West v. Jefferson Woolen Mills.

Cases cited and approved: Harbison v. Knoxville Iron Co., 103 Tenn., 441; City of New York v. Miln, 11 Peters, 139; Passenger Cases, 7 Howard, 457; Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall., 36-62; Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U. S., 746; Bowman v. Railroad, 125 U. S., 465; Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S., 136; Redfoot Lake Levee District v. Dawson, 97 Tenn., 172; Smith v. The State, 100 Tenn., 494; Austin v. The State, 101 Tenn., 567; Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S., 97; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S., 356; Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S., 1; Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S., 136.

FROM JEFFERSON.

Appeal from the Chancery Court of Jefferson County.HON. M. H. GAMBLE, Chancellor.

FRANK PARK, JR., for complainants.

C. T. RANKIN and JOHN W. GREEN, for defendants.

MR. JUSTICE MCKINNEY delivered the opinion of the Court.

Roy H. Lord, while in the employ of the defendant Jefferson Woolen Mills, executed the following instrument: "To the Jefferson Woolen Mills, Jefferson City, Tennessee:

"The undersigned hereby transfers and assigns the wages now due or to become due me from you to W. A. Edgar to the amount of $300.

"There is further transferred next to J. R. Renfro my wages now due or to become due to the amount of $200. "There is next transferred and assigned my wages due or to become due to me to D. L. Butler to the amount of

West v. Jefferson Woolen Mills..

"There is next transferred and assigned to Ed Lockett my wages to become due to the amount of $400.

"There is next transferred to J. P. Nanny my wages

or to become due me to the amount of $125.

due

"There is next transferred and assigned my wages due or to become due me to Sterchi & Haun, of Knoxville, Tenn., to the amount of $30.

"There is next transferred and assigned my wages to become due to Minnis & Zirkle to the amount of $50.

"There is next assigned and transferred my wages due or to become due me to the sum of $150 to Jefferson City Hardware Company.

"There is next assigned and transferred to Hickle West my wages due or to become due me to the amount of $600.

"These several sums will be paid in the order named and out of my wages as earned from this date till all said sums are paid. This shall be authority to you to pay same and charge to my account with you.

"This Dec. 2, 1919.

ROYDEN H. LORD.

"Signed and acknowledged before me this December, 1919.

"C. T. RANKIN, Notary Public." Said instrument was presented to one of the officers of the defendant, but said assignment was not assented to by him either verbally or in writing, and the defendant did not owe the assignor any sum at the time; hence the purpose of the instrument was to assign his future earnings. While the instrument recites that the assignor assigns his "wages," the proof shows that Lord was working for a salary of $200 per month, but the record does not show that he was employed for any specified time, although he continued in the employ of the defendant for many months.

West v. Jefferson Woolen Mills.

The record suggests that this assignment was made by Lord in view of the fact that his wife was about to institute suit against him for alimony, although the instrument is not attacked for fraud. In any event, it appears that he compromised with his wife by paying her $1,000, and about seventeen days after the execution of the assignment he undertook to withdraw or annul same, and the defendant continued paying his salary direct to him.

More than two years after the execution of said assignment the present bill was filed by H. H. West and J. R. Renfro to recover from defendant the sums which said instrument directed it to pay them, it being alleged that said sums were still owing and that Lord was insolvent.

The main defense interposed by the defendant is that it is not liable because it did not assent to said assignment in writing.

Chapter 21, Acts of 1903, as amended by chapter 453, Acts of 1903, and as carried into Shannon's Code at section 4341a1, reads as follows:

"No action shall be brought whereby to charge any employer upon any assignment by any clerk, servant, or employee of such employer to any person, persons, firm, or corporation of any wages or salaries unearned at the time of such assignment, unless such assignment at the time of the execution thereof shall have been assented to in writing by such employer."

To meet this defense counsel for complainants insist that the foregoing statute is unconstitutional, first, because it contravenes section 20, article 1, of the Constitution of Tennessee, which provides that "no retrospective law, or law impairing the obligations of contracts, shall be made."

West v. Jefferson Woolen Mills.

Counsel does not point out the manner in which said statute contravenes the provision of the, Constitution set forth above, and from a reading of the statute it is apparent to us that it is not a retrospective law, nor does it impair the obligations of contracts, as it deals solely with contracts. to be made in the future.

In Greenfield v. Dorris, 1 Sneed, 548, this court said: “As to mortgages and deeds of trust made since the law was passed, they will be construed and governed by it. For there is no question as to the power of the State to declare the force and effect of future contracts made and to be executed in it."

It is next insisted that said statute violates section 8, article 1, of the State Constitution, which is as follows:

"No man shall be taken or imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner destroyed or deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land."

This court, in Ogilvie v. Hailey, 141 Tenn., 392, 210 S. W., 645, said:

"The later decisions of this court and of the federal supreme court have conceded to the legislature a very wide range of discretion in the matter of classification in police statutes and revenue statutes. The idea is that, if any possible reason can be conceived to justify the classification, it will be upheld."

The great weight of authority sustains the validity of such statutes. See notes to Massie v. Cessna (Ill.), 28 L. R. A. (N. S.), 1108, and Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell (Mass.), 43 L. R. A. (N. S.), 746, also reported in 222 U. S., 225, 32 Sup. Ct., 74, 56 L. Ed., 175, Ann. Cas., 1913B, 529.

West v. Jefferson Woolen Mills.

Counsel for complainants seems to concede that by the weight of authority the statute could be sustained under the police power had it been limited to "wages." but contend that "salaries" is a much broader and more comprehensive term, which cannot be upheld under the police power, and cite the case of Massie v. Cessna, supra.

In that case the first section of the statute under consideration was as follows:

"No assignment of the wages or salary of any person shall be valid, so as to vest in the assignee any beneficial interest, either at law or in equity, unless such assignment shall be in writing, signed by the assignor and acknowledged in person by the assignor before a justice of the peace in and for the township in which the assignor resides, and entered by such justice upon his docket, and unless, within three days from the date of the execution and acknowledgment of such assignment, a true and complete copy of said assignment and of the certificate of its acknowledgment shall be served upon the person, firm, or corporation from whom such wages or salary is due or is to become due, in the same manner that the summons in chancery is now required by law to be served: Provided, further, that no assignment of wages or salary by a married person shall be valid unless the same is also executed and acknowledged as above, by the assignor's wife or husband, as the case may be."

The fourth section of said statute provided that all assignments of wages to be earned in whole or in part, more than six months from and after the making of the assignment, shall be absolutely void.

The court held the act unconstitutional upon several grounds, and, in dealing with the question here involved, said: