alliance which will avoid entanglements and clear the air of the world for common understandings and the maintenance of common rights.-Address at the Metropolitan Opera House, New York, September 27, 1918. My conception of the League of Nations is just this-that it shall operate as the organized moral force of men throughout the world, and that whenever or wherever wrong and aggression are planned or contemplated, this searching light of conscience will be turned upon them, and men everywhere will ask, "What are the purposes that you hold in your heart against the fortunes of the world?" Just a little exposure will settle most questions. If the Central Powers had dared to discuss the purposes of the war for a single fortnight, it never would have happened; and, if as should be, they were forced to discuss it for a year, the war would have been inconceivable."-Speech in acknowledgment of the doctor's degree conferred by the University of Paris, December 21, 1918. We know there cannot be another balance of power. That has been tried and found wanting, for the best of all reasons that it does not stay balanced inside itself, and a weight which does not hold together cannot constitute a make-weight in the affairs of men. Therefore there must be something substituted for the balance of power, and I am happy to find everywhere in the air of these great nations the conception that that thing must be a thoroughly united League of Nations.-Speech in the Chamber of Deputies, Rome, January 3, 1919. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND HISTORICAL SURVEY OF The first of the long series of "projects of perpetual peace”— the Grand Design, which Sully ascribes to Henry IV. of France -was directed quite frankly, so far as it had any substance at all, against the [Holy Empire]; was, in fact, in its idea at least, little more than a strategical move in the secular conflict between France and Austria. Yet, though Sully says that its realization would have dealt a mortal blow at the imperial authority, the emperor was to be the chief or first magistrate of this new "Christian Republic"; but, in order to put an end to Hapsburg dominance, he was not to be chosen from the same house twice in succession. For the rest, the "Grand Design," which Sully says was first suggested by Queen Elizabeth, was a singular anticipation of certain modern developments. Italy, for instance, was to be unified as a “Republic of the Church" under the Pope (one remembers Gioberti's dream), and the dukes of Savoy were to become kings of Lombardy; while the independence of Belgium under a foreign dynasty is foreshadowed by the singular idea that the Low Countries should be carved into a series of fiefs for English princes or "milords." As for the General Council of Europe, over which the emperor was to preside, this was to be modeled, with certain necessary modifications, on the Amphictyonic Council of Greece, and to consist of a perpetual senate of sixty-four commissioners or plenipotentiaries, four from each great power, two from each lesser power, renewable every three years. The function of this senate was to be to deliberate on affairs as they arose; to discuss matters of common interest; to settle disputes; to examine into 1 By Walter Alison Phillips. Reprinted from Books and Reading, 1:88-95. October, 1918. Mr. Phillips is author of "The Confederation of Europe" from which this excerpt was taken originally. and determine all civil, political, and religious suits either in Europe itself or arising out of the relations of Europe with the world outside. Such was the Grand Design, which Sully recommended in language which anticipates that of the rescript of the Emperor Nicholas II. "He found the secret of persuading all his neighbors that his only object was to spare himself and them these immense sums which it costs them to maintain so many thousands of fighting men, so many fortified places, and other military expenses; to deliver them forever from the fear of bloody catastrophes, so common in Europe; to secure for them an unalterable repose, so that all the princes might henceforth live together as brothers." It is on this Grand Design that all other projects of peace, directly or indirectly, consciously or unconsciously, are based— from that which Eméric Crucé gave to the world under the title of "Le Nouveau Cynée,” two years before Grotius published his "Le Jure Belli et Pacis," to the latest program of the modern peace societies. It inspired the "Projet de Paix Perpétuelle" of the Abbé de St. Pierre, and through him the Emperor Alexander I.'s idea of a universal Holy Alliance. It may have played its part in forming the schemes of one whose name is not usually associated with projects of peace-Napoleon. Among the conversations of the great emperor recorded by the Comte de Las Cases, in his "Mémorial de Sainte Hélène," is one in which Napoleon explains the grand design which had underlain all his policy. He had aimed, he said, at concentrating the great European peoples, divided hitherto by a multiplicity of artificial boundaries, into homogeneous nations, which he would have formed into a confederation bound together "by unity of codes, principles, opinions, feelings, and interests." At the head of the league, under the ægis of his empire, was to have been a central assembly, modeled on the American Congress or the Amphictyonic Assembly of Greece, to watch over the common weal of "the great European family." Whether this plan had ever been seriously contemplated or not, it is easy to recognize in it the source of its inspiration. The "Projet de Traité pour rendre la Paix Perpétuelle" of the Abbé de St. Pierre was published in 1713, immediately after the signature of the Treaty of Utrecht. Its immediate effect was, of course, insignificant. The abbé, Rousseau scornfully said, was trying to do by publishing a book what Henry IV. had failed to do with the power of France behind him, and with the aid of the universal dread of Austrian ambitions, which supplied a stronger motive than any care for common interests. But the abbe's project was destined to exert considerable practical influence later, and this gives to his proposals and to the comments of his critics a permanent interest. The social order of Europe, he urges, is still largely determined by the passions rather than by reason. We are in civil relations with our fellow citizens, but with the rest of the world we are in the state of nature. Thus we have abolished private wars, only in order to set aflame general wars, which are a thousand times more terrible; and in forming partial alliances we make ourselves, in effect, enemies of the human race. Now, Christianity, he argues has given to the nations of Europe, in religion, morals, and customs, and even in laws, the impress of a single society-to such a point that those peoples which, like the Turks, have become European in a geographical sense without becoming Christians have been regarded as strangers; and between the members of this commonwealth "the ancient image of the Roman Empire has continued to form a sort of bond." But the public law of Europe, not being established or authorized in concert, having no foundation of general principle, and varying incessantly in different times and places, is full of contradictory rules, which can only be reconciled by the right of the stronger. Now, every society is based on a consciousness of common interests, while all divisions are caused by interests that are opposed, and both common and private interests may vary with a thousand changes of circumstance. In every society, then, it is necessary that there should be a coercive power to command and concert the movements of its members, and, to form a solid and durable European confederation, it would be necessary to place all its constituent states in such a condition of mutual dependence that no one of them should be in a position to resist the rest. If, under the system of the balance of power, states are limited in their opportunities for aggression, what would their position be when there is a great armed league, ever ready to prevent those who might wish to destroy or resist it? Such a league would not waste its time in idle deliberations, but would form an effective power, able to force the ambitious to keep within the terms of the general treaty. The nucleus or model of such a league was already in existence in the "Germanic Body," as constituted by the Treaty of Westphalia-the "conservative force of Europe," since it was strong for defense but powerless for attack. Now, since the Treaty of Westphalia was the basis of the European system—the abbé argues-German public law was in a sense that of all Europe. His project was then, in effect, to remodel Europe somewhat on the lines of the empire as it was after 1648. Its provisions are as follows: I. The sovereigns are to contract a perpetual and irrevocable alliance, and to name plenipotentiaries to hold, in a determined spot, a permanent diet or congress, in which all differences between the contracting parties are to be settled by arbitration or judicial decision. 2. The number of the sovereigns sending plenipotentiaries to the congress is to be specified, together with those who are to be invited to accede to the treaty. The presidency of the congress is to be exercised by the sovereigns in turn at stated intervals, the order of rotation and term of office being carefully defined. In like manner the quota to be contributed by each to the common fund, and its method of collection, are to be carefully defined. 3. The confederation thus formed is to guarantee to each of its members the sovereignty of the territories it actually possesses, as well as the succession, whether hereditary or elective, according to the fundamental laws of each country. To avoid disputes, actual possession and the latest treaties are to be taken as the basis of the mutual rights of the contracting powers, while all future disputes are to be settled by arbitration of the diet. 4. The congress is to define the cases which would involve offending states being put under the ban of Europe. 5. The powers are to agree to arm and take the offensive, in common and at the common expense, against any state thus banned, until it shall have submitted to the common will. 6. The plenipotentiaries in congress, on instructions from their sovereigns, shall have power to make such rules as they shall judge important with a view to securing for the European Republic and each of its members all possible advantages. It is impossible to examine this project without being struck by the fact that there is scarcely one of its provisions which does not emerge, at least as a subject of debate among the powers, during the years of European reconstruction after 1814. This fact is, perhaps, not the least striking on what may be called its negative side. In the Abbé de St. Pierre's project there is no provision made for even an honorary preeminence of the emperor; there is also no provision made for any representation other than that of the sovereigns. From this vision of perpetual peace the venerable phantom of the Holy Empire has vanished all but completely; this churchman and apostle of international |