ficult and dangerous work, as owing to the constant supervision which the line officers held over the men's quarters in and behind the trenches, and the frequent inspections by higher officers, it was almost impossible to conceal radical literature, and the militarists soon got wind of the movement and issued an order that any one found with an incriminating leaflet on his person

would immediately be executed after a drumhead court-martial. Many an innocent man was thus summarily compelled to face a firing squad for no other reason than that revolutionary literature was found in his bunk, although this may have been put there by a comrade who wished to avoid suspicion. Even men under the lightest suspicion were removed from the front and thrown into dungeons, where many of them languished for years without trial, until released during the first weeks of the revolution.

Far from suppressing the agitation, this violent method of dealing with the radicals only added fuel to the flames. The Spartacans gained so large a following in so short a time that the Government was forced to recognize the movement as a serious menace to its power. Certain centres became the foci of revolutionary agitation. Some of these, such as Spandau, where the great Government munition works were located, or Düsseldorf, in the heart of the coal region, soon became hotbeds of revolt.

THE KIEL REVOLT

But it remained for Kiel, at the outlet of the canal to the North Sea, to distinguish itself as the centre from which the revolution was to spread throughout the empire. The men at Kiel had plenty of time to think during the interals of their naval duties. After the battle of Jutland it was apparent even to the dullest stoker that the German fleet was hopelessly inferior to the British. The drill or practice cruises only signified disagreeable routine, which would never again lead to an active engagement. Speaking of the conditions leading up to the Kiel revolt, Captain Persius of the German Navy says in his book, "Tirpitz, der Totengräber der

deutschen Flotte," (Berlin: Koch & Jurgens, 1919:)

In the course of the war the situation became ever more acute. The high seas fleet was condemned to inaction. Demoralizing influences were exercised by the everlasting sameness of life aboard ship, the close quarters, the eternal drill, the Prussian militarism, i. e., the failure to comprehend the soul of the common sailor, failure to take personalities into consideration, and the unnecessarily stern punishments for the slightest transgressions; the gradually growing realization that all was in vain, that the fleet could not contend against the overwhelming superiority of the enemy, and especially that the U-boat war was a failure.

even

The beginning of 1917 found the army as well as the navy saturated with the spirit of revolution. The autocrats of Potsdam took alarm and the Kaiser issued his famous Easter message, which proclaimed the early "reform" of the Prussian three-class ballot law. Liberal thought had then grown SO strong that at Whitsuntide Wilhelm was compelled to amend his vague promise by a more definite statement that at the earliest possible moment the existing law would be superseded by one granting "the secret, direct, and universal ballot to my subjects of Prussia." It was too late for such palliatives, although too early for the revolution. So thought the Committee of Ten, but Liebknecht was of a different opinion. On his own responsibility he ordered a general strike for May Day of that year. A few thousand men and women in Berlin and its suburbs responded. Several thousand attempted to create a diversion by parading in the streets, but were easily dispersed by the police without the aid of the soldiers. While attempting to address a crowd on the Potsdamer Platz, Liebknecht was arrested, tried by court-martial, as he was an enlisted man, and sentenced to a long term in prison.

PLOT AND COUNTERPLOT

The attempted strike, which was openly of a revolutionary nature, created much alarm among the ruling powers. Their attention was soon directed to Kiel. An agent provocateur, an officer disguised as a warrant officer, was as

signed to Kiel station and soon wormed his way into the confidence of the men. However, the Committee of Ten was not to be caught napping; it also had its secret agents, and in no less exalted a position than the Admiralty Building on the Augusta Ufer in Berlin. The comImittee was informed of the counterplot of the Government spy and hastened to perfect its plans for a revolt and insurrection at the end of the campaign of 1917. Meantime the alleged warrant officer at Kiel was "accidentally " drowned during a practice cruise off Helgoland. He had, however, secured the names of several members of the Kiel Sailors' Council, and had reported them to Berlin. The conspirators were arrested and summarily shot without trial, and Ledebour's demands for an investigation by the Reichstag were repeatedly suppressed by special command of the "AllHighest."

Of the sixty-two members of the Sailors' Council twenty-eight met their fate in front of a firing squad. The survivors were not sure how much the Government had been able to learn concerning the details of their organization, and on consultation with the Committee of Ten and the various delegates of the Soldiers' Councils scattered throughout the army, it was decided to postpone activities until December, 1918, after the Autumn campaign had simmered down.

BOLSHEVIKI TAKE A HAND

In the meantime the committee received active assistance from an unexpected source. The Bolsheviki, on coming to power in Russia, began a worldwide propaganda for a universal revolution, and in Germany they found an organization ready at hand. A Bolshevist agent, in the guise of an ambassador, M. Joffe, took charge of the embassy on Unter den Linden, and truckloads of literature as well as four millions of rubles passed through that palatial structure to the hands which would employ them most effectively.

M. Joffe's activities were finally discovered and he was compelled to abandon the field within twenty-four hours, but his work was even then finished. It required only the match to set off the

powder-cask. On Oct. 5, 1918, the Chancellor, Prince Max, announced to the Reichstag that an armistice had been requested of the Allies. Eight days afterward the high-sea fleet was ordered to sail from Kiel on a practice cruise. The order was commonplace enough, but the amount of coal taken aboard was sufficient for a voyage of many weeks and aroused the suspicion of the men. Their doubts were confirmed later, when the Captain of the Margraf publicly boasted that the fleet was to attack the British naval forces, if necessary to seek them out in Scapa Flow itself. The report spread like wildfire among the men. They were to be sacrificed in a mad attempt to damage the British fleet to such an extent that England would not be in a position to impose severe terms on the defeated foe.

SUCCESSFUL MUTINY

The third squadron, including the Margraf, had in the meantime passed through the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal on the way to the North Sea. In spite of the well-filled bunkers, the ships were ordered to put in at Wilhelmshaven and take on more coal. Previous to this, deputations of the crews had visited the several commanders and informed them that although they were prepared to lay down their lives in defense of their native shores, under no circumstances would they engage in a mad enterprise involving the certain destruction of the fleet and the probable death of most of the men. They therefore refused to take the ships beyond the German mine fields.

Other preparations as well as the order to take on more coal convinced the men that, notwithstanding their protests, the desperate adventure was to be attempted. A deputation of the stokers on the Margraf sought out the Captain of the vessel and the Admiral of the squadron and informed their superiors that they would not load any coal in addition to the 2,600 tons already on board.

The commandant placed the refractory men under immediate arrest, but at the same time the squadron was ordered to return to Kiel lest the mutinous spirit infect the other ships lying off Wilhelmshaven. The Margraf and her consorts

arrived at Kiel on Oct. 31, and the imprisoned stokers, some thirty in number, were placed in irons and dragged through the streets of Kiel to the guardhouse. This needless humiliation, which made a public spectacle of the transport, instead of cowing the men, as was intended, merely added to their fury.

On Nov. 1 the Sailors' Council met at the Labor Union building in Kiel and resolved to liberate their comrades by force if necessary, and also to compel a cancellation of the orders to fight the British fleet. By this step they anticipated the revolution, which, as has been said, was intended by the Committee of Ten to start after the armistice had been signed, some time in December.

On nearing the guardhouse the mutinous sailors were opposed by a strong detachment of marines, between whom and the bluejackets the traditional ill-feeling existed. Nevertheless, the marines refused to obey orders after some desultory firing, and, abandoning their officers, went over to the mutineers. The combined force then attacked the guardhouse and liberated the men of the Margraf, as well as other prisoners, among them some of the men who had been betrayed in the Summer of 1917.

NOSKE'S ADVENT

Nov. 2 was characterized by street fighting between monarchist troops and the insurrectionists, and the latter did not assume a revolutionary character until the 3d; by that time they had greatly increased their number from the other ships in the harbor, and in many cases from detachments of soldiers who had been sent to subdue them. In the afternoon of the same day a powerful force stormed the fortress-like headquarters of the Commandant of the Port, took the Admiral and several members of his staff prisoners, and held them as hostages in the name of the Sailors' Council, which was then proclaimed as the supreme authority in the German Navy.

The same evening Gustav Noske hastened to Kiel from Berlin and the

next morning was chosen Commissioner of the People and Commandant of the Port. During the street fighting of those two days only seven men were killed, exclusive of officers. No report of the later losses was ever made, but many a private grudge was wiped out in blood, many an insult avenged, before Noske came to restore discipline. This man is a born leader, and under his strict but just rule the civilians as well as sailors and marines enjoyed an orderly regimen.

The events of the succeeding days followed each other with lightning-like switfness. Bremen, Wilhelmshaven, and Lübeck followed the example of Kiel on Nov. 4 and 5. Hamburg was infected with the spirit of revolt, and the Senate was forced to capitulate to the Workers', Soldiers' and Sailors' Council on Nov. 7. Alarmed at the terrifying occurrences, the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg proclaimed a constitution for his autocracy on the 6th, but it was too late. A few days afterward he was a fugitive without a crown, and the flames had spread to Potsdam and Berlin. The Kaiser fled ere yet the red flag had been hoisted in his old capital. Soldiers at the front and at home, men who had longed for peace these many weary years, hastened to proclaim their allegiance to the republic.

So swiftly had the overturning followed the revolt at Kiel that the Committee of Ten lost its hold on the organization. When the new Government was formed on Sunday, Nov. 9, the committee could only secure the three Commissionerships and one of the presidial seats in the Executive Council. Even these posts they were not to hold for long; a strange and malignant fate seemed to pursue them, and today only four of their number are still alive, two of them in prison. Yet when the history of the German revolution is written their names must head the chapter as the men who brought about the overthrow of the last stronghold of autocracy in Europe.

April, 1919.

S

UPPLEMENTARY to the publica

tion in the Deutsche Zeitung of the letters of the Kaiser and Crown Prince seeking to justify their conduct at the time of the German débâcle, a memorandum reproduced by Die Freiheit on April 5, 1919, throws fresh light on the decisive events leading up to the flight of the Kaiser and his son to Holland. This memorandum, written on Dec. 8, 1918, by Count von der Schulenburg, Commander of the Gardes du Corps Regiment, is summarized herewith:

Schulenburg says that he arrived at Spa on Nov. 9, where he found that all the Headquarters Staff were in a depressed state, and seemed to have almost lost their heads, Marshal von Hindenburg having just announced in a speech that revolution had broken out in Germany. When the necessity for the abdication of the Kaiser was pointed out to Count Schulenburg he rejected the idea, and said that the army was loyal to the Kaiser. He was thereupon invited to go with the others to the Kaiser's headquarters, where Marshal von Hindenburg, General von Plessen, General Marschall, General Groener, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Admiral von Hintze, and others were already assembled. Marshal von Hindenburg told the Kaiser that he must tender his resignation, because as a Prussian officer he could not say to his King what he had to say. To this the Kaiser replied: "We must see first."

General Groener thereupon declared in a long speech that the position of the army was desperate, and that Germany was in the hands of the revolution. Civil war, he said, threatened to break out at any moment in Berlin. The army was no longer reliable. In his view, and in that of Marshal von Hindenburg, a view which was shared by his divisional chiefs and Quartermaster General, the only salvation for the Fatherland lay in the immediate abdication of the Kaiser.

His Majesty then requested Count Schulenburg to give his view. The Count represented that the armies of the Crown Prince's Army Group were still firmly in the hands of their commanders. "At present," he declared, “in their thinned ranks, they are exhausted and overstrained and their one desire is. for an armistice and a rest. Once the armistice has begun, it will be extraordinarily difficult again to get the troops to fight the enemy. If, however, they can get a few days' rest it will be possible for the regimental commanders to get them in hand again and to influence them." Count Schulenburg also said that he did not believe the whole Western Army would march into Germany to suppress the revolution, but that he thought reliable troops, equipped with all modern fighting material, might first be sent to Aix-la-Chapelle and Cologne to restore order there, if necessary by force of arms. Summing up, Count Schulenburg said the Kaiser must not yield to force and must not abdicate. The Kaiser agreed to this view, and, taking Count Schulenburg aside, declared that he did not desire to abdicate and that Aix-laChapelle and Cologne must first immediately be recovered with the help of chosen commanders and specially good troops.

A long discussion followed, in which General Groener again and again declared that events had already gone so far that it was too late for such resolves.

The Kaiser then asked General Groener how he had come to this view regarding the feeling of the army. Schulenburg, he said, had given him an entirely contrary impression. To which the General replied that he was of another opinion. The Kaiser thereupon said, very sharply: "I desire from Marshal von Hindenburg and yourself the report, in black and white, but only when you have ascertained the views of all the Commanders in Chief." The Kaiser emphatically declared that in no circumstances

did he want civil war, and that he would never demand this of the army. He had only one wish, he said, namely, to take the army back home, united and in solid order. General Groener replied: "The army will march back home unitedly under its leaders and commanding Generals, but not under the leadership of your Majesty." Count Schulenburg again contradicted this view.

Marshal von Hindenburg then spoke again, saying that while every Prussian officer must doubtless hold the views expressed by Count Schulenburg, nevertheless all the reports from the homeland and the army made abdication an unavoidable necessity. Both he and General Groener could no longer undertake the responsibility for the reliability of the army. The Kaiser then closed the discussion with the words: "You must ask all my Commanders in Chief about the feeling in the army. If they report to me that the army is no longer loyal to my person, then I am ready to go, but not before."

While the discussion was taking place telephone messages from the Imperial Chancellery were continually arriving concerning the gravity of the situation in Berlin, and demanding the immediate abdication of the Kaiser. The last of these communications reported street fighting in Berlin.

These declarations made the deepest impression on the Kaiser, who was apparently resolved to sacrifice his person in order to avoid civil war. Count Schulenburg then told him that it could at the most be a matter of his abdication as German Kaiser and not as King of Prussia. The Kaiser agreed to his proposals, and said that he would in all circumstances remain King of Prussia and would not leave his army. General Groener laid considerable stress on his own opinion that, although such a decision might have saved the situation a fortnight earlier, it was now much too late. The Imperial Chancellor then telephoned that civil war was inevitable unless the Kaiser's abdication was announced within the next few minutes.

Marshal von Hindenburg, General Groener, and Admiral Hintze then went into the garden to make their report to

the Kaiser. Count Schulenburg himself received the Crown Prince, who had hurried to the scene, and asked him to persuade the Kaiser not to act with undue haste. The Crown Prince had a short conversation with his father, after which Colonel Heye made his report. Colonel Heye declared that all the army commanders said that the army could not be counted upon in the event of civil war. Count Schulenburg interjected, "No soldier would break his oath to the colors," to which General Groener replied, "The oath to the colors and the Supreme War Lord are only an idea.”

Admiral Hintze then came in with a telephone message that the situation in Berlin was extremely menacing. He himself must resign, he said, and the monarchy could not be saved any longer if the Kaiser did not abdicate immediately. The Kaiser then gave instructions that the Imperial Chancellor should be informed that he would abdicate as German Emperor, but would remain as King of Prussia and not leave the army. At this moment the chief of the Imperial Chancellery, Wahnschaffe, telephoned that the declaration of the Kaiser's abdication must be in Berlin within the next few minutes. In the afternoon, therefore, the Kaiser's abdication as German Emperor was telephoned by Admiral Hintze to Berlin. At 8:10 P. M. the declaration of abdication, as circulated by the Wolff Bureau, arrived in Berlin. The Imperial Chancellor had, however, already issued the decree, without awaiting receipt of the Kaiser's formal declaration.

The Kaiser, according to Count Schulenburg, received the news with deep emotion, but perfect kingly dignity. Count Schulenburg making a statement regarding the loyalty of the army, the Kaiser said he was King of Prussia and would remain so, and would not leave the army. When saying "Good-bye,"

he stated to Count Schulenburg: "I will remain with the army," but, at the conference which immediately followed, Hindenburg and General Groener declared that the Kaiser must leave headquarters and go to Holland, because they could not guarantee his safety even for an