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than defense.

of the truth.

This is only a half statement Unquestionably, unsuccessful attack is generally more expensive than defense, particularly if the attack is pressed home with courage and resolution. On the other hand, attack so pressed home, if skillfully conducted, is rarely unsuccessful, whereas, in its later stages especially, unsuccessful defense is far more costly than attack.

Moreover, the object of all war is victory, and a purely defensive attitude can never bring about a successful decision, either in a battle or in a campaign. The idea that a war can be won by standing on the defensive and waiting for the enemy to attack is a dangerous fallacy, which owes its inception to the desire to evade the price of victory. It is an axiom that decisive success in battle can be gained only by a vigorous offensive. The principle here stated has long been recognized as being fundamental, and is based on the universal teaching of military history in all ages. The course of the present war has proved it to be correct.

To pass for a moment from the general to the particular, and consider in the light of the present war the facts upon which this axiom is based.

A defensive rôle sooner or later brings about a distinct lowering of the morale of the troops, who imagine that the enemy must be the better man, or at least more numerous, better equipped with and better served by artillery or other mechanical aids to victory. Once the mass of the defending infantry become possessed of such ideas the battle is as good as lost. An army fighting on enemy soil, especially if its standard of discipline is high, may maintain a successful defense for a protracted period, in the hope that victory may be gained elsewhere or that the enemy may tire or weaken in his resolution and accept a compromise. The resistance of the German armies was undoubtedly prolonged in this fashion, but in the end the persistence of our troops had its natural effect.

Further, a defensive policy involves the loss of the initiative, with all the consequent disadvantages to the defender. The enemy is able to choose at his own convenience the time and place of his attacks. Not being influenced himself by the threat of attack from his opponent, he can afford to take risks, and by greatly weakening his front in some places can concentrate an overwhelming force elsewhere with which to attack. The defender, on the other hand, becomes almost entirely ignorant of the dispositions and plans of his opponent, who is thus in a effect position to surprise. This was clearly exemplified during the fighting of 1918. As long as the enemy was attacking he obtained fairly full information regarding our dispositions. Captured documents show that, as soon as he was thrown once more on the defensive and the initiative returned to the Allies, he was kept in comparative

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ignorance of our plans and dispositions. The consequence was that the Allies were able to effect many surprises, both strategic and tactical.

As a further effect of the loss of the initiative and ignorance of his opponent's intentions, the defender finds it difficult to avoid a certain dispersal of his forces. Though for a variety of reasons, including the fact that we had lately been on the offensive, we were by no means entirely ignorant of the enemy's intentions in the Spring of 1918, the unavoidable uncertainty resulting from a temporary loss of the initiative did have the effect of preventing a complete concentration of our reserves behind the point of the enemy's attack.

An additional reason, peculiar to the circumstances of the present war, which in itself compelled me to refuse to adopt a purely defensive attitude so long as any other was open to me, is to be found in the geographical position of our armies. For reasons stated by me in my dispatch of July 20, 1918, we could not afford to give much ground on any part of our front. The experience of the war has shown that if the defense is to be maintained successfully, even for a limited time, it must be flexible.

END OF THE WAR

If the views set out by me in the preceding paragraphs are accepted, it will be recognized that the war did not follow any unprecedented course, and that its end was neither sudden, nor should it have been unexpected. The rapid collapse of Germany's military powers in the latter half of 1918 was the logical outcome of the fighting of the previous two years. It would not have taken place but for that period of ceaseless attrition which used up the reserves of the German armies, while the constant and growing pressure of the blockade sapped with more deadly insistence from year to year at the strength and resolution of the German people. It is in the great battles of 1916 and 1917 that we have to seek for the secret of our victory in 1918.

Doubtless the end might have come sooner had we been able to develop the military resources of our empire more rapidly and with a higher degree of concentration, or had not the defection of Russia in 1917 given our enemies a new lease of life.

So far as the military situation is concerned, in spite of the great accession of strength which Germany received as the result of the defection of Russia, the battles of 1916 and 1917 had so far weakened her armies that the effort they made in 1918 Morewas insufficient to secure victory. over, the effect of the battles of 1916 and 1917 was not confined to loss of German man power. The moral effects of those battles were enormous, both in the German Army and in Germany. By their means our soldiers established over the German soldier

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THE

BLACK LINE AT THE LEFT THE LIGHT SHADING ALONG THE

ALLIED OCCUPATION OF WESTERN GERMANY:
SHOWS BATTLEFRONT AT TIME OF ARMISTICE.
RHINE INDICATES THE NEUTRAL ZONE SEPARATING THE OCCUPIED REGION FROM
THE REST OF GERMANY

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our cavalry covered the retirement and protected the flanks of our columns against the onrush of the enemy, and on frequent occasions prevented our infantry from being overrun by the enemy's cavalry. Later in the same year at Ypres their mobility multiplied their value as a reserve, enabling them rapidly to reinforce threatened portions of our line.

During the critical period of position warfare, when the trial of strength between the opposing forces took place, the absence of room to manoeuvre made the importance of cavalry less apparent. Even under such conditions, however, valuable results may be expected from the employment of a strong force of cavalry when, after there has been severe fighting on one or more fronts, a surprise attack is made on another front. Such an occasion arose in the operations before Cambrai at the close of 1917, when the cavalry were of the greatest service; while throughout the whole period of trench fighting they constituted an important mobile re

serve.

At a later date, when circumstances found us operating once more in comparatively open country, cavalry proved themselves of value in their true rôle. During the German offensive in March, 1918, the superior mobility of cavalry fully justified their existence. At the commencement of the battle, cavalry were used under the Fifth Army over wide fronts. So great, indeed, became the need for mounted men that certain units which had but recently been dismounted were hurriedly provided with horses and did splendid service. Frequently, when it was impossible to move forward other troops in time, our mounted troops were able to fill gaps in our line and restore the situation. The absence of hostile cavalry at this period was a marked feature of the battle. Had the German command had at their disposal even two or three well-trained cavalry divisions, a wedge might have been driven between the French and British Armies. Their presence could not have failed to have added greatly to the difficulties of our task.

In the actions already referred to east of Amiens the cavalry were again able to demonstrate the great advantage which their power of rapid concentration gives them in a surprise attack. Operating in close concert with both armored cars and infantry, they pushed ahead of the latter and by anticipating the arrival of German reserves assisted materially in our success. In the battle of Oct. 8, they were responsible for saving the Cambrai-Le Cateau-St. Quentin railway from complete destruction. Finally, during the culminating operations of the war, when the German armies were falling back in disorganized masses, a new situation arose which demanded the use of mounted troops. Then our cavalry, pressing hard upon the enemy's heels, hastened his retreat and threw him into worse confusion. At such a time

the moral effect of cavalry is overwhelming and is in itself a sufficient reason for the retention of that arm.

On the morning of the armistice two British cavalry divisions were on the march east of the Scheldt, and before the orders to stop reached them they had already gained a line ten miles in front of our infantry outposts. There is no doubt that, had the advance of the cavalry been allowed to continue, the enemy's disorganized retreat would have been turned into a rout.

VALUE OF MECHANICAL CON-
TRIVANCE

A remarkable feature of the present war has been the number and variety of mechanical contrivances to which it has given birth or has brought to a higher state of perfection.

Besides the great increase in mobility made possible by the development of motor transport, heavy artillery, trench mortars, machine guns, airplanes, tanks, gas, and barbed wire have in their several spheres of action played very prominent parts in operations, and as a whole have given a greater driving power to war. The belligerent possessing a preponderance of such mechanical contrivances has found himself in a very favorable position as compared with his less well provided opponent. The general superiority of the Allies in this direction during the concluding stages of the recent struggle undoubtedly contributed powerfully to their suc

cess.

In this respect the army owes a great debt to science and to the distinguished scientific men who placed their learning and skill at the disposal of their country.

It should never be forgotten, however, that weapons of this character are incapable of effective independent action. They do not in themselves possess the power to obtain a decision, their real function being to assist the infantry to get to grips with their opponents. To place in them a reliance out of proportion to their real utility; to imagine, for example, that tanks and airplanes can take the place of infantry and artillery, would be to do a disservice to those who have the future of these new weapons most at heart by robbing them of the power to use them to their best effect.

Every mechanical device so far produced is dependent for its most effective use upon the closest possible association with other arms, and in particular with infantry and artillery. Airplanes must rely upon infantry to prevent the enemy from overrunning their airdromes, and, despite their increasing range and versatility of action, are clearly incapable in themselves of bringing about a decision. Tanks require the closest artillery support to enable them to reach their objectives without falling victims to the enemy's artillery, and are dependent upon the infantry to hold the position they have won. As an instance of the interdependence of

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This war has given no new principles; but the different mechanical appliances above mentioned-and in particular the rapid imTrovement and multiplication of airplanes, the use of immense numbers of machine guns and Lewis guns, the employment of vast quantities of barbed wire as effective obstacles, the enormous expansion of artillery and the provision of great masses of motor transport-have introduced new problems of considerable complexity concerning the effective co-operation of the different arms and services. Much thought has had to be bestowed upon determining how new devices could be combined in the best manner with the machinery already working.

The development of the Air Service is a matter of general knowledge, and figures showing something of the work done by our airmen were included in my last dispatch. The combining of their operations with those of the other arms, and particularly of the artillery, has been the subject of constant study and experiment, giving results of the very highest value. As regards machine guns, from a proportion of one gun to approximately 500 infantrymen in 1914, our establishment of machine guns and Lewis guns had risen at the end of 1918 to one machine gun or Lewis gun to approximately twenty infantrymen. This great expansion was necessarily accompanied by a modification of training and methods both for attack and defense and resulted ultimately in the establishment of the Machine Gun Corps under an Inspector General.

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other arms and services that it merits special comment.

In the first place, big changes were required in artillery organization, as well as important decisions concerning the proportions in which the different natures of artillery and artillery ammunition should be manufactured. These changes and decisions were made during 1916 and resulted in the existing artillery organization of the British armies in France.

In order to gain the elasticity essential to the quick concentration of guns at the decisive point, to enable the best use to be made of them and to facilitate ammunition supply and fire control, artillery commanders, acting under army and corps commanders, were introduced and staffs provided for them. This enabled the large concentrations of guns required for our offensives to be quickly absorbed and efficiently directed. The proportions required of guns to howitzers and of the lighter to the heavier natures were determined by certain factors, namely, the problem of siting in the comparatively limited areas available the great numbers of pieces required for an offensive; the "lives of the different types of guns and howitzers, that is, the number of rounds which can be fired from them before they become unserviceable from wear; and questions of relative accuracy and fire effect upon particular kinds of targets.

ARTILLERY METHODS

The result attained by the organization established in 1916 is in itself strong evidence of the soundness of the principles upon which it was based. It made possible a high degree of elasticity and by the full and successful exploitation of all the means placed at its disposal by science and experience, insured that the continuous artillery battle which began on the Somme should culminate, as it did, in the defeat of the enemy's guns.

The great development of air photography, sound ranging, flash spotting, air-burst ranging and aerial observation brought counterbattery work and harassing fire both by day and night to a high state of perfection. Special progress was made in the art of engaging moving targets with fire controlled by observation from airplanes and balloons. The work of the field survey sections in the location of hostile battery positions by resection and the employment of accurate maps was brought into extended use. In combination with the work of the calibration sections in the accurate calibration of guns and by careful calculation of corrections of range required to compensate for weather conditions, it became possible to a large extent to dispense with registration, whereby the chance of effecting surprise was greatly increased. In the operations east of Amiens on the 8th of August, 1918, in which over 2,000 guns were employed, practically the whole of the batteries concentrated for the

purpose of the attack opened fire for the first time on the actual morning of the assault.

The use of smoke shell for covering the advance of our infantry and masking the enemy's positions was introduced and employed with increasing frequency and effect. New forms of gas shell were made available, and their combination with the infantry attack carefully studied. The invention of a new fuse known as "106,"which was first used in the battle of Arras, 1917, enabled wire entanglements to be easily and quickly destroyed and so modified our methods of attacking organized positions. By bursting the shell the instant it touched the ground

and before it had become buried, the destructive effect of the explosion was greatly increased. It became possible to cut wire with a far less expenditure of time and ammunition, and the factor of surprise was given a larger part in operations.

Great attention was paid to the training of personnel, and, in particular, the Chapperton Down Artillery School, Salisbury Plain, was formed for training artillery brigade commanders and battery commanders, while artillery schools in France were organized for the training of subalterns and noncommissioned officers.

[Conclusion in the Next Issue]

Final Battles in Mesopotamia

Official Report of General Marshall Regarding the Victorious Operations on the Tigris-Occupation of Baku

T

HE official report of Lieut. Gen. Sir W. R. Marshall, covering the last military operations of the war against the Turks in Mesopotamia in the period between Oct. 1 and Dec. 31, 1918, was made public in London on April 12, 1919. The report falls naturally into two parts, the account of the operations on the River Tigris, and that covering the reoccupation of Baku.

General Marshall deals first with the attack on the Turkish Sixth Army, covering the approaches to Mosul, which opened on Oct. 23. The main operations on the River Tigris were intrusted to Lieut. Gen. Sir A. S. Cobb's 1st Corps, consisting of the 17th and 18th Divisions and the 7th and 11th Cavalry Brigades. Both these divisions, says General Marshall, were new formations, and, with the exception of a few units, had had no previous war experience. A serious outbreak of influenza which occurred at this time also greatly reduced the fighting strength of all units. It is a curious fact that as soon as the operations started there were practically no further cases of influenza.

The operations took place under the most arduous conditions. Long marches had to be made over waterless country, and after fighting had been in progress

for some days the tired troops were called on for renewed exertions in order to close in on the enemy and force his surrender. The result was a complete success for the British arms.

The bulk of the Turkish forces (calculated at about 9,000 rifles and fifty-nine guns) were located on the Tigris, in a position of great natural strength astride the Fatha Gorge. The enemy's right flank was protected by two formidable ranges of hills, which could not be turned owing to lack of water in the desert. Only light armored cars could operate in this direction, and a direct attack on the main position would have proved very costly. The plan adopted, therefore, was to turn the left of the Turkish position on the Tigris and force a crossing of the Lesser Zab, thus getting their right bank positions in enfilade, and so enabling our troops on that bank to attack with greater chances of success. Having cleared the left bank of the enemy, it was then intended to cut his line of retreat on Mosul by means of cavalry working up the left bank and by light armored motor cars moving round the enemy's right.

These operations, begun on Oct. 23, were brilliantly carried out. The Turks were speedily forced to abandon their strong position, and on the 25th one of

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