THE MONROE DOCTRINE AND THE PROGRAM OF THE LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE1

There have been some arguments against the platform of the League to Enforce Peace. One of the most frequently advanced of these arguments is that the carrying out of the platform of the League would violate the so-called Monroe Doctrine. These words, the Monroe Doctrine, have been used to designate or to conceal such a variety of ideas and practices that it is necessary to start with some premise as to what the Monroe Doctrine may be.

If the Monroe Doctrine is, as Professór Bingham says, an "obsolete shibboleth," it is clear that the relation of the platform of the League to its content would be one of historical and speculative interest only. If on the other hand it is, as Mr. Pétin says, the substitution by the United States of an "American law for the general law of nations," the relations of the Monroe Doctrine to the platform of the League would be a fundamental question. If the Monroe Doctrine is an assertion of the "supremacy of the United States in the Western Hemisphere" or "supremacy in political leadership," there would also be reason for careful deliberation. A careful investigation would, however, show that the Monroe Doctrine is not a part of international law.

The statement of the Doctrine has varied. Early discussions in the cabinet before the Doctrine was set forth in Monroe's message seem to have been as lively as some later ones upon the same subject. Jefferson, when consulted upon the advisability of a policy which would not "suffer Europe to intermeddle with cis-Atlantic affairs," comparing the Declaration of Independence with this doctrine, said: "That [the Declaration] made us a nation, this sets our compass and points the course which we are to steer through the ocean of time opening on us." In the early days of the Monroe Doctrine the aim was to avoid further European interference in American affairs. Later, par

1 By George Grafton Wilson, professor of international law at Harvard University. Read at the first National Assemblage of the League to Enforce Peace at Washington on May 26, 1916, under the general topic "Practicability of the League Program." Reprinted from the World Peace Foundation, vol. vi. No. 4, August, 1916.

ticularly from the days of President Polk, the Doctrine assumed a more positive form. Bismarck is reported to have called the Doctrine a piece of "international impertinence." In 1901 President Roosevelt in his annual message declared: "The Monroe Doctrine should be the cardinal feature of the foreign policy of all the nations of the two Americas, as it is of the United States," and in 1904 that "the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence to the exercise of an international police power." President Taft intimated in his message in 1909 that "the apprehension which gave rise to the Monroe Doctrine may be said to have already disappeared and neither the doctrine as it exists nor any other doctrine of American policy should be permitted to operate for the perpetuation of irresponsible government, the escape of just obligations or the insidious allegation of dominating ambitions on the part of the United States."

The construction of the Panama Canal gave rise to new problems. The rumor that foreigners were making purchases of land about Magdalena Bay in Mexico led to pronouncements in the United States Senate in 1912, that the United States could not view foreign possession of this or any such harbor "without grave concern" and it was admitted that this is a "statement of policy, allied to the Monroe Doctrine of course, but not necessarily dependent upon it or growing out of it."

As in the early days the United States considered it within its rights to assert a policy defensive in its nature but for the preservation of its well-being, so in later days the same general policy has taken differing forms. President Wilson early in his administration endeavored to assure the Americas of his desire for the cordial cooperation of the people of the different nations, and a little later he asserted, "we are friends of constitutional government in America; we are more than its friends, we are its champions"; and, in the same message, he declared that the United States "must regard it as one of the duties of friendship to see that from no quarter are material interests made superior to human liberty and national opportunity." President Roosevelt had in 1901 asserted that the Doctrine referred not merely to European but to "any non-American power." This was recognized abroad, as Sir Edward Grey said in 1911 of the

United States: "They had a policy associated with the name of Monroe, the cardinal point of which was that no European or non-American nation should acquire fresh territory on the continent of America."

In December, 1913, Mr. Page, the American Ambassador to Great Britain, announced a late form of policy, saying: "We have now developed subtler ways than taking their lands. There is the taking of their bonds, for instance. Therefore, the important proposition is that no sort of financial control can, without the consent of the United States, be obtained over these weaker nations which would in effect control their government."

These and many other views as to the significance of the Monroe Doctrine show the varying forms in which the United States has stated its opposition to the permament occupation of territory or acquisition of political control in the American hemisphere by non-American powers. It has seemed necessary to present these differing ideas of the Monroe Doctrine to show that it is not law and to show that, as a manifestation of policy, it is not set forth in any single formula.

As single nations and as groups of nations have policies which vary in different parts of the world, and as the conflict of policies rather than the violation of established law is the frequent cause of international differences, it is evident that, if the League to Enforce Peace cannot provide any aid in case of conflict of policies, its function will be comparatively restricted. The conflict of policy would rarely take a form which would make justiciable methods practicable as a means to settlement.

This being the case, reference of such matters would be to the council of conciliation provided for in the second article of the platform of the League to Enforce Peace. The first article provides for justiciable questions and the second states:

"All other questions arising between the signatories and not settled by negotiation shall be submitted to a council of conciliation for hearing, consideration and recommendation."

A dispute in regard to the Monroe Doctrine or involving its principles, whatever they may be, would surely be included in the agreement made by the United States to refer disputes "of every nature whatsoever" to an international commission for in vestigation and report. This principle has had indorsement by

leaders in preceding administrations as well as in the action upon these treaties by the present administration, and is therefore not to be regarded as embodying partisan policies. The United States is already bound to act as regards the Monroe Doctrine in disputes which may arise with most states in a fashion in exact accord with the second article of the platform of the League to Enforce Peace. The aim of the League is secured when the question which negotiation has been unable to settle is submitted "for hearing, consideration and recommendation," and it makes little difference whether the body to which it is submitted is called an "international commission" or a "council of conciliation."

If, then, the United States and thirty or more nations are already bound to the principle of the second article of the League's platform so far as the Monroe Doctrine and other matters are subjects of dispute, there would seem to be no reason for raising the question of the practicability of that part of the program at the present time. Its practicability has already been formally declared, and, as embodied in treaty provisions, is a part of the law of the land.

Any further discussion as to the practicability of the application of the League's program to differences arising in regard to the Monroe Doctrine would involve the question as to whether treaties already made will be observed when put to the test. Put concretely the question may be, will the United States, which has made treaties with certain states agreeing to submit to an international commission disputes "of every nature whatsoever," find it practicable to submit a dispute arising in regard to the Monroe Doctrine to such a commission, or will the United States disregard the treaty, and did the United States so intend in making the treaty. It is to be hoped, and it must be believed, that these treaties were made in good faith and that the parties to the treaties intend to observe their provisions. It has been announced that the United States proposes to observe in principle toward other nations not parties to such treaties the conduct prescribed in these treaties. These treaties are called treaties for the "Advancement of Peace" and declare as their object "to contribute to the development of the spirit of universal peace" or "to serve the cause of general peace." Accordingly, the enforcement of these treaties is regarded by these states as at least desirable for the sake of peace.

Under the general practice and law of nations the violation of a treaty may be a just cause of war. If this be so, then it is particularly essential that treaties for "the development of the spirit of universal peace" be kept. It would seem to be a simple proposition that the greater the risk of violation of a treaty the less ready a state will be to violate the treaty. This principle generally prevails, though at times states disregard all risks. If there is behind a treaty the compelling force of the fact of a signed agreement and the physical resources of the other signatory only, the fact of the agreement seems often, even in modern times, to have had little weight, and the sole deterrent seems to have been the physical power which might be felt if the agreement was not observed. This has given rise to the maxim often quoted that "a treaty is as strong as the force behind it." There is undoubtedly some truth in the maxim. The program of the League to Enforce Peace proposes to adopt what is beneficial in the maxim and to put behind treaties a degree of force which weak states might by themselves be unable to command. If, under the provision by which the United States and other states have agreed to refer to an international commission all differences, there is a reservation as regards matters affecting the Monroe Doctrine, this reservation is not expressed or implied.

In brief, the United States would be obliged, so far as members of the League were concerned, to do exactly what it is now obliged by treaty agreement to do with most of the states of the world; and, as these treaty states would probably be the members of the League, the conditions would be changed in no respect, except that behind the treaty obligation would be the sanction of the justified use of economic and military force in addition to other sanctions.

Further, it may be said if, when in dispute, the Monroe Doctrine as applied by the United States is not a policy upon which the United States is willing to await hearing, consideration and recommendation, then the United States has not acted in good faith in signing these recent treaties; and it may also be said, if the American policy as embodied in the Monroe Doctrine will not stand the test of investigation and consideration, that it is time for the United States to be determining why it should longer give to the Doctrine its support.

As the plan of the League for submssion of controversies