enemy scouts kept up a running fight. One scout attacking from in front was driven off by the leader's observer firing over the top plane. No. 104 Squadron was attacked at a long range fifteen miles over the lines. The enemy was driven off. Fifteen hostile machines heavily attacked over the objective and followed the formation back for seventy miles. Near the lines the formation was again attacked by seven hostile machines. Over two tons of bombs were dropped at Mannheim in this raid. On the night of Sept. 16-17 seven HandleyPage machines were missing. Five of these, detailed for Cologne and Mannheim, were probably unable to return in the face of a strong southwesterly wind, which increased after the machines had left the ground. The missing machines undoubtedly attacked various objectives well into Germany before they had to land. It was reported that one machine landed in Holland with engine trouble, after having dropped its bombs on Bonn, and was interned. On Sept. 25 No. 110 Squadron, led by Captains A. Lindley and A. C. M. Groom, dropped over 11⁄2 tons of bombs on Frankfort. They were opposed by a large number of hostile machines, two of which they destroyed. Four of our machines did not return, and, in addition, one observer was killed and one observer and one pilot were wounded. This was the first long-distance raid carried out by this squadron. On the night of Oct. 21-22 machines of Nos. 97 and 100 Squadrons attacked the railways at Kaiserslautern in very bad weather. Several 1.650-pound bombs were dropped, but bad visibility obscured the results. One very large fire and five smaller ones were observed, and all these fires were seen to be still burning when the town was lost sight of in the mist. I would like to bring to your notice the work of bombing aerodromes done by No. 100 Squadron, commanded by Major C. G. Burge, when it was equipped with the shortdistance F.E. 2b machines, and also with Handley-Pages. The squadron bombed aerodromes from low heights, and photographs show that a large number of sheds were hit. The Independent Force, at the request of Marshal Foch, co-operated with the American First Army in its attack on the St. Mihiel salient, and it further co-operated with the army by attacking important railway junctions behind the French lines in the combined offensive of Sept. 26. General Trenchard's dispatch ends with praise for the work of his entire staff, including Brig. Gen. B. B. Gordon, his Chief of Staff, and Colonel G. R. M. Church, his Army Troops Commander. Official figures made public in Berlin on March 16 showed that 729 persons were killed and 1,574 injured by allied aerial attacks on German territory up to Nov. 6, 1918. Decrease in the Population of France Official statistics show that the civilian population of France in the four years of war decreased by considerably over three-quarters of a million, without including the deaths in occupied Northern France or the losses due directly to the war. In 1913 the births outnumbered the deaths by 17,000. But this slight excess disappeared in the following year, since which time the deaths have outnumbered the births-in 1914 by more than 50,000, and in 1915, 1916, and 1917 by nearly 300,000 in each year. The total excess of deaths over births for these four years is given as 883,160. Births, which numbered approximately 600,000 in 1913, dropped to 315,000 in 1916, and 343,000 in 1917, while the deaths increased, but not in comparable proportions, so that the total decrease in population was due to the great diminution in births, and not to any great increase in deaths. The statistics cover seventy-seven departments, excluding the eleven invaded departments and not including 1,400,000 persons killed in the war. Full Text of the British Field Marshal's Official Narrative of the Final Battles in France [SECOND HALF] HE first half of Sir Douglas Haig's official report of Dec. 21, 1918, covering the last six months of fighting in France, appeared in the preceding issue of CURRENT HISTORY MAGAZINE. The narrative is here continued in full to the conclusion at the time of the armistice: (33) THE HINDENBURG LINE Between St. Quentin and the village of Bantouzelle the principal defenses of the Hindenburg system lie sometimes to the west, but more generally to the east of the line of the Scheldt Canal. The canal itself does not appear to have been organized as the enemy's main line of resistance, but rather as an integral part of a deep defensive system, the outstanding characteristic of which was the skill with which it was sited so as to deny us effective artillery positions from which to attack it. The chief rôle of the canal was that of affording cover to resting troops and to the garrisons of the main defensive trench lines during the bombardment. To this end the canal lent itself admirably, and the fullest use was made by the enemy of its possibilities. The general configuration of the ground through which this sector of the canal runs produces deep cuttings of a depth in places of some sixty feet, while between Bellicourt and the neighborhood of Vendhuille the canal passes through a tunnel for a distance of 6,000 yards. In the sides of the cuttings the enemy had constructed numerous tunneled dugouts and concrete shelters. Along the top edge of them he had concealed well-sited concrete or armored machine-gun emplacements. The tunnel itself was used to provide living accommodations for troops, and was connected by shafts with the trenches above. South of Bellicourt the canal cutting gradually becomes shallow, till at Bellenglise the canal lies almost at ground level. South of Bellenglise the canal is dry. On the western side of the canal south of Bellicourt two thoroughly organized and extremely heavily wired lines of continuous trench run roughly parallel to the canal, at average distances from it of 2,000 and 1,000 yards respectively. Except in the tunnel sector the double line of trenches known as the Hindenburg line proper lies immediately east of the canal, and is linked up by nu merous communication trenches with the trench lines west of it. Besides these main features, numerous other trench lines, switch trenches, and communication trenches, for the most part heavily wired, had been constructed at various points to meet local weaknesses or take advantage of local command of fire. At a distance of about 4,000 yards behind the most easterly of these trench lines lies a second double row of trenches known as the Beaurevoir-Fonsomme line, very thoroughly wired and holding numerous concrete shelters and machine-gun emplacements. The whole series of defenses, with the numerous defended villages contained in it, formed a belt of country varying from 7,000 to 10,000 yards in depth, organized by the employment of every available means into a most powerful system, well meriting the great reputation attached to it. (34) THE BATTLE OF CAMBRAI AND THE HINDENBURG LINE (Sept. 27-Oct. 5) The battle of Cambrai, which on Oct. 5 culminated in the capture of the last remaining sectors of the Hindenburg line, was commenced by the First and Third Armies. Between the neighborhood of St. Quentin and the Scheldt the Fourth, Third, and First Armies in the order named occupied on the evening of Sept. 26 a line running from the village of Selency (west of St. Quentin) to Gricourt and Pontruet, and thence east of Villeret and Lempire to Villers Guislain and Gouzeaucourt, both exclusive. Thereafter the line continued northward to Havrincourt and Moeuvres, and thence along the west side of the Canal du Nord to the floods of the Sensee at Ecourt St. Quentin. On the First and Third Army fronts strong positions covering the approaches to Cambrai between the Nord and Scheldt Canals, including the section of the Hindenburg line itself north of Gouzeacourt, were still in the enemy's possession. His trenches in this sector faced southwest, and it was desirable that they should be taken in the early stages of the operation, so as to render it easier for the artillery of the Fourth Army to get into position. On the Fourth Army front, where the heaviest blow was to fall, the exceptional strength of the enemy's position made a prolonged bombardment necessary. I therefore decided that a very heavy bombardment, opened during the night of Sept. 26 and 27 along the whole front of all three armies, should be followed on the morning of Sept. 27 by an attack delivered only by the First and Third Armies. In this way the enemy might be deceived as to the main point of attack, the First and Third Armies would be enabled to get nearer to their final objective, and the task of the Fourth Army artillery would be simplified. (35) THE BATTLE OPENED On the morning of Sept. 26 French and American forces attacked on both sides of the Argonne, between the Meuse and the Suippe Rivers. At 5:20 A. M. on Sept. 27 the Third and First British Armies attacked with the 4th, 6th, 17th, and Canadian Corps in the direction of Cambrai on a front of about thirteen miles from Gouzeaucourt to the neighborhood of Sauchy Lestree. The success of the northern part of the attack depended upon the ability of our troops to debouch from the neighborhood of Moeuvres, and to secure the crossings of the Canal du Nord in that locality. The northern portion of the canal was too formidable an obstacle to be crossed in the face of the enemy. It was therefore necessary for the attacking divisions to force a passage on a comparatively narrow front about Moeuvres, and thereafter turn the line of the canal further north by a divergent attack developed fanwise from the point of crossing. This difficult manoeuvre was carried out successfully, and on the whole front of attack our infantry, assisted by some sixty-five tanks, broke deeply into the enemy's position. The attack proceeded according to plan from the commencement. On the right strong resistance was encountered at Beaucamp. Several strong counterattacks were made during the day in this neighborhood, but in spite of them troops of the 5th and 42d Divisions successfully established the right flank of our attack between Beaucamp and Ribecourt. The 3d Division moved forward with the guards, forcing the crossings of the canal in face of heavy fire from machine guns and forward field guns and captured Ribecourt and Flesquieres. The Guards Division (Major Gen. T. G. Matheson) took Orival Wood and reached the neighborhood of Premy Chapel, where the 2d Division (Major Gen. C. E. Pereira) took up the advance. In the centre the 52d Division, (Major Gen. F. J. Marshall,) passing its troops across the canal by bridgeheads previously established by the 37th Division, on the opening of the assault carried the German trench lines east of the canal and gained the high ground overlooking Graincourt. On their left the 63d Division and the 4th and 1st Canadian Divisions (under command of Major Gen. Sir D. Watson and A. C. MacDonell) moved under cover of darkness down the west bank of the canal between Moeuvres and Sains-les-Marquion. In the half light of dawn these three divisions stormed the line of the canal itself, and advanced on Graincourt, Anneux, Bourlon, and the slopes to the north of the latter village. As soon as the line of the canal had been secured our engineer troops commenced the construction of bridges, completing their task with remarkable speed and working with great gallantry under the fire of the German guns. Greatly assisted by their efforts, our advance continued. Obstinate resistance was met with at Graincourt, and it was not until late in the day that the village was finally surrounded and captured by the 63d Division. The 57th Division (Major Gen. R. W. R. Barnes) meanwhile had passed through and carried the line forward east of Anneux to Fontaine-Notre-Dame. Bourlon had been carried by the 4th Canadian Division, and the 3d Canadian Division (Major Gen. F. O. W. Loomis) had passed through at Bourlon Wood, which was wholly in our possession. On the left the 1st Canadian Division, having seized Sains-les-Marquion early in the attack, advanced with the 11th Division (Major Gen. H. R. Davies) and took Haynecourt, while the latter division captured Epinoy and Oisy-le-Verger. On the extreme left the 56th Division of the 22d Corps crossed the canal and, having cleared Sauchy Lestree and Sauchy Cauchy, moved northward toward Palluel. At the end of the day our troops had reached the general line Beaucamp-Ribecourt-Fontaine-Notre-Dame-east of Haynecourt-Epinoy-Oisy-le-Verger, and had taken over 10,000 prisoners and 200 guns. Next day the advance on this front was continued, and Gouzeaucourt, Marcoing, Novelles-sur-l'Escaut, Fontaine-Notre-Dame, Sailly, and Palluel were taken. At Marcoing our troops established themselves on the east bank of the Scheldt Canal and on the northern flank entered Aubencheul-au-Bac. (36) THE HINDENBURG LINE BROKEN The heavy and continuous bombardment opened on the morning of Sept. 27 had been maintained by the Fourth Army along its whole front without intermission for two days. The intensity of our fire drove the enemy's garrisons to take refuge in their deep dugouts and tunnels, and made it impossible for his carrying parties to bring up food and ammunition. At 5:50 A. M. on Sept. 29, under an intense artillery barrage, General Rawlinson's Fourth Army attacked on a front of twelve miles, between Holnon and Vendhuille, with the 9th, 2d American (General G. W. Read commanding) and 3d Corps, a strong force of tanks, manned by British and American crews, accompanying the infantry. On the right of the Fourth Army the French First Army continued the line of attack in the St. Quentin sector. On the left the 5th and 4th Corps of the Third Army had attacked at an earlier hour between Vendhuille and Mar coing, and had heavy fighting about Villers Guislain, Gonnelieu, and Welsh Ridge. On the Fourth Army front, the 46th Division (Major Gen. G. F. Boyd) greatly distinguished itself in the capture of Bellenglise. The village is situated in the angle of the Scheldt Canal, which, after running in a southerly direction from Bellicourt, here bends sharply to the east toward the Le Tronquoy Tunnel. Equipped with lifebelts, and carrying mats and rafts, the 46th Division stormed the western arm of the canal at Bellenglise and to the north of it, some crossing the canal on footbridges which the enemy was given no time to destroy, others dropping down the sheer sides of the canal wall, and, having swum or waded to the far side, climbing up the further wall to the German trench lines on the eastern bank. Having captured these trenches, the attacking troops swung to the right and took from flank and rear the German defenses along the eastern arm of the canal and on the high ground south of the canal, capturing many prisoners and German batteries in action before the enemy had had time to realize the new direction of the attack. So thorough and complete was the organization for this attack, and so gallantly, rapidly, and well was it executed by the troops, that this one division took on this day over 4,000 prisoners and 70 guns. On the remainder of the front, also, our attack met with remarkable success. South of Bellenglise, the 1st Division, (Major Gen. F. P. Strickland,) with the 6th Division covering their flank, crossed the ridge northwest of Thorigny and reached the west end of the Le Tronquoy Tunnel. Here they gained touch with the 32d Division, who had passed through the 46th Division and taken Lehaucourt and Magny la Fosse. North of Bellenglise the 30th American Division, (Major Gen. E. M. Lewis,) having broken through the deep defenses of the Hindenburg line, stormed Bellicourt and seized Nauroy. On their left the 27th American Division (Major Gen. J. F. O'Ryan) met with very heavy enfilade machine-gun fire, but pressed on with great gallantry as far as Bony, where a bitter struggle took place for the possession of the village. Fighting on the whole front of the 2d American Corps was severe, and in Bellicourt, Nauroy, Gillemont Farm, and at a number of other points amid the intricate defenses of the Hindenburg line, strong bodies of the enemy held out with great obstinacy for many hours. These points of resistance were gradually overcome, either by the support troops of the American divisions or by the 5th and 3d Australian Divisions (Major Gens. Sir J. J. T. Hobbs and J. Gellibrand) which, moving up close behind the American troops, were soon heavily engaged. On the left of the attack the 12th and 18th Divisions cleared the slopes above Vendhuille. Meanwhile, the Third Army captured Masnières and secured the crossings of the Scheldt Canal between that village and the outskirts of Cambrai, while the Canadian Corps made progress northwest of that town, taking St. Olle and Sancourt. For the next two days our attacks continued on all fronts. On Sept. 30 the gap in the Hindenburg line was enlarged by the capture of Thorigny and Le Tronquoy by the 1st and 32d Divisions, thus securing possession of the Le Tronquoy Tunnel. On this day the enemy abandoned Villers Guislan and Gonnelieu, being threatened with envelopment, and withdrew behind the Scheldt Canal. Next day the 9th and Australian Corps attacked in conjunction with the French First Army, who occupied St. Quentin. Levergies was taken by the 32d Division and Australian troops captured Joncourt, Estress, and Bony, establishing our line well to the north and east of the latter village. In the Cambrai sector the New Zealand and 3d Divisions took Crevecoeur and Rumilly, while north of Cambrai the Canadian Corps cleared the high ground west of Ramillies and entered Blecourt. The fighting on the Canadian front at this period was particularly severe, and our troops displayed great courage and determination. The enemy employed large forces, amounting to at least eleven divisions in the space of five days, in his attempt to check our advance, and counterattacked frequently and in strength. (37) MONTBREHAIN AND During the first week of October the Cambrai battle was completed by a series of successful minor operations, in which the breach driven through the Hindenburg line, and such prepared defenses as lay behind it, was widened. On Oct. 3 the Fourth Army attacked between Sequehart and Le Catelet and captured those villages and Ramicourt, together with the Beaurevoir-Fonsomme line on that front. In this operation the 50th Division took Gouy and Le Catelet after heavy and prolonged fighting, in which a number of counterattacks were beaten off. In the course of the next two days, other local improvements were effected in our line in this sector, and the villages of Montbrehain and Beaurevoir were captured after hard fighting, in which tanks did good service. Our advance compelled the enemy to evacuate the high ground about La Terriere, in the bend of the Scheldt Canal between Le Catelet and Crevecoeur, with the result that on Oct, 5 the right of the Third Army was able to cross the Scheldt Canal and occupy the Hindenburg line east of it, thereby greatly simplifying our arrangements for our next attack. (38) RESULTS OF BREAKING THE HINDENBURG LINE The great and critical assaults in which during these nine days of battle the First, |