single tile behind her. From each of the corner posts of the dredge, which, as she was towed, were on her after corners, a line ran to the forward part of the first scow behind. These lines were about 60 feet in length, and similar lines were run from each scow to the next succeeding scow. The E. Luckenback took the dredge and scows in tow by putting out a hawser, which belonged to the E. Luckenback, of about 100 fathoms in length, to the starboard bitts on the forward end of the dredge, and running a bridle from that hawser to the port bitts of the dredge. The hawser was parceled where the bridle crossed it, and the mode of towage was usual and proper. The Edith Beard made fast along-side of the dredge, and there assisted in the towage, leaving her position from time to time for the purpose of keeping the scows in line and transferring men, and lengthening the lines running from scow to scow.

The tow left New London about 4 o'clock P. M., and proceeded without accident towards Fall River until midnight. It had then arrived at a place off Point Judith. Two days before there had been a strong southerly and easterly gale, which had raised heavy seas. This gale had been followed by a shore wind from the north, which had flattened the sea, but left a long roll. The sea was sufficiently heavy to put the strength of the dredge to the proof, and demonstrate its ability to endure any strain to which it could be properly subjected on the occasion in question. The speed which the E. Luckenback made with her tow was not over three miles an hour. While so proceeding, the hawser between the tug and the dredge chafed and parted. New hawsers were put out from the stern of the tug to each of the forward corners of the dredge, and the tug thereupon started ahead suddenly, and too fast, whereby the scows, which had drifted into great confusion on the port side of the dredge, were rapidly and violently swung astern, and pulled out the rear corner post of the dredge, being the left-hand or in-shore one, as she was towed,―so that she sank and became a total loss, one man of her crew being drowned. The damage occurred through such negligence of the tug, and without the fault of the libelants. The amount of the damage is that reported by the commissioner in the district court.

On the foregoing facts I find, as conclusions of law, that the tug is responsible for the damage, and that the libelants are entitled to a decree for $13,210.35, with interest from March 28, 1882, and their costs in the district court, taxed at $771.05, and their costs in this court to be taxed.

Accompanying the foregoing findings was the following opinion: BLATCHFORD, Justice. The reasonings and views and conclusions of the district judge in his opinion are satisfactory to me, and nothing is needed to add to their force. The new evidence on appeal does not furnish ground for a different result. The damages fixed in the district court seem to be proper.

ADDICKS V. THREE HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FOUR TONS CRUDE KAINIT.1

1. DemurragE-CUSTOM-DISCHARGE INTO LIGHTERS-FALSE NOTICE-REASONABLE DILIGENCE.

It is the usage in the port of New York for ships loaded with kainit to discharge into lighters. Under this usage it is the ship's duty to wait for lighters a reasonable time before discharging on the dock. The master of the ship Cleopatra, loaded with kainit, sent word to the consignees on January 11th that the ship was at the dock ready to discharge, and requested lighters to be sent at once. She did not reach the dock till the morning of the 12th, which was Saturday. No lighter was sent till the 15th. The ship claimed demurrage for the 12th and the 14th. The consignees claimed that she was discharged in a reasonable time. Held, that false notice of readiness to discharge was no notice, and therefore the ship was not entitled to demurrage for the 12th. But the notice was sufficient to have enabled the consignees to have a lighter alongside on the 14th, and therefore the ship was entitled to demurrage for that day. Held, also, that, under the usage to discharge into lighters, the ship had a right to demand that lighters shall be brought along-side with reasonable diligence, and to receive aboard as fast as the ship can deliver, in the absence of special circumstances preventing; no fixed rate of tons per day being obligatory. 2. SAME-DISCHARGE ON DOCK IN ABSENCE OF LIGHTER-LIABILITY THEREFOR -CUSTOM.

The ship Carl, loaded with kainit, began to discharge into lighters. Having filled one lighter at 12 M., and no other being then along-side, she began at 2 P. M. to discharge on the dock. Another lighter came the next morning. Held that, in view of the absence of any fixed usage to discharge a particular number of tons per day, the ship had no right to begin to discharge on the dock without reasonable and timely notice of her intention; and that the slight delay in the coming of the second lighter did not justify the Carl in discharging on the dock; and that the consignee was entitled to recover the extra expense thereby occasioned him.

Demurrage.

Hill, Wing & Shoudy, and H. Putnam, for libelants.

Wilcox, Adams & Macklin, for claimants.

BROWN, J. The libelant, Addicks, claims two days' demurrage for the detention of the ship Cleopatra, during Saturday and Monday, January 12, and 14, 1884, in discharging some kainit, part of the cargo of the ship. The ship arrived in New York on the seventh of January, loaded with petroleum barrels above, and kainit (resembling salt) below. The ship was required by the charter to go to two different wharves to discharge. The bills of lading required each consignee, upon arrival of the ship, to give immediate notice of the dock to which she should go, in order to deliver their respective portions of the cargo. The claimant, accordingly, whose cargo was at the bottom, gave no

1 These were two distinct cases, but as the principles involved were similar, and the same proctors appeared in both cases, only one opinion was written. In each case there was delay in getting lighters along-side vessels which were ready to discharge. The Cleopatra waited for the lighters before discharging, and then libeled the cargo for demurrage. The Carl did not wait for the lighters, but discharged on the dock, and was libeled for the extra expense occasioned thereby.