House v. Creveling.

The state equalization board and the fire prevention commissioner are not judicial officers. They are executive officers or administrative officers, and a statute designed to deal with the executive part of the government may properly legislate concerning these officials.

It is true that quasi judicial powers are conferred on such officers, but that does not make them judicial officers. In Richardson v. Young, 122 Tenn., 471, 125 S. W., 664, it is shown that as a matter of practice it has been found impossible to entirely preserve the theoretical lines between the three departments of government. In Woods v. State, 130 Tenn., 100, 169 S. W., 558, L. R. A., 1915F, 531, it is noted that judicial powers are commonly conferred on sheriffs, clerks of courts, notaries public, registers of deeds, district attorneys general, and other administrative officers.

We know, too, that the power to make rules is commonly given to boards and commissions. 12 C. J. 847; Woods v. State, supra. These rules have the force of statutes, and their formulation is really the exercise of a legislative power.

So the fact that certain limited judicial and legislative powers are conferred upon executive officers does not change their status as such officers, nor is it inappropriate or beyond the scope of a statute dealing with executive officers to confer such powers.

Since it is the customary and usual thing to endow executive officers with some legislative and judicial authority, we do not think such matter in this act made it broader than its aption.

The statute before us undertakes to deal, it is said, with about sixty commissions, boards, departments, and officers

House v. Creveling..

prosecuting the greater part of the various activities of the state government. It is urged that all these functionaries cannot be grouped and their duties regulated in one statute, and that an act affecting them all is omnibus legislation and in violation of the constitutional provision against more than one subject in one act.

It has been held in Tennessee since Cannon v. Mathes, 55 Tenn. (8 Heisk.), 504, that the generality of a title is not objectionable if not made a cover for legislation incongruous in itself, and that the legislature must determine for itself how broad and comprehensive the object of the statute shall be. Our cases are very numerous. The last review of thein is contained in State v. Cumberland Club, 136 Tenn., 84, 188 S. W., 583.

We would heistate to say what is the limit, if any, to the scope of an act of the legislature suitably entitled. We have many acts covering very wide fields.

For instance, chapter 142 of the Acts of 1875 is entitled "An act to provide for the organization of corporations." In this statute and the amendments thereto is contained most of the corporation law of Tennessee, and its validity has not been seriously questioned. Railroad v. Transportation Co., 128 Tenn., 277, 160 S. W., 522.

In State v. McCann, 72 Tenn. (4 Lea), 17, the court held an act to contain but one subject that dealt with the fees of the clerks of all the courts in this State, the county trustees, registers of deeds, the district attorneys, and the Secretary of State.

In Carroll v. Alsup, 107 Tenn., 257, 64 S. W., 193, a revenue bill with all its many provisions was held to contain but one subject.

House v. Creveling.

Our uniform statutes, the Negotiable Instruments Law, the Sales Law, the Partnership Law, and others are of the widest range, and cover a multitude of matters, and yet their validity is not doubted.

We cannot say that an act which undertakes to reorganize the administration of the State is omnibus legislation, although it may affect sixty officials, so long as unity of purpose is preserved.

The question as to whether the various provisions of an act are congruous and germane is largely a question of fact to be determined upon our knowledge of affairs. Frazier v. Railroad, 88 Tenn., 138, 12 S. W., 537.

Upon careful examination of the statute before us, we think its object or purpose is sufficiently expressed in the title, and that its provisions are germane to the title, and not incongruous with each other.

Some reference is made to authorities in other states upon the limits of a legislative enactment. We cannot go into these, since we have so many cases of our own.

The authorities generally are considered in Lewis' Sutherland on Statutory Construction, section 117, and the author states that "there is no constitutional restriction as to the scope or magnitude of the single subject of a legislative act." It may be noted that the supreme court of Kansas held that "An act to establish a code of laws;" embraced but a single subject or object; yet it might include all the state's general statutes. Bowman v. Cockrill, 6 Kan., 311.

Before passing we should notice a statement in Acklen v. Thompson, 122 Tenn., 43, 126 S. W., 730, 135 Am. St. Rep., 851, to the effect that a single act could not be passed containing provisions for the protection of game animals,

House v. Creveling.

fish, and birds, and the preservation of the forests of the State. It could not have been intended by this remark to mean that a single act could not be passed conferring upon an official the right to enforce the laws on all these subjects. Certainly a court might be created and given authority by one act to enforce the laws enacted for the protection of game animals, fish, and birds, and the preservation of the forests, and at the same time to enforce all the other criminal laws of the State.

We think the statute under consideration is expressly repealing. This purpose is expressed both in caption and body. Shelton v. State, 96 Tenn., 521, 32 S. W., 967; Turner v. State, 111 Tenn., 593, 69 S. W., 774; Stinnett v. State, 142 Tenn., 94, 217 S. W., 343.

The statute by abolishing numerou offices created by former acts, the incumbents of which offices were to direct the various activities to which said acts devoted the State, thereby, repealed such portions of said former acts as immediately provided for their execution. In section 59 of the act before us some forty-nine offices, commissions, boards, etc., are abolished.

We think the statute does recite in its caption and other wise the title or substance of the laws in port repealed.

Where an act proposes to repeal or amend several laws relating to one subject, it is not neecssary for it to recite the title or substance of each previous law separately. One descriptive word or phrase may be employed if it conveys the purport of all the earlier statutes. Thus two acts establishing and defining the powers of the municipal corporation of the city of Knoxville were sufficiently identified by mention of them as the "charter of said city” in a later

House v. Creveling.

ɛmendatory statute. Heiskell v. City of Knoxville, 136 Tenn., 376, 189 S. W., 857.

To the same effect is Van Dyke v. Thompson, 136 Tenn., 136, 189 S. W., 62, where the reference was to the charter of Chattanooga.

Again it was held that an amendatory statute made apt reference to our various liquor iaws as "the law of the State of Tennessee prohibiting the man' acture, sale, importation, transportation or possession of intoxicating liquors." Minter v. State, 145 Tenn., 678, 238 S. W., 89.

The substance of all the laws directly trimmed by the act of January 31, 1923, was the creation of officials to carry on for the state various efforts undertaken. These were all executive or adminis.rative officials. Such laws practically furnished the State its administration, and a statute entitled "An act to reorganize the administration of the State, abolishing certain offices, repealing

acts and parts of acts," unerringly

pointed to the laws it was designed to reach.

Such reference is clearer and carries sharper notice of the general scope of the repeal than had an effort been made to recite in haec verba all the titles of all the previous acts. This would have made a voluminous caption indeed. Members of the legislature were plainly notified by this caption that this act proposed to operate on the earlier laws setting up the administration of the State.

In a late case it was said: "This court has established a liberal interpretation in upholding amendatory acts where the caption and the body of the act taker as a whole, and from a practical standpoint, indicate the subject of the legislation sought to be affected." Greenwood v. Rickman, 145 Tenn., 361, 235 S. W., 425.