described him as more eminent in his time as a genial wit and humorist in the social circle, than as a philosopher; and he placed Franklin always in the same category with Talleyrand. While he conceded to Hamilton great talent, he represented him as a parasite of Washington, unamiable and ungenerous toward all others. When I referred to the histories of the Revolution, and especially to Marshall's Life of Washington, as differing from his own representations, he replied that the histories were all partial, interested, ' unreliable, and false.' 'I was myself present,' said he, at a skirmish which he had with the enemy at Monmouth, N. J. Of course I well knew what occurred there. I have read accounts of that battle from a dozen different histories, and if it were not that the date of the battle and the place where it was fought were mentioned, I should not recognize in the description that it was the battle of Monmouth at all.' He was severely satirical upon Jefferson, who he said he verily believed would have run away from Monticello, if he had heard that he (Burr) had approached as near as Alexandria or Georgetown."

WE

E must turn back to New England far more quickly than is agreeable to meet the next attempt to break up the Union. The election of Jefferson had been a shock to conservatism in both Church and State; but as we have seen, opposition gave way before the splendid success and moderation of his administration. Unfortunately our foreign relations during his second term grew more and more strained. The larger part of the stipulations of the Jay treaty terminated in 1804. England had however overreached even that unjust agreement. Our neutral commerce

was held open to seizure and confiscation. The right was asserted by her war vessels to overhaul our ships and impress seamen. If we had secured independence, England meant to make it worth to us as little as possible. The king sent out a proclamation affirming the right of Great Britain to secure her own seamen wherever found. Pickering, always careful to be on the wrong side, defended the British claim. Adams insisted that the doctrine was novel and unjustifiable. "It is," he said, "in direct contradiction and violation. of every principle of English liberty. Is there any reason why another proclamation should not appear

200

commanding all the officers of the English army in Canada to go over the line, and take by force all the king's subjects they can find in our villages?" The principle was precisely the same; but many Federals were willing to submit to the insolence on the ocean.

Meanwhile the struggle between France and England had been renewed on the seas. It was necessary for each one to secure the alliance of the United States, or to compel subservience. In 1806 England declared all the French ports blockaded. France retorted with a similar fulmination. It was all a matter of paper; nevertheless it subjected neutral ships to danger from both parties. Our shippers for the most part favored England, believing her to be the master of the ocean. The government looking at the justice of the case, felt that France was at least the less unjust of the two. But France was obnoxious in another direction. Our boundary lines with Florida, were under dispute; and Talleyrand would not permit Spain to accede to our demands. For a time there was about equal danger of war in three directions. There was a short period when Jefferson was almost persuaded to seek English alliance in a war against Spain and France. Monroe negotiated a new treaty with Great Britain; but it was a stingy affair, yielding no material point to the United States; and especially ignoring the question of impressment. It was rejected at once by our executive, without submitting it to Congress. English war vessels coasted along our shores to overhaul our ships; and even entered our harbors in chase of their prey. The Chesapeake, sailing from Hampton Roads in August of 1807, was overhauled by the British man-of-war Leopard; and not yielding to the orders of the admiral, was fired upon until the American flag was lowered. Embargo

was recommended by the President as a temporary expedient. It was a sacrifice of a nature so serious that it could be excusable only in a case like that in which the Union was then placed. It had this advantage that it was neither tame submission, nor was it to proclaim a war, which would be fought hopelessly on our part. It was simply a resolution to withdraw from the trade of the nations. It was not much unlike the scheme so long pursued by China and Japan, of shutting their ports against the world. Nominally to ensure the safety of our ships from capture, it was intended to make the inhabitants of Great Britain and France suffer for lack of goods, only to be secured from America. But while this would be endurable for an agricultural race, it could create only misery for a commercial people. The embargo was specially injurious to New England shipping. Acquiescing for a time under the lead of the Adams, both father and son, Joseph Story, Eustis, and others, those States soon grew restive. For some years past New England had become less and less agricultural; and more and more manufacturing and commercial. It could not eat its goods; it must ship them to market. Its ships were rotting at the wharves.

The almost suppressed leaders of 1804 came from their retreat. Pickering denounced the embargo as a first step to war with England. The Massachusetts legislature, which at first endorsed the measure, in its next session condemned it. 1808 brought the election of Madison; a triumph of Republicanism in spite of growing disaffection with the embargo. In the early part of 1809 a Force Bill was passed by Congress, which allowed the use of the army and navy in enforcing the embargo, and making seizures. In the Boston papers

this act was printed in mourning. Public meetings were held memorializing the legislature. The legislature took strong ground in the way of justifying Great Britain, and demanding of Congress the repeal of the embargo, and a declaration of war at once with France. Pickering raged with great heat; but Cabot managed to suppress his most violent fulminations. The Massachusetts legislature adopted a report intensely British, and declaring the Enforcement Act "not legally binding." Resistance was recommended. It was nullification as strong as that of 1798. Preachers preached it; politicians harangued it. Connecticut was not one whit behind her neighbor. John Quincy Adams vouches that the Essex Junto planned a New England convention to consider secession. DeWitt Clinton, openly charging this in the New York legislature, secured the passage of strong resolutions at Albany to sustain the national policy. The New York Federalists retorted that the State was the victim of the Clintons, who ruled as political bosses. They issued an Address from Albany in which they said: "Bonaparte considered the embargo as evidence of our submission to his will, and there is too much reason to believe it was so intended by our government. Yet when the freemen of New England are unwilling to be manacled as slaves, the legislature of this State denounces their resolutions as seditions." Adams was so outspoken in opposition to plotters that the Massachusetts legislature passed a vote of censure; and he resigned as Senator from that State. But New England was really suffering; and this time it was not the Federalist leaders only who created the revolt. The people peppered Washington with protests. Of the five New England States Mr. Madison carried only Vermont in 1808.