there never had been reason to believe these divergencies were absolutely irreconcilable, but up to the time of the delivery of the memorandum, on April 14, by President Wilson, setting forth the American view, assurances had been given that the American delegation had not reached a definite decision regarding the Italian question.

There were certainly divergencies of views between the two Governments, (Italy and the United States,) but never did I believe that such differences were irreconcilable. Indeed, until, April 14, when the American memorandum was delivered to us, I had always been assured that the American delegation had not reached any definite conclusions regarding us. Several times I stated with firmness consistent with courtesy that the program of the Italian territorial claims was based on essential cardinal points of acceptance, which was an absolute condition for the Italian Government.

This is, synthetically, the history of the activity of.the Italian delegation from the middle of March to April 13, when the convocation of the German delegates was agreed upon, with a reserve provision.

On April 14 I had two long conversations with President Wilson, in which the whole Italian territorial question was profoundly discussed. Mr. Wilson concluded by handing me a memorandum, saying it represented the decision of the American Government on the question, and authorizing me to communicate the same to the Italian Parliament. I have distributed it today to all members.

President Wilson's message prevented us from refusing, as well as accepting, any proposal without first appealing to the Italian people and Parliament, which alone are entitled to pass judgment on the conduct and responsibility of the Italian Government.

This, therefore, is my duty-to ask before this National Assembly whether the Italian Government and delegation, acting as they did, were faithful interpreters of the thought and will of Parliament and the country.

THE ANGLO-FRENCH VIEW The point of view of England and France can be summed up as follows: They have always recognized with perfect loyalty the pledge of honor contained in the Treaty of Alliance between them and Italy, intending faithfully to respect it, but they have declared that as that treaty does not include, and, indeed, excludes, Fiume from the Italian claims, they do not concur with Italy on this question.

They would only admit the principle of making Fiume an independent free State, on condition, however, that this would occur as a compromise and not as an addition to the integral execution of the conditions of the treaty.

It only remains for me to expound further the Italian viewpoint. Italy firmly believes, before all, that her aspirations, as I set them forth in my answer to President Wilson's message, are founded on such high and solemn reasons of justice and right that they should be integrally accepted, even putting aside any international treaty or agreement. I need not repeat the reasons of historic rignt and national solidarity which are engraved in the heart of every Italian so that they become an absolute part of our nature.

I wish, however, to repeat a simple fact, to wit: That if all Italy's aspirations were accepted in their entirety, Italy would have, in proportion to her population, a number of inhabitants inferior to those assigned to other States as a consequence of the war. Therefore, the accusation of entertaining imperialistic sentiments grieves and offends us.

This nation, which certainly has given no proofs of cupidity in discussing the billions requested for reparation, and which has shown no excessive signs of emotion one way or another even when vast and rich territories had to be distributed in Africa and Asia among belligerents, and which has demonstrated that she prefers sentiment to utility until her attitude was a fault, has given the highest proof that she was fighting for her sacred rights.

Regaining in this hour all her energies and will and finding her reserves of enthusiasm and sacrifice inexhaustible, Italy has made it not a question of billions, nor colonies, nor rich territories, but the suffering cry of her own brothers.

Regarding relations between us and our allies, we esteem and love the generous people of France and England and the Governments which represent them. Perhaps we love and esteem them too much, so that we may not be sure that we will realize our rights, which come from contracts which pledge them and their honor. It must also be considered that in making these relations there is a sentiment which must be maintained between friend and friend, and Italy, perhaps, measured according to her contract the extent of the sacrifices which the war imposed.

EARLIER MEMORANDUM

President Wilson's memorandum of April 14, to which Signor Orlando referred in the foregoing speech, was in part as follows:

Personally, I am quite willing that Italy should be accorded along the whole front of her nothern frontier, and wherever she comes into contact with Austrian territory, all that was accorded her in the so-called Pact of London, but I am of the clear opin. on that the Pact of London can no longer

apply to the settlement of her eastern boundaries.

It is with these facts in mind that I have approached the Adriatic question. It is commonly agreed, and I very heartily adhere to the agreement, that the ports of Trieste and Pola, and with them the greater part of the Istrian Peninsula, should be ceded to Italy, her eastern frontier running along the natural strategic line established by the physical conformation of the country-a line which it has been attempted to draw with some degree of accuracy on the attached

map.

Within this line on the Italian side will lie considerable bodies of non-Italian populations, but their fortunes are so naturally linked by the nature of the country itself with the rest of the Italian people that I think their inclusion is fully justified.

There would be no justification in my judgment in including Fiume, or any part of the coastline to the south of Fiume, within the boundaries of the Italian Kingdom. Fiume is by situation and by all the circumstances of its development not an Italian, but an international, port serving the countries to the east and north of the Gulf of Fiume.

Just because it is an international port and cannot with justice be subordinated to any one sovereignty, it is my clear judgment that it should enjoy a very considerable degree of genuine autonomy, and while it should be included no doubt within the customs system of the new Jugoslavic State, it should nevertheless be left free in its own interest, and in the interest of the States lying about it, to devote itself to the service of the commerce which naturally and inevitably seeks an outlet or inlet at its port.

The States which it serves will be new States. They will have complete confidence in their access to an outlet on the sea. The friendship and the connections of the future will largely depend upon such an arrangement as I have suggested, and friendship, co-operation, and freedom of action must underlie every arrangement of peace if peace is to be lasting.

I believe there will be common agreement that the Island of Lissa should be ceded to Italy, and that she should retain the port of Volpna. I believe that it will be generally agreed that the fortifications which the Austrian Government established upon the islands near the eastern coast of the Adriatic should be permanently dispensed with under international guarantee, and that the disarmament which is to be arranged under the League of Nations should limit the States on the eastern coast of the Adriatic to only such minor naval forces as are necessary for policing the waters of the islands and the coast. These are conclusions which I am forced to by compulsion of the understandings which underlie the whole initiation of the present peace. *

At the very outset we shall have avoided the fatal error of making Italy's nearest

neighbors on her east her enemies, and nursing just such a sense of injustice as has disturbed the peace of Europe for generations together, and played no small part in bringing on the terrible conflict through which we have just passed.

VOTE OF CONFIDENCE

After hearing Premier Orlando's speech the Italian Chamber of Deputies voted confidence in the Cabinet by a ballot of 382 to 40, the latter votes being cast by Socialists. The following day (April 30) this vote in the Chamber was followed by a similar vote, in this case unanimous, in the Italian Senate.

After this double confirmation of the Cabinet's course the popular excitement in Italy somewhat abated. The dominant note of expectation implied that the Italian delegates would return to the Peace Conference with increased authority. The same note was struck in several of the leading papers. The Tribuna stated that President Wilson's appeal to the Italian people had been answered. The Popolo Romano declared that the five great powers must agree on the Italian question, or Italy would be obliged to act independently. Other papers attacked President Wilson less vehemently. Thomas Nelson Page, the American Ambassador to Italy, had a long interview on April 30 with Premier Orlando and Foreign Minister Sonnino, after which he sent a telegraphic report to Paris, giving a full account of the point of view of the Italians and the Italian Government.

It was stated from Paris on April 29 that the British Prime Minister had intervened in the Italian situation by sending one of his trusted associates to communicate personally with Premier Orlando in Rome. The representative, it was said, bore a message advising Signor Orlando against the inclusion of Fiume under Italian control as likely to make a settlement difficult if not impossible.

DELEGATION'S ACTIVITY IN ROME

After the resolution of confidence passed by the Italian Parliament at Rome on April 29 upholding the OrlandoSonnino Government in the policy pursued at the Peace Conference, Italy set

tled down to what might be described as a state of anxious waiting. The resolution was interpreted in Paris as a signal of conciliation, because it made no specific mention either of Fiume or Dalmatia, but spoke only in general terms of the rights of Italy. The language used had left scope for Orlando's return to Paris.

The Italian delegates, meanwhile, did not remain idle in Rome. On April 30 the delegation met under the chairmanship of Orlando, after conferences held by the Premier with the King and the American Ambassador, Thomas Nelson Page. Other meetings held in Rome with Mr. Page, Mr. Griffiths, former Parliamentary Under Secretary to the British Home Office, and Camille Barrère, the French Ambassador at Rome, brought progress in the direction of the eventual return of the Italian delegation to France. It was stated definitely in Paris on May 4 that the immediate cause of this return was an invitation sent to Orlando by the Council of Three, inviting him and his colleagues to resume their place at the Peace Conference; the previous week it had been announced that Premier Lloyd George had even sent a British representative to Rome to bring about such a return.

ITALIAN DELEGATION RETURNS

M. Clemenceau received word in Paris May 5 that the Italian delegation was leaving Rome on the evening of that day; this information was transmitted by the Italian Ambassador in Paris. Pending the delegation's arrival the Italian Ambassador was designated to represent Italy in the meeting of the Executive Committee of the League of Nations held on that date.

The French newspaper Le Temps stated that the Italian decision to return was taken spontaneously by the delegates after full discussions with the official

personages already named; another paper, La Liberté, said that the conferences with Ambassador Page and Ambassador Barrère were especially important in smoothing away the differences between the Italian and the allied point of view. Meanwhile the Italian credentials were forwarded by courier to the Conference, and arrived in time to be presented to the German delegation headed by von Brockdorff-Rantzau, thus formally reinstating Italy as among the nations included both in the Peace Treaty itself and in the League of Nations Covenant incorporated therein.

President Wilson, it appeared, had had no share in the invitation to the Italians to return; this invitation had been sent by the French and British Premiers alone. Subsequent events showed that the President had not changed his views on Fiume and Dalmatia, and that the Italians had, therefore, come back without any plenary assurance that their demands would be granted. This was confirmed on May 6 by the head of the Italian Press Bureau in Paris, who declared that Orlando and his colleagues were returning to Paris on their own initiative.

After its arrived at the Conference the Italian delegation remained in seclusion and gave out no statement to the press. Meantime the conferences regarding the Italian claims went on. Continuous discussion from May 15 to May 17 resulted in considerable concessions on Italy's part, including recognition of Fiume as a free city, and the giving up of important portions of Istria; also Italy's renunciation of her claims to the Greekpopulated Dodecanese Islands. The Italians, however, were still unwilling to yield Zara and Sebenico, on the Dalmatian coast. The final settlement had not been announced when this issue of CURRENT HISTORY went to press.

DR.

R. TRUMBICH, Foreign Secretary of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, issued a statement on April 9, 1919, with a view to having the case for which he stood brought to the attention of public opinion. He had on two or three separate occasions stated the claims of his people before the Peace Conference. On the first two occasions when he met the Council of Ten the Italians were present, and he and his fellownationals regarded this as unfortunate on the ground that the Italian delegates were in the position of being judges in their own case. In the chief meeting before the Council of Four the procedure followed was that Signor Orlando developed his case before the other three. He then retired, and Dr. Trumbich pleaded his cause. He said:

Our principal demand is, as the world knows, for the port of Fiume and for the eastern coast of the Adriatic Sea. Despite all that has been said, I would insist that Fiume is the only possible port that can serve our kingdom. Those taking a different view have suggested that our needs can be met by another port. As Spalato has been mentioned, I would point out that it is hopeless for our purposes. The port itself would have to be created. Fiume took the Hungarians fifty years to make, and Spalato has no proper port. Railways would have to be built, which would involve the cutting of tunnels as difficult as those running through the St. Gothard. In other words, unless Fiume is given to our kingdom our outlet to the sea cannot really exist, and we start our national life with our commerce strangled.

POPULATION OF FIUME

On all grounds Fiume belongs to us. Ethnographically it is ours. Take the official Austro-Hungarian statistics for 1910, which in themselves are hostile to us. It is there stated that there were in the city 24,212 Italians and 15,687 Jugoslavs. What is ignored is that Fiume is really joined up with the town of Sushak, and a tourist would not know when he was passing from one to the other. The population of Sushak consists of 658 Ital

ians and 11,706 Jugoslavs. Fiume and Sushak together, therefore, number 24,870 Italians and 27,393 Jugoslavs. It is unnecessary perhaps to do more than mention that historically Fiume is Croatian. In 1848 its inhabitants were 691 Italians and 11,581 Jugoslavs. The city has never entered into Italian history, the closest approach to this being its seizure by the Venetians in 1509. It was then, however, held only for a very short time.

I can put forward similar claims as regards the eastern shores of the Adriatic. All along the coast the population is predominantly Jugoslav, Italians being in a majority only in the town of Zara, while all the Dalmatian towns and islands and the whole hinterland are admittedly Jugoslav. The one obstacle to our claims is the existence of the secret agreement of 1915. Now we were no party to that agreement, and by the nature of things it cannot be regarded as binding. It was concluded at a time when it was partly expected that Russia would be granted Constantinople. For that reason it was natural-with the emergence of Russia as a Mediterranean power-that Italy should wish to be strengthened to meet any possible danger. By the nature of things it is for the Peace Conference to decide these territorial questions from the actual present-day standpoint, and if this is done I feel confident that our claims will be recognized as just.

SERBIAN MINISTER'S VIEW

A further exposition of the Jugoslav claims, covering aspects of the question not treated in the official pronouncement printed above, is contained in a statement by Yovan Yovanovitch, Serbian Minister to Great Britain, published on April 27:

Fiume is a point to which the routes from Zagreb (Agram) and Belgrade converge and gravitate. It is in a sense the natural sea outlet for all Croatia, Bosnia, Hungary, Serbia, Batchka, the Banat, Rumania, Bohemia, (Czechoslovakia,) Poland, and Austria.

To quote the official statistics of 1910, the town of Fiume had 24,212 Italian, 6,493 Hungarian, 2,315 German, and 15,687 Serbo-Croat inhabitants. These statistics were prepared by the Fiume Municipal Council, a body which was composed of

Hungarians and Italians, and was controlled by the Hungarian authorities.

Thus, after fifty years, the Hungarians were still trying to establish their hegemony in the town. By the actual number of their own inhabitants they were incapable of reaching their object, nor have they succeeded up to the present by means of emigrations or concessions to other

races.

Su

The suburbs of Fiume are Slavic. shak, the most important of them, is populated by 11,706 Slavs as against 658 Italians. The more outlying districts, including the Island of Veglia, are inhabited by Slavs only. The Hungarians and Italians form a wedge in the town proper.

Before the world war, all the powers Italy included, were in agreement about according Serbia access to the Adriatic. Now, after the termination of the war, this access to the sea has become more necessary than ever to the United Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, who number 12,000,000 and occupy a territory of 10,000 square miles. Not one Dalmatian or Croatian port-neither Split (Spalato) nor Chibenik (Sebenico) nor Dubrovnik (Ragusa) nor Kotore (Cattaro) nor Bari (Antivari)-possesses the same geographical advantage as Fiume. Above all, the port is linked to the various Jugoslav countries by railway. It also connects with the tributaries of the Danube and the Sava.

Fiume in the hands of Italy, which has already on the Adriatic the harbors of Ancona, Venice, Bari, and Brindisi, might, at a given moment, proauce an intolerable effect on the economic independence of the Triune Jugoslav Kingdom.

The Allies are making every effort as well as every combination imaginable to assure to inland States free access to the sea. Would it, in any circumstances, be just to take from the United Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes their natural outlet on the Adriatic?

ITALIAN CLAIMS

words the Italian case as presented by the Italians themselves.

After some prefatory remarks, the memorandum says that Italy went to war with two aims-the liberation of her oppressed sons and the attainment of safe frontiers by land and sea. Victory has cost her much more than she expected, and she is, therefore, all the less likely to repudiate the principles which determined her intervention. The concrete application of these principles might be summed up as the Alpine frontier, which includes the Upper Adige, the Trentino, and Julian Venetia, and an improvement of her Adriatic position which, without prejudicing the legitimate aspirations of the new State, will allow Italy to escape from the position of absolute inferiority and danger in which she finds herself.

The Treaty of London gives to Italy 6,326 square kilometers of the total area of Dalmatia, which is 12,085 square kilometers, and 44 per cent. of the population of Dalmatia, while of the whole coast from Fiume to the Boyana Italy will have only one-sixth. That is to say, the Jugoslav State will have six times as much of the coast as Italy, and will have more than half of the population and half of the total area of Dalmatia and its islands.

FIUME

The memorandum then turns to the special question of Fiume. Russia's defection imposed on Italy a much greater burden than that stipulated in the Treaty of London. American intervention did nothing to relieve the pressure on Italy, whereas on the western front it more than compensated for Russian defection. Not only Trieste but Fiume must cease to function in favor of indirect German domination of the Adriatic. Leaving on one side the damage to Trieste which would result from the competition of Jugoslav Fiume or of a Fiume not under Italian sovereignty and to the economy of the hinterland, resulting upon the inevitable attempt to deflect all of its trade to a non-Italian Fiume, it is necessary to insist on the anti-German part which Italy alone can play at Fiume, a part which can be played in such a way as to