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pact known as the Treaty of London. He said:
This secret treaty, the text of which we now know, denies by its very constitution and clauses our unity and national status in the interests of one of the Allies. In our opinion this is the sole reason for the nonrecognition hitherto by France, Great Britain, and Italy of the kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. If the pretext is given that peace is not yet signed and the frontiers are not yet demarkated, then the same pretext should apply in the case of Poland and Czechoslovakia, particularly as their participation in the war cannot even remotely be compared with the effort of our people and of the Serbian Kingdom, representing in the war our whole nation.
The grounds for Rumania's not having replied to the notification of the creation of our State will be found in another secret treaty. This treaty also violates our national territory. We regret, therefore, that there should be two weights and two measures in regard to an ally who has always been loyal and deserving.
Serbia has lost more than 290,000 soldiers who have been killed or have died of sickness, without counting the victims of the concentration camps. We regret that the Allies are treating as enemies some of our people who belonged formerly to Austria-Hungary, but who now form part of our new kingdom. Notwithstanding our respect for our friends and allies, we feel obliged to protest, on behalf of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, formerly a part of Austria-Hungary, who fought so heroically on the Saloniki and Dobrudja fronts and on behalf of the Jugoslav battalions who surrendered to the Italians in order to facilitate the advance of the allied army on this front.
ITALY'S CLAIMS CONTROVERTED
We shall not despair, however, as our claims arc justified by modern and sacred principles. We may hope for the full success of our national claims if President Wilson's principles are the true basis of the organization of Europe and
the world, and if the solemn proclama tions by the Allies on the equality of great and small nations and on the liberty of peoples have validity.
We are receiving unjustifiable reproaches while one of our allies, without Incurring blame, is continually advancing into Albania right up to our frontiers, although our contingents were the" first to arrive on the Mati and at Scutari, after driving off the enemy. No reproaches are made concerning the claims of another allied nation on the Western Banat in spite of its considerable foreign population, and although the Western Banant was never part of that country's national territory.
The Italian authorities are hoisting the Italian flag all over Dalmatia and are forbidding our national and State flags to appear. They insist on candidates for Government service making special applications, taking the oath of allegiance to Italy, and considering themselves as Italian officials. They are deporting notables. Misunderstandings, disagreements, and even conflicts must be the inevitable consequence of this abnormal situation. What must be the Impressions of this portion of our nation on learning that the Italian Premier affirms that Italy cannot remain deaf to the call of the most Italian town of Fiume, although we know that Fiume is a Croatian town and that it not only calls us but begs us to Incorporate it in its territory as soon as possible, as well as the whole of Istria and the Gorizla region? The great number of Italians in Trieste and Gorizia is not a sufficient reason for us to refuse this request, any more than the great number of Italians in New York would be a sufficient reason to deny the right of America to that town. The whole region of Trieste and Gorizia is really ours by right, as well as Bosnia and the Western Banat.
In conclusion M. Protitch said the Jugoslavs based their hopes upon the principles of national liberty and demanded the independent and impartial arbitration of America.
Montenegro and Serbia
The Mountain Kingdom's Protest Against Forcible Absorption by Serbia—Montenegro's Part in the War
MONTENEGRO'S complete union with Serbia and the kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was decided upon by the "National Assembly of Montenegro," and M. Pavitchovitch was appointed Montenegrin representative at Belgrade, according to a dispatch from the Serbian capital dated April 23, 1919. A message from Podgoritza further stated that 118 Deputies were present at the meeting.
This merging of Montenegro with Serbia has long been regarded by Serbian leaders as an accomplished fact; but King Nicholas of Montenegro, though an exile, still has many followers who are energetically protesting against what they consider compulsory amalgamation. Their side of the case is stated in a series of pamphlets by Yovan S. Plamenatz, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Montenegro. These documents, issued in Paris on March 5 as a memorandum addressed to the Peace Conference, tell in detail the part played by Montenegro in the European war, from the assassination of the Austrian Grand Duke at Serajevo in June, 1914, to Montenegro's capitulation to Austria in January, 1916. The memorandum narrates the course of events leading to the military occupation of Montenegro by Serbia, denounces alleged acts of injustice and cruelty committed by Serbia's representatives during this occupation, urges an investigation by the Peace Conference of Serbia's alleged wrongdoing, and puts forth certain territorial claims on historical, geographical, economic and linguistic grounds to Herzegovina, the mouths of Cattaro and Scutari.
HOW MONTENEGRO HELPED
As early as July 24, 1914, immediately following the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, the Montenegrin Government answered the appeal of M. Pashitch, head of the Serbian Government at Belgrade, in the following words:
Serbia can count on the fraternal, unlimited assistance of Montenegro in this critical moment for the Serbian people, as on all other occasions.
Montenegro declared war on AustriaHungary on Aug. 8, 1914, and a few days later on Germany. On Oct. 15, 1915, she declared war similarly on Bulgaria, announcing that "she considered the cowardly attack of Bulgaria against Serbia as having been committed equally against Montenegro." Her course, the memorandum implies, was imprudent, for she had neither food nor equipment. She mobilized all her effective troops, totalling 43,000 active belligerents, placed them under Serbian officers, and fought on the left wing of the Serbian Army.
The offensive of 1914 against Serajevo, capital of Bosnia, was effected by a column composed largely of Montenegrin troops. In the Autumn of 1914, when the Austrian General Potiorek undertook his great offensive against Serbia, and Belgrade and a large part of Serbia were invaded, forcing the Serbian Army to retreat before superior numbers, Montenegro was fighting on its own frontiers, in Bosnia, and even on Serbian territory. Two Austrian army corps were opposed to the Montenegrin forces- When Russian successes in the Carpathians became menacing, Austria sent two army corps from Serbia to that front; on this ground the Montenegrins hold that the subsequent victories due to this reduction of the Austrian forces opposed to Serbia were due to her.
Again, in the Autumn of 1915, Montenegro played an important part. Toward the beginning of October, Serbia underwent a frontal attack by the Austro-Germans commanded by Mackensen, while Bulgaria assailed her on the rear. The situation was critical. Serbia, because of the inactivity of the Balkans, was completely isolated. Only Montenegro came to her aid. Ferri Pisani, who accompanied the Serbian Army at this moment, in his book "The Serbian Drama," (Paris, 1916,) acknowledged the services rendered by Montenegro on this occasion.
MONTENEGRO'S HEROIC STAND
But it was in the last months of 1915 that Montenegro's " debt to Serbia " was most liberally paid. Mackensen's plan was to cut off the Serbian Army and make it prisoner. Bulgaria was to break the eastern front in Macedonia, near Veles and Uskub, and push on to Prizren; the Austrians were to break through the western, that is, the Montenegrin front. The Bulgarians attained their objective, taking Veles, Uskub, and Tetovo, and thus cutting off the Serbian retreat through Macedonia. Mackensen's plan would have succeeded if the Montenegrin front had been similarly broken. But Montenegro did not give way. For nearly three months Montenegro carried on a desperate and bloody conflict against the Austrians. The Serbian official communiques tell the story of that long resistance. The Serbian Army's line of retreat to the sea was thus kept open through Montenegro. In November, 1915, the Generalissimo of the Serbian Army sent a dispatch to Yanko Voukotitch, the Montenegrin General, saying: "If you succeed in checking the advance of the enemy, Montenegro will have paid her debt to Serbia." The debt was paid by an army destitute of munitions, clothing, and food, fighting on a front of 300 kilometers, 90 of which were on Serbian territory. In this war Montenegro lost 11,000 men; 8,500 were wounded.
The lack of food, the pamphlet declares, was the main cause of Montenegro's capitulation to Austria in January, 1916. During the years 1914-15 Montenegro was practically abandoned to her fate by the Allies. Envoys sent to Paris to obtain supplies were told that the Allies had included food for Montenegro in provisions assigned to Serbia; requests of Serbia were left unanswered; appeals to Russia were answered, but the food never reached Montenegro. The situation became critical. The King of Montenegro asked the advice of the allied representatives, who either positively or negatively counseled the asking of
an armistice. The Serbian Minister at Cettinje was emphatically in favor of an armistice. The King then left the country and went to Paris» the armistice was concluded.
This peace with the enemy was denounced by Serbia as an act of treason to the Serbian cause. As soon as the peace was requested, she recalled from Montenegro all the Serbian officers of the High Command. Colonel Pechitcli, the Serbian commander, promised to defend Scutari and the Boyana passage; this promise was not kept, and the retreat of the Montenegrin Army was completely cut off. The pamphlet accuses Serbia of perfidy, first, in persuading Montenegro to make peace; secondly, in betraying her on the occasion just described; and thirdly, in representing the peace with Austria in the Serbian press in the light of Montenegrin " treachery."
THE SERBIAN OCCUPATION
Following the armistice, this account continues, the Austrian troops left Montenegro. The Serbians then entered, accompanied by bands of agents and agitators. Thousands of pamphlets were distributed, defamatory, according to this statement, both of Montenegro and of her King. The Serbian troops and the comitadjis oppressed the Montenegrins both morally and physically. The nation was suffering from famine, which the Allies, owing to the machinations of the Serbians, made no effort to relieve. The Serbian Red Cross, says this writer, distributed food only to those Montenegrins who were pro-Serbian; only those Montenegrins were repatriated who upheld the Serbian cause; only those Government officials were paid who favored Serbia. Montenegrin officers were compelled to swear fidelity to the King of Serbia.
Then came the so-called election for a "Great National Skuptchina" to decide the fate of Serbia; the decree calling for the elections was signed by three individuals, of whom two were Serbs, and not Montenegrins, Svetozar Tomitch, Inspector in the Ministry of Public Instruction and chief of Serbian propaganda against Montenegro, and Peter Kossovitch, professor in a Serbian college. The "election " lasted only half a day; its decision, the Montenegrins declare, was prepared and compelled by coercive means. A directorate of five, three of whom had a criminal record, according to this account, was then appointed to "liquidate the affairs of Montenegro." And lastly, the Belgrade Government announced that "the union of Montenegro and Serbia was an accomplished fact." Against this whole procedure, this memorandum, reflecting the views of many Montenegrins, energetically protests, and calls on the Peace Conference to investigate the charges made against Serbia, which it declares to be irrefutable.
Montenegro, in this memorandum, holds that the Allies should have given her the right to send two delegates to the Peace Conference as one of the belligerant nations. Instead of this, one delegate was assigned to her, no more than was given to nations that simply broke off diplomatic relations with the Central Powers. Furthermore, she declares, her one delegate has never been invited to attend the sessions of the Conference. She proclaims herself as not averse to the Jugoslav coalition, but wishes this object to be attained by equitable and peaceful means. She wishes, above all, to be freed of the Serbian occupation, and to regain her sovereignty. In this connection she recalls President Wilson's message of Jan.
8, 1917, which included among the conditions of peace the restoration of Montenegro, as well as that of Belgium and Serbia, a promise confirmed by the other allied powers. And lastly she declares that historically, ethnically, linguistically, and economically, Montenegro should be united with Herzegovina, the Mouths of Cattaro, and Scutari.
Yovan S. Plamenatz, the author of the series of pamphlets summarized above, gave in Rome on April 7 an interview which paints a gloomy picture of conditions in Montenegro. After recapitulating the sacrifices of the Montenegrin people during the war, he continued as follows:
After all these sacrifices the Montenegrin people had to undergo the Serbian military invasion. I have not time to describe all the atrocities committed by them, otherwise I would have to talk until tomorrow. I will only tell you of one episode of which I was a witness.
The village of Mirzi, whose only fault was its faithfulness to Montenegro, was surrounded by Serbian troops and set afire. The inhabitants, thus rendered homeless, were driven away, while soldiers pursued them, striking them with the butts of their rifles. Many women had their heads crushed in. Four men were hanged on trees, to terrorize the people. An immense number of houses in Montenegro have been sacked and destroyed, while the Serbians have taken the futniture, food and everything the people possessed. The Serbian aim was to stifle forever the voice of Montenegro. Our country demands, first of all, the evacuation of the Serbian troops, then the integral restoration of our boundaries.
Greeks in the Balkans and Asia Minor
A New Ethnological Map
THE map given herewith was drawn by Professor George Soteriadis of the University of Athens with the object of correcting the " ethnological inaccuracies " of other maps of Greek population in the Balkan Peninsula and Asia Minor. This map takes not language, but what Professor Soteriadis calls "national consciousness," as the only satisfactory criterion of nationality. In accordance with this view, those
portions of the map that comprise Greek populations showing a distinct national feeling of solidarity, irrespective of language, religion or facial angle, are indicated in black. Thus the various scattered localities in Thessaly and Macedonia, where the Vlach dialect is spoken, are not given separate (non-Greek) coloring, but those Koutso-Vlach communities which regard themselves as outposts of the Rumanian Kingdom are regarded as Rumanians, and are not claimed by the Greeks. Other examples of the working out of this diagrammatic principle may be summarized as follows:
1. The Pomaks (Mohammedans speaking a Slavic language) are indicated in the original map by the same color as Turks, their national consciousness being Turkish. Similarly the Cretan Mohammedans are shown as Turkish.
2. A distinction is graphically shown
by this map between Macedonian Slavs to the east of the valley of the Struma who belong to the Orthodox Greek Church (Patriarchate) and those belonging to the Exarchate, (Bulgarian Church;) the same differentiation is shown for the Macedonian Slavs in Western and Central Macedonia. (It should be noted, says Professor Soteriadis, that in Macedonia language is such, an inadequate criterion that even Bui