ence of climate, habits and customs of economic opportunity, and industrial tradition make strict uniformity in the conditions of labor difficult of immediate attainment. But, holding as they do that labor remedies (probably error in transmission) be regarded merely as an article of commerce, they think that there are methods and principles for the rectification of labor conditions which all industrial communities should endeavor to apply so far as their special circumstances will permit.

Among these methods and principles the following seem to the high contracting parties to be of special and urgent importance:

First-The guiding principle above enunciated that labor should not be regarded merely as a commodity or article of commerce.

Second-The right of association for all lawful purposes by the employed, as well as by the employers.

Third-The payment to the employed of a wage adequate to maintain a reasonable standard of life as this is understood in the time and country.

Fourth-The adoption of an eight-hour day or a forty-eight-hour week as the standard to be aimed at where it has not already been obtained.

Fifth-The adoption of a weekly rest of at

least twenty-four hours, which should include Sunday whenever practicable.

Sixth-The abolition of child labor and the imposition of such limitations on the labor of young persons as shall permit the continuation of their education and assure their proper physical development.

Seventh-The principle that men and women should receive equal remuneration for work of equal value.

Eighth-The standard set by the law in each country with respect to the condition of labor should have due regard to the equitable economic treatment of all workers lawfully resident therein.

Ninth-Each State should make provision for a system of inspection, in which women should take part, in order to insure the enforcement of the laws and regulations for the protection of the employed.

Without claiming that these methods and principles are either complete or final the high contracting parties are of opinion that they are well fitted to guide the policy of the League of Nations, and that if adopted by the industrial communities who are members of the League and safeguarded in practice by an adequate system of such inspection, they will confer lasting benefits upon the wage earners of the world.

S

TANDING on the crest of Montfaucon, on the roof of the concrete observation post from which the German Crown Prince watched his troops attack Verdun in 1916, the visitor sees spread out before him an excellent panorama of the battlefield.

To the north is an unending series of rolling hills, covered here and there with patches of woods, each hill and each patch seemingly impregnable to attack. On the west towers the wooded massif Argonne Forest, impenetrable except by a few trails. On the east are the heights of the Meuse, dominated from the further bank of the river. Behind is the single bare peak of Vauquois, while to the southeast appear the heights made famous in the battle of Verdun-Hill 304 and Dead Man's Hill.

This battlefield, stretching between the forest and the Meuse, played a prominent rôle in the war from the beginning. In 1914, when the Germans, pouring south from Montmédy, reached the line on which the battle of the Marne was fought, the pivot of that line was the fortress of Verdun. Though they surrounded it on three sides, all their efforts to crush in this pivot failed. They did not make another attempt to reduce the formidable point of resistance until 1916, though in 1915 there was heavy fighting in that part of the Argonne Forest known as the Bois de la Grurie and around Vauquois.

The German attacks in 1916 were pivoted on two points, Montfaucon, west of the Meuse, and the twin heights of Ornes on the east. Attacking Feb. 21, they succeeded, after terrific losses, in getting as far as the forts of Douaumont and Vaux. They subsequently penetrated to the village of Fleury and even got close to Fort Souville, but were checked there.

On the left bank of the Meuse the Germans, beginning operations in May, 1916, set themselves the object of closing in on Verdun by capturing the formidable defensive positions of Hill 304 and Dead Man's Hill. They took them at great cost, but were unable to hold them.

The French saw the absolute necessity of disengaging the village of Fleury and, by a counter-attack, wrested it from the oe. Then, as the line had become stabilized, the French command believed the time ripe to launch a counter-attack to retake Douaumont and Vaux. This operation, carried out in October, 1916, under General Mangin, then a corps commander, was brilliantly successful. WHERE THE ADVANCE STARTED

Hill 304 and Dead Man's Hill, on the other side of the Meuse, were not finally cleared of the enemy until Aug. 20, 1917, when the Germans on the left bank were driven back to the exact positions from which they had started, running from Avocourt to the river near Forges. It

was from this line that the Americans advanced to the attack on Sept. 26, 1918. The old battleline from the Argonne to the Meuse may, then, be divided into two distinct parts. The western part ran from the western edge of the Argonne to Avocourt and had been stationary for four years until the Americans broke clean through it last September. The eastern part ran from Avocourt to the Meuse and had constantly fluctuated as a result of the vain German attempts to reduce Verdun.

Nowhere on the western front were the German defenses so formidable as between the Argonne and the Meuse. It was against this bristling mass of fortified positions-the Hindenburg line, Hagen Stellung, Völker Stellung, Kriemhilde Stellung, and Freya Stellung-that the American Army hurled itself in its supreme bid for victory.

All these lines of defense followed

the heights, depending on the natural strength of the positions on which they were built. The Hindenburg, Hagen, and Kriemhilde were the principal defenses; the others were local lines.

To win the war Germany felt that she must have undisturbed access to the coal fields of Northern France and Belgium, as well as to the iron mines of Lorraine. Therefore she had to build her defenses so as to cover these territories. In addition, it was imperative that she should protect the great double track (in places four track) railway from Lille to Metz along the Franco-Belgian frontier. This main transverse line of communicationor, as the French call it, the "voie de rocade -was fed in the north by the immense railroad system running through Liége, and in the south by the lines running through Luxemburg. These are the main arteries connecting France and Germany from the north

1st.-Major Gen. Charles P. Summerall.

Brig. Gen. F. E. Bamford.

Brig. Gen. Frank Parker.

2d.-Major Gen. John A. Le Jeune. 3d.-Major Gen. Beaumont B. Buck. 4th.-Major Gen. John L. Hines.

Major Gen. Mark L. Hersey. 5th.-Major Gen. John E. McMahon. Major Gen. Hanson E. Ely.

26th.-Major Gen. Clarence E. Edwards. Brig. Gen. F. E. Bamford. 28th.-Major Gen. Charles H. Muir. 29th.-Major Gen. Charles G. Morton. 32d.-Major Gen. W. G. Haan.

1st Corps. Divs. 77, 28, 35

78, 82, 1 77, 80

1

33d.-Major Gen. George Bell, Jr. 35th.-Major Gen. Peter E. Traub. 37th.-Major Gen. C. S. Farnsworth. 42d.-Major Gen. Charles T. Menoher. 77th.-Major Gen. Robert Alexander. 78th.-Major Gen. James H. McRae. 79th.-Major Gen. Joseph E. Kuhn. 80th.-Major Gen. A. Cronkhite. 81st.-Major Gen. C. J. Bailey.

82d.-Major Gen. George B. Duncan. 85th.-Major Gen. William M. Wright. 90th.-Major Gen. Henry T. Allen. 91st.-Major Gen. William H. Johnston.

42

and northeast, and it was along them that all German troops and supplies entered France.

When lack of man power compelled the German High Command to take into account the necessity of shortening the battleline, the question of carrying out successfully this shortening became allimportant. Owing to the fact that Holland juts southward into Belgium close to Liége, the great majority of German troops in France, it was foreseen, would be compelled to retreat by the southern rail artery described above. Therefore, the German front in the region of Verdun, opposite the American lines, must necessarily hold to the last if there was to be a successful withdrawal of the huge masses of German troops and material further west and north. It was to thwart such a withdrawal and bring about a situation where the Germans would face a disaster surpassing that which befell the French at Sedan, in this same region in 1870, that the Americans made their tremendous onslaught that did not terminate until the enemy,

Duration of the battle. Forces engaged

torn, broken, and without reserves, with lines of communication cut and all hope lost, begged for a cessation of hostilities.

SECRET PREPARATIONS

Preparations for the great battle were made by the Americans with the utmost secrecy. A few days before the date set they had taken over the sector from La Harazée, in the Argonne Forest, to the Meuse, near Forges. The American forces were disposed as follows:

The 1st Corps (77th, 28th, and 35th Divisions) lay between La Harazée and Vauquois. The 5th Corps (91st, 37th, 79th Divisions) held the line from Vauquois to a point close to Malancourt. The 3d Corps (4th, 80th, 33d Divisions) covered the sector from Malancourt to the Meuse.

The American plan of attack interlocked with that of the French on the left. Both armies were to strike hard blows against the vital German lines before them, thus helping the attacks of the British and French on the northern front. The Americans, and the French co-operating with them, were to drive

Divisions engaged

.631,405 .138,000

Villages and towns liberated..

attack

Total artillery ammunition fired. Prisoners captured

Material captured

Casualties

.313,078 rounds, (Sept. 26)

.3,408,725 rounds

316 officers, 15,743 men

468 guns, 2,864 machine guns, 177 trench

into the enemy's lines two deep salients on both sides of the Argonne Forest, which had been deemed impregnable to frontal assault. The salient to the west was to run from the eastern edge of the Bois de Forges through the heights south of Monthois to the Liry-OrfeuilMédéah Farm road, and was to be made by the French. The American Army objective was a line running from east of the Argonne Forest to Aprémont, Exermont, Romagne, Cunel, Brieulles, and the Meuse. The combined objective of the two armies ran by Monthois, Vaux-lesMouron, the Aisne to its junction with the Aire, the Aire to Chevières, St. Juvin and the ridges north of that village, Landres-et-St. Georges, the Bantheville road and southeastward to Brieulles. This combined objective did not call for an advance in the salient west of the Argonne, but, if reached, would mean that the enemy must get out of the forest. FIRST PHASE-SEPT. 26 TO OCT. 4

At 5:30 o'clock on the morning of Sept. 26, 1918, the greatest battle in the history of American arms began. Hundreds of our guns, pouring shell into the enemy's positions, had made of the night before a rocking, ear-shattering, flaming hell. They tore and smashed the German lines of defense to such an extent that, when our troops went over the top, they advanced to an average depth of seven miles.

On the left the height of Vauquois and Varennes fell almost without a fight. The 77th Division made some progress north of La Harazée in spite of extremely difficult terrain. The 91st, overcoming machine-gun and light-artillery resistance, reached the Véry-Montfaucon ridge by nightfall; some of its patrols fought their way into Epinonville. The 37th and 79th passed through the woods in front of them and, by evening, the latter held the slopes leading to Montfaucon. Montfaucon itself was assailed in the dusk by the 313th Infantry, with the aid of tanks, but a deluge of fire and the lack of artillery support caused the postponement of the attack, after heavy casualties.

The crossing of the Forges stream by the 33d Division was a wonderful feat.

Duckboards were thrown over the enemy wire in some places and elsewhere the soldiers waded through swampy ground under deadly fire. By noon this division had reached its objectives along the Meuse. The other two divisions of the corps met strong resistance after making an initial break in the German line.

The 37th Division entered Ivoiry and took Hill 258, southwest of the town, but was later withdrawn. The right of the 37th and the left regiment of the 79th attacked Montfaucon on the next day and, despite furious resistance, the 313th Infantry got into the town, followed by troops of the 37th, who mopped up the position. At dark the line of these divisions ran along the Ivoiry-Montfaucon road.

On the right the 33d Division held its ground along the Meuse, according to plan. The 4th pushed forward to the northern edge of the Bois de Brieulles and met strong opposition just beyond, at the Bois de Faye. The 80th Division reached its objectives, except on its left, where it was held up by the 4th Division's unsuccessful advance.

77TH REACHES OBJECTIVES

On the extreme left troops of the 77th Division had reached their objectives, while, further east, the 91st and the other two divisions of the 5th Corps (37th and 79th) were pushing forward despite stubborn resistance. The 91st made a particularly successful advance, going ahead of the divisions

on both

its flanks, but, because these could not keep up, it was forced to abandon ground won at great cost. The 91st soon ran into increasingly murderous fire, but on Sept. 29, after having cleared the Bois de Baulny and the Bois des Epinettes, it renewed its attack. Though held up at Cièrges, it cleared the wood of that name and, on the left, reached the woods north of Tronsol Farm. Another attack, ordered in the afternoon, was successful along the front of the 91st and resulted in the capture of Gesnes. On the left the line went beyond the Bois de la Morine and the Bois de Chêne Sec.

At 4 in the afternoon the commander