Unless the nations were willing to devise some plan by which the nation that suffered the most from the loss of trade would be compensated by the others this objection might be almost insuperable.

Third, Force. If public opinion and economic pressure will not always and invariably suffice to compel a recourse to the peaceful adjustment of international disputes, we must evidently fall back on force as the ultimate sanction. For, as Woolf says in The New Statesman, July 10, 1915, “The maintenance of overwhelming power in the great nations and the continuance of their agreement" are the only guarantee of the future peace of the world.

The nations are now living in a world in which there are laws to prevent war but no force to compel a resort to them. It would be an exact parallel if within the state were elaborate laws governing the conduct of persons engaged in riots, murder and violence but none to prevent riot, murder and violence and no police to enforce them. This aspect of the case has recently been discussed by Elihu Root, who says:

Many states have grown so great that there is no power capable of imposing punishment upon them except the power of collective civilization outside the state and the only possibility of establishing real restraint by law seems to remain to give effect to the undoubted will of the vast majority of mankind.

In other words, Mr. Root proposes to establish an international criminal law.

If, then, we must have force as the ultimate sanction to bring the nations before the courts and councils, are there not times when economic pressure will do just as well as force and the nations will not have to resort to the bloody arbitrament of war? Or, if force cannot entirely be dispensed with, why might not some members of the league be permitted to use economic force while the other fight? Let us take up the latter question first.

There can be no doubt that if a nation knows that certainly, instantly and concertedly all the other nations will make war against it the minute it begins hostilities, such a nation will not break the peace as long as the force of the league is unquestionably superior to its own force. In other words, the certainty that an overwhelming force will be used means that prac

tically it never will be used. The only conceivable contingency in which the force of the league might not be effective would be in the improbably but not impossibly rare case when the members of the league divide into two nearly equal groups, as the American states did in the Civil War. Such a contingency, tho remote, can, of course, never be absolutely guarded against.

But the real danger of trying to separate economic from military pressure and exerting it independently lies in this fact: If the choice is open as to which course may be pursued, delay and parleying ensue after the danger has arisen, and that in turn would give the offending nation opportunity to befog the issue with intrigue, with the possibility that either nothing at all would be done, and the guilty nation escape punishment, or else the intrigue would continue until war would become inevitable. On the other hand, if the offending nation knew that no parleying and intrigue could prevent instant military intervention it would behave itself from the beginning and neither injustice nor war would be nearly so likely to ensue.

Several of the various American peace organizations, as well as the American Chamber of Commerce, which represent the business life of the United States, have exprest a belief that there is a stage in the proceedings before hostilities are actually reached where economic pressure might advantageously be applied. There are two stages, it is claimed, in which joint intervention of the league might take place, to put pressure upon a recalcitrant nation. The first stage is that in which war is being threatened by one power against a second when an ultimatum might be presented and the mobilization of troops begun. This would be the stage for economic pressure. But once actual hostilities or invasion had ensued the second state would be reached and military pressure automatically applied. The League to Enforce Peace has been willing to accept an amendment granting the value of economic pressure before military pressure, provided military pressure follows the instant hostilities begin. But the probability is that there would not be a sufficiently extended time between the ultimatum and actual hostilities in modern warfare to bring economic pressure into action or to permit pressure to exert any deterrent effect on the nation bent on war. In other words, economic pressure is of more theoretical than practical value, since modern wars begin so suddenly.

In taking up the question of whether all members of the league must invariably furnish their quota of force against the recalcitrant nation, there can be no doubt that if it is necessary it must be done. But as a practical proposition, if all nations exert economic pressure it may be sufficient for certain nations of the league alone to furnish the military force.

When the Hague Court announced its decision in the Venezuela case in 1904 it called upon the United States to see that its decree was carried out. When the allied nations lifted the siege of Peking, only those sent troops who happened to have them in Asia. . . . The United States alone is amply able to protect all foreign interests in Mexico with her own forces. The question of how and in what measure the force of the league shall be used is, after all, a practical one to be decided at the time. The only important thing is to have each nation prepared to use its force to the utmost if necessary.

INTERNATIONAL POLICE TO ENFORCE
WORLD PEACE1

The purpose of the League is to organize the world's strength into an international police to enforce a procedure with respect to issues likely to lead to war which will prevent all wars but those which nothing can prevent.

The procedure to be enforced is the submission of questions of a legal nature, the decision of which must be guided by rules of law, to an international court for its judgment, and the submission of all other questions to an impartial commission to hear and decide, its decision to take the form of a recommendations of compromise present a still more serious question by the court will be legally and in honor binding on the parties. That is implied in a submission to a court. The recommendation of compromise, however, is not in law or in honor binding unless the parties accept it. The League does not propose to enforce either. Some time if the League comes into successful operation it may be thought well to enforce

1 By William Howard Taft, President of the League to Enforce Peace. From an article in "The Nation's Business," published by the United States Chamber of Commerce.

judgment just as domestic judgments are enforced. The difficulty, however, that even the Supreme Court of the United States has in enforcing its judgments against sovereign states may give pause in taking that step. The enforcement and recommendations of compromise present a still more serious problem. Nations may well hesitate to submit questions of policy and vital interests to the unlimited discretion of arbitrators, unguided by settled principles of law, for their final decision, and its enforcement by the world police.

Practically if we enforce the procedure of the League, we shall take a step which will rid us of most wars. If every issue between nations is forced to arbitration and judgment or recommendation of compromise, it will compel deliberation by those who think of war, it will enable the quarreling peoples to understand what it is they are to fight about, and what the attitude of their opponents is. The decision of impartial tribunals can not but have great influence, and will form the public opinion of the world. The period of delay itself will abate heat and induce calmer views. It is the successful practice of arbitration that leads to its adoption.

...

To make arbitration useful, the state of mind of nations in regard to arbitration should be that of the strict and orthodox Puritans, that one must be willing to be damned if he would be saved. Practice in arbitrations produces this state of mind and this confidence in the method, the League enforces this practice, the educational effect of which upon nations in showing the possibility of such peaceful settlement of disputes will be invaluable. The procedure will become as of course and the habit of such settlement will be formed.

But the Pacifist asks why use force at all. Why is not a general agreement by all the world to arbitrate enough? The belligerent nations will not regard mere promises an adequate guaranty. They will insist on adding as a sanction the fear of international police. Every domestic community, however law-abiding its citizens, provides a police force to suppress disturbers of the peace. Many people would never create disturbances, but others would do so, unless they knew that police representing the full power of all for the common good would restrain them.

The potential existence of a police force of such overwhelming nature as the united armies and navies of the world

would furnish, and the threat of destructive isolation by a withdrawal of all commerce with all neighbors, would, except in rare cases, accomplish the purpose of this organization of world force without its use.

A second reason why the agreement to contribute to an international police force is a great improvement over a mere general treaty to arbitrate all differences between all nations is that where no force is behind a treaty as a sanction, no one is especially interested in the performance of the treaty except the two nations who have a difference.

If one of the two nations fails or refuses to arbitrate as agreed, the other nations, though signatories to the treaty, look on and are sorry, but they have no responsibility or motive which leads them to exert pressure upon the recalcitrant nation. In our League, however, every member in order to avoid contributing to the police, is deeply interested to secure peaceful compliance with the procedure. This motive will arouse a world public opinion, having an ever operating and selfishly active influence. The diplomatic pressure that all those not in the quarrel will thus bring to bear on those who are, will be most effective to prevent hostilities.

The Monroe Doctrine does not grow out of rules of international law. It is a policy to be pursued in our own interest and to be maintained by us by force if questioned. No nation can deny our legal right to exclude whom we will from our shores, or to deny to whom we will our citizenship unless we have contracted these rights away. If it is said that such questions might nevertheless be held by the International Court to be of a legal nature, they are so clearly not in that category that a specific provision defining them as non-justiciable issues could, doubtless with the consent of all the powers, be inserted in the Treaty. If therefore we do not accept the recommendation of compromise, on the Monroe Doctrine or our Immigration policy, honor will not require us to acquiesce in it. Thus we shall be no worse off as to such issues than if we had not entered the League. Neither the delay nor the hearing would prejudice us because we are now under treaty obligation with most of the world not to begin hostilities for a year after the issue arises, and to have an investigation by an impartial tribunal meantime.