State ex rel. v. City of Memphis. called upon to determine the objects and purposes for which the school funds shall be expended, within the limits of the authority granted, which will prove beneficial to nd promote the interests of education, and to expend money daily for such purposes. "It is admitted that the securing of group insurance for the teachers enables the board of education to procure a better class of teachers, and prevents frequent changes in the teaching force. This is certainly desirable and conducive to the 'proper conduct of the public schools.' School funds are now being spent in all the school districts of the State, and in many, if not all, of the other States, for purposes and objects unquestionably proper, gauged by our advancing civilization, which a quarter of a century ago would have been considered highly improper. In many of the schools we have mechanical instruction in many of the trades and professions which not so many years ago would not have been tolerated. The teaching of music, arts, and science has become a recognized necessity. Many things are provided now for the comfort and convenience of both teachers and pupils which heretofore would have been prohibited by injunction as an improper expenditure of public funds. In some of the schools of the State gymnasiums, swimming pools, playgrounds, and other forms of recreation, amusement, and diversion are provided, because it is recognized by advanced public sentiment that such instrumentalities are calculated to and do promote the cause of education, and tend to better the schools and keep the pupils and teachers satisfied and contented. Many corporations employing large numbers of laborers throughout the country carry group insurance on such employees with the same object in view as that which evidently was State ex rel. v. City of Memphis. in the minds of the members of the board of education of the city of Albuquerque when the insurance in question was purchased. In many parts of the State we have consolidated schools, where conveyances are hired, or means of transportation provided, by which pupils living at long distances from the school are transported to and from the consolidated school. The power of boards of education to do so has never been questioned, because it is recognized that better schools are thus provided, and the cause of education is promoted. "It is clear that the courts should not interfere with the discretion intrusted to boards of education under the statute, unless it plainly appears that there has been a gross abuse of such discretion, and that the funds are being spent for purposes and objects which have no relation to the public schools. This cannot be said in this case." The question was again before the supreme court of New Mexico in the case of Bowers v. City of Albuquerque, 27 N. M., 291, 200 Pac., 421, involving the carrying of group insurance on employees of the city, and upon the authority of the previous case the court upheld the right. A similar question was held invalid by a judge of an inferior court in New York, but in the court of appeals his action was not passed upon, the court saying: "No question is made that relator has not tak en proper steps to the enforcement of its claim, assuming that the city had the legal right to contract. . The record is too fragmentary to enable the court to decide the fundamental question as to the right of the city to take out the policy which has actually been issued to it and the duty of the city to pay the premium thereon. State ex rel. v. City of Memphis. "1. It does not appear that the bill of relator has been audited or allowed by the common council nor that the comptroller has been ordered to pay the same, nor that such audit, allowance and order are unnecessary, nor that the comptroller has legal authority to pay the relator. Peremptory mandamus will not lie unless it appears without contradiction that it is the clear legal duty of the comptroller to pay the bill. "2. The record does not set forth the facts needful to enable the court to determine the question argued. The insurance policy actually issued is not before us. We are left in ignorance as to its terms. It does not appear whether or not the insurance continues to cover the life of an employee after he voluntarily leaves the service of the city. The opinion of BORST, J., at special term refers to disability benefits but so far as the record shows the policy is one of life insurance only. It does not appear that employees disabled before the policy was issued are excluded from its benefits. It does not appear that the insurance is not unauthorized as a donation or as extra compensation (Matter of Mahon, 171 N. Y., 263) as to any of the employees of the city. The inadequacy of the record in this and other respects precludes us from examining the question as to the power of the city to take out group life insurance for the benefit of its employees who may thereafter die or become disabled while in the service of the city. The order should therefore be affirmed, with costs. Order affirmed." People of New York, etc., v. Dibble, 231 N. Y., 593, 132 N. E., 901. We are therefore of the opinion that the action of the city in taking out said group insurance was in no sense il State ex rel. v. City of Memphis. legal, and that the expenditure of said fund was for a public purpose. It is contended by the complainants that chapter 32 of the Acts of 1899, under which the water plant of the city of Memphis is operated, is invalid, for the reason that it was enacted for the special benefit of Memphis, and confers rights and privileges upon that city not enjoyed by the other cities of the state. In Todtenhausen v. Knox County, 132 Tenn., 172, 177 S. W., 487, it was held otherwise. Independently of this, the city had a right to operate a waterworks system, and to employ laborers, tix their compensation, etc. This is an important case, and we take this means of expressing our gratitude to the attorney-general and to counsel for the defendants for the able manner in which the case was briefed and argued. The Chancellor held the action of the city in taking out said policy of insurance valid, and his decree will be affirmed, with costs. Wallwork v. City of Nashville. LOUISE WALLWORK v. CITY OF NASHVILLE et al.* (Nashville. December Term, 1922.) 1. CHARITIES. Charitable municipal hospital not liable for negligence of employees, even where fees paid by patient. A charitable municipal hospital is exempt from liability, due to the negligence of its employees, even where fees were paid by the patient injured by such negligence. (Post, pp. 690-697.) Cases cited and approved: Abston v. Waldon Academy, 118 Tenn., 24; Gamble v. Vanderbilt University, 138 Tenn., 616; Weston v. Hospital of St. Vincent, 131 Va., 587; Taylor v. Flower Deaconess Home & Hospital, 104 Ohio St., 61; Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 211 N. Y., 125; Morgan v. Shelbyville, 121 S. W., 617; Jones v. City of Corbin, 98 S. W., 100; Maxmilian v. New York, 62 N. Y., 160. Cases cited and distinguished: Browder v. City of Henderson, 182 Ky.. 771; Bell v. City of Cincinnati, 80 Ohio St., 1; Benton v. Boston City of Hospital, 140 Mass., 13; Cook, Adm'r, v. John N. Norton Memorial Infirmary, 180 Ky., 331; Caroline Tollefson, Adm'x, v. City of Ottawa, 228 Ill., 134; Watson v. City of Atlanta, 136 Ga., 370; Love v. City of Atlanta, 95 Ga., 129. 2. CHARITIES. City and hospital commissioners held not liable for injuries to pay patient in charitable hospital due to nurse's negligence. Where plaintiff, a pay patient in a charitable municipal hospital, underwent an operation and was severely burned upon the feet by a hot water bottle placed in her bed by hospital employees before she recovered from the effects of the anæsthetic, it was not error to direct a verdict for the city and hospital commissioners, there being no claim that they did not exercise ordinary care in selecting the employees, the hospital existing for purely governmental purposes under the exclusive ownership and control of the city. (Post, pp. 697, 698.) *On liability of privately conducted charity for personal injuries, see notes in 14 A. L. R., 572, 23 A. L. R., 923. On liability of charitable institutions for personal injuries, see notes in 23 L. R. A., 200; 7 L. R. A., (N. S.), 481; 10 L. R. A. (N. S.), 74; 22 L. R. A. (N. S.), 486; 32 L. R. A. (N. S.), 62; 42 L. R. A. (N. S.), 144; 52 L. R. A. (N. S.), 505; 6 B. R. C., 552, |